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
e ﬁrst (two page) philosophy paper I ever wrote was for René vanWouden-
berg’s class ‘Introduction to Metaphysics’, which I took my ﬁrst semester of
college. I wrote on dualism and physicalism; in particular, I tried to come up
with arguments against physicalism, which I thought was an underdeveloped
topic in the book we read for the class, Peter van Inwagen’sMetaphysics. Little
did I know that four years later I would be taking a class with Van Inwagen
himself and, soon afterwards, starting a four-year research project about the
problems of physicalism (which I now prefer to call ‘naturalism’). It has been
ten years since I wrote my ﬁrst philosophy paper and four years since I started
working on this dissertation, and I am happy to report that I am still fascinated
by the same topic.
Over the past four years I have learned a great deal about naturalism and
subjectivity, how to do (and not to do) research, how to write more clearly,
and how to overcome ‘feeling stuck’. But most of all I have learned that it
takes determination and discipline to write a dissertation. Yet discipline and
determination, though necessary, are not, in my experience, suﬃcient for
success. I could not have written this dissertation without the help and support
of many others, whom I am greatly indebted to and would like to thank here.
First of all, I want to thank my director, René van Woudenberg, who has
greatly shaped my philosophical thinking ever since the very ﬁrst class I took
with him. I have been very fortunate to work so closely with René throughout
college and graduate school, and I have learned more than I can say from him
both as a philosopher and as a person. I would like to thank René for teaching
me what it means to be a philosopher, for trusting me to carry out this project,
for his detailed and helpful comments on papers and drafts of chapters, and for
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encouragingme every step of the way. I could not have written this dissertation
without his unrelenting support.
I also wish to thankmy co-director, Leopold Stubenberg, for his comments
and suggestions for improvement on an earlier draft of this dissertation. I
greatly enjoyed and learned very much from the classes I took with him at the
University of Notre Dame.
is project was carried out at the Department of Philosophy at the Vrije
Universiteit Amsterdam. I want to thank the board for its hospitality and for
allowing me to spend a semester at the University of Notre Dame as a visiting
student. My time at Notre Dame proved to be very inspirational through
the classes I attended and the many discussions I had with other graduate
students. I would like to thank the University of Notre Dame, especially the
Department of Philosophy, for its part in making this possible. At the Vrije
Universiteit, the research group provided a wonderful opportunity to get feed-
back on earlier drafts of the dissertation. I am grateful to the members of this
group for their helpful comments and suggestions, especially Arianna Betti,
Martijn Blaauw, Lieven Decock, Rik Peels and Jeroen de Ridder. I would like
to give a special thanks to Jeroen for his detailed comments on Chapter .
In the very last stage I got help from a couple of diﬀerent directions. First,
I want to thank my mother-in-law, Margo Tepley, for proofreading and copy-
editing the entire manuscript. I am very grateful for her incredible eﬀort,
and any remaining errors are, of course, entirely my responsibility. Second,
I am very happy to have chosen Zink Typograﬁe for designing the lay-out
of my dissertation. I want to thank Job and Roel Zinkstok for their fast and
professional work.
On a more personal note, I would like to take the opportunity to thank
my parents, Tom Berk and Ineke Slootweg, for encouraging me to study and
pursue a Ph.D. in philosophy and for all their advice, love, and support. I
am very lucky to have them as my parents. I also want to thank my oma,
Oma Slootweg, for being the best oma in the entire world. Last but not least,
I want to thank my husband, Joshua Tepley, for reading earlier drafts of this
dissertation, for talking withme (and listening tome talk) aboutmy project on
a daily basis, and for all the times philosophy was far from our minds (at least
from mine). I beneﬁted greatly from sharing the intellectual and emotional
burden of writing a dissertation with a fellow philosopher who knows, from
his own experience, what it is like to write a philosophy dissertation.

e main question that this dissertation aims at answering is whether the
subjectivity of experience is compatible with naturalism or not. In order to
be able to establish this, two sub-questions need answering ﬁrst: What is the
subjectivity of experience? And: What is naturalism? However, before doing
even so much, we need to pause and consider why one should care to ask the
question whether the subjectivity of experience is compatible with naturalism.
Let me give a short summary of the answer before going on to explain
it in more detail. A great many philosophers think that the subjectivity of
experience is a very important phenomenon, not just in theory or for philos-
ophy, but also in and for (daily) life. Because this real-life phenomenon is so
important, it ought to have its place in, or at least be compatible with, any
metaphysics or ontology that is to be taken seriously, especially one which is
frequently adopted and enjoys popularity. Nowadays the ontology that is by
far the most popular is naturalism; virtually everyone, scientists, philosophers
and laymen alike, claim to be naturalists, a trend which will most likely
only expand in the near future. Given the importance of the subjectivity
of experience and the popularity of naturalism, whether the phenomenon
of subjectivity can be accounted for or have its place within a naturalistic
ontology is a relevant and pressing question. Maybe unnecessary to add, I
think that it is very important for this phenomenon to be compatible with
this theory, and if it is not, I think this is a good reason to reject naturalism.
e main part of this introduction will be spent giving the long answer to
the question we have just answered brieﬂy. e question why we should care
about this project breaks up into three preliminary questions:Why and how is
the subjectivity of experience important? is will be addressed in section .
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Why would we want to know whether it is compatible with naturalism in
particular, instead of with a diﬀerent ontology? is will be addressed in
section . Finally, what can we say about the relation between the subjectivity
of experience and naturalism right now and what does it mean for two things
to be compatible or incompatible with one another? is will be addressed in
section .
Once we have established this project to be worthwhile, section  concerns
the game plan, i.e. how this project is to be executed, and the road mapping,
i.e. how this dissertation is organized. I will go over the functions and outlines
of each chapter, present the questions that are central in it and give an overview
of the answers to these questions and the conclusions we can subsequently
draw.
Finally, in section  I will specify how this project relates to and diﬀers
from other projects and debates in its vicinity and what is unique about it.
       
My short answer to the question why we should care whether the subjectivity
of experience is compatible with naturalism contains a number of controver-
sial claims. One of these claims is: e subjectivity of experience is a very
important phenomenon, not just in theory or for philosophy, but in and for
(daily) life. What do I mean when I say that the subjectivity of experience is
an important phenomenon?What is the subjectivity of experience, in the ﬁrst
place?
e question what the subjectivity of experience exactly is will be ad-
dressed in the ﬁrst and second chapters in detail. For now we’ll have to work
with an intuitive, pre-theoretical understanding of what it means for experi-
ence to be subjective. ere are many diﬀerent senses in which experience can
be said to be subjective (we will distinguish ﬁve), but here I will focus on one
of them and see why it is important. e sense in which experience can be
said to be subjective that I will focus on here is also called the phenomenal
character or qualia of experience. One way to get a grasp on this concept is by
realizing that there is something about experience or experiences that makes
us think that they are diﬀerent in kind than objects such as tables and chairs.
Even though we (can) have tables and chairs, we seem to think that we have
experiences in a diﬀerent way. Without trying to come up with philosophical
distinctions (e.g., maybe experiences are ‘mental’ or ‘immaterial’, whereas
tables and chairs are ‘physical’ or ‘material’; or maybe experiences are not
objects, and tables and chairs might be), let’s try to describe what is special
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about having experiences. It seems that what is special about experiences is
that we are so intimately related to our own experiences – more so than to
our possessions – and in a way in which no one else is or can be. Moreover,
we don’t just have our experiences, but there is something it is like to have
them. Let’s look at an informal description of this aspect of ‘the subjective
quality of experience’ by Chalmers to get a better sense of it:
Whenwe perceive, think, and act, there is a whir of causation and information process-
ing, but this processing does not usually go on in the dark. ere is also an internal
aspect; there is something it feels like to be a cognitive agent. is internal aspect
is conscious experience. Conscious experiences range from vivid color sensations to
experiences of the faintest background aromas; from hard-edged pains to the elusive
experience of thoughts on the tip of one’s tongue; frommundane sounds and smells to
the encompassing grandeur of musical experience; from the triviality of a nagging itch
to the weight of a deep existential angst; from the speciﬁcity of the taste of peppermint
to the generality of one’s experience of selfhood. All these have a distinct experienced
quality. All are prominent parts of the inner life of the mind.
e fact that experiences are subjective in this sense thus means that experi-
ences have an internal aspect: there is something it is like for us to have them.
Granted, for now, this remains a rather vague description of the subjectivity
of experience, but it will do for the purposes of the current section.
Why would one think that subjective experiences are important? I will
proceed by discussing a number of reasons to think subjective experiences are
important found in three diﬀerent papers in the literature after which I will
add some reasons of my own.
In Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness Perry oﬀers two reasons why
subjective experience is important. e ﬁrst reason he gives, is that subjective
experiences are our main motivation(s) for doing anything in life. Because our
experiences are subjective, i.e. because there is something it is like to have our
experiences, we choose to do certain things and avoid others. Let me explain.
If there was nothing it was like for you to eat chocolate muﬃns, you would
not pursue buying or baking and eating them. And if there was nothing it
was like for you to be in pain, you would not make choices to avoid being in
pain when you can. Because experiences are subjective we are able to pursue
and/or avoid things (or situations or events) as we see ﬁt. Needless to say,
our subjective experiences are not our only motivations and do not solely
determine our choices – reasoning and testimony are also important in this
respect and ought to be. However, the fact that experiences have a subjective
 Chalmers : .
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nature (or subjective character) helps us a great deal in making choices. Perry
formulates this ﬁrst reason to think that subjective experiences are important
as follows:
Some subjective characters are very important because they are pleasant or unpleasant.
Some experiences are very pleasant and others are unpleasant. is is a property they
have in virtue of their subjective characters. Seeking the pleasant and avoiding the
unpleasant is one of the keys to animal and human motivation.
But subjective experiences are not only sources of motivation. Perry’s second
reason for thinking that subjective experiences are important is that they pro-
vide us with important information. is information includes keys about
which things we like and don’t like, but it goes beyond that. As Perry writes:
Some subjective characters are important because they carry crucial information.
When I hit my thumb with a hammer, the fact that my thumb is in pain carries
the information that there is something wrong with my thumb.
e experience of hitting your thumb with a hammer has a subjective char-
acter in the sense that there is something it is like to hit your thumb with
a hammer: it is very unpleasant. According to Perry, subjective experiences
such as these do not only motivate us to avoid pain in the future (and be
more careful when using a hammer), they do more: these experiences give us
information. If the left side of my thumb hurts, I know this is the spot where
I hit it and this is the spot that needs to be treated.
More generally, it can be helpful to consider how a doctor does her work.
In addition to listening to your heart and taking an X-ray of your lungs, a
doctor will ask you questions about your symptoms (i.e. your experiences of
pain). Where the pain is located and whether it’s a sharp or a dull pain (i.e. the
way you experience your pain) is important information for a doctor, which
she needs in order to form an accurate diagnosis. Subjective experiences thus
carry useful information.
In the introduction toe View From Within Varela and Shear also make
the point that the subjectivity of experience is an important phenomenon
which cannot be sidestepped by science:
To accept experience as a domain to be explored is to accept the evidence that life and
mind includes [sic] that ﬁrst person dimension which is a trademark of our on-going
 Perry : .
 Ibid.: .
  xv
existence. To deprive our scientiﬁc examination of this phenomenal realm amounts
to either amputating human life of its most intimate domains, or else denying science
explanatory access to it. In both cases the move is unsatisfactory.
In this passage, Varela and Shear call ‘the ﬁrst person dimension’, of which
subjective experience is at least part, ‘a trademark of our ongoing existence’,
which indicates just how important it is in daily life. Varela and Shear think
that subjective experiences are essential for human activity and ‘life involving
the use of one’s own mind’. ey also think that it is because of subjective
experiences that we are able to change. As they put it:
Experience in human practices is the privileged entry point for change mediated by
professional interventions of all kinds, such as education and learning, sports training,
and psychotherapy.
By recognizing that we have subjective experiences and by working with them
we can change; teachers, (sport) coaches and psychotherapists can help us
achieve this. A doctor’s work would be harder if subjective experience was not
recognized; the work of teachers, sports coaches and psychotherapists would
be impossible.
In considering the importance of subjective experiences, the aesthetic as-
pect should not be overlooked. In e Mental and the Physical Feigl records
this dialogue between Einstein and himself:
Feigl: wouldn’t the qualities of immediate experience be left out in a perfect physical
representation of the universe?
Einstein: Why without them, the world would be nothing but a pile of [dirt]!
Without subjective experience (i.e. the ‘qualities of experience’) we would
not be able to enjoy and appreciate art or any beauty in the world. After all,
aesthetic experience would not be possible if experience wasn’t subjective.e
value of art, poetry and theatre could not be recognized without subjective
experience and, in so far as this value depends on our recognition of it, there
would not be any such value. Not just the beauty and value of art, but the
beauty and value of anything in (daily) life depends (partly, obviously) on
our ability to have aesthetic experiences. Without the smell of coﬀee, the way
we see the sunlight shine on the trees, the taste of food, the sound of music,
 Varela & Shear : .
 Ibid.
 Feigl .
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and so on, the world would be a dreary and dark place. Similarly, it can be
questioned if spiritual and religious experience would be possible if experience
was not subjective.
In addition to the reasons discussed above, which reasons do I personally
have for thinking that the subjectivity of experience is so important? I think
it is so important because it is through experiences that we know the world
and, in this sense, experiences are the part of the world with which we are most
familiar. And, not just the world but also our life or consciousness consists, in a
sense, of all our experiences strung together. Even though we (can) consciously
interpret our experiences, the way they seem to us, or what it is like to have
them, colors the way we perceive the world and our lives. Moreover, the fact
that there is an ‘inner aspect’ to experience, to borrow Chalmers’ term, is,
despite its familiarity, so puzzling and fascinating when we stop and think
about it. Why and how do we have experiences at all? And is there a sense in
which we can share our experiences, or can we not escape living in our own
worlds to a certain extent? I think it is fascinating that there are subjective
experiences in the ﬁrst place and I think it is crucial to understand them and
their place (in a naturalistic world) better.
  
Why are we interested in knowing whether the subjectivity of experience is
compatible with naturalism and not with any other ontology? ere are two
reasons for focusing on naturalism.
First, as I pointed out in my short answer to the question why one should
care about this project, the ontology which is by far the most popular today
is naturalism. As said, virtually everyone, scientists, philosophers and laymen
alike, claims to be a naturalist, or for that matter, a physicalist or a materialist.
Naturalism, physicalism and materialism are views that are very closely re-
lated, as will be extensively discussed in Chapter . Whatever the cause of this
popularity, which might be due to fashion or to the arguments in favor of this
view (or a combination of both), naturalism is everywhere and it seems that
it will be for at least a while. Because it is so popular, questions concerning
naturalism are highly relevant and important to be asked. Potential problems
or threats to the view should be carefully considered since whether they can
be averted concerns many people, i.e. naturalists.
Second, on the surface, there appears to be a tension between naturalism
and the subjectivity of experience. It is often assumed or mentioned that the
subjectivity of experience is a problem for naturalism without explaining ex-
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actly why and how it is.e fact that there is surface tension together with the
fact that it is not often made explicit why exactly the subjectivity of experience
and naturalism don’t go together calls for an in-depth analysis. To ask whether
the subjectivity of experience is compatible with dualism or idealism is a less
interesting question since it most likely is compatible and, in any case, we can
easily see how it could be.
  
Wehave seen why one would care to ask whether the subjectivity of experience
is compatible with naturalism. But is this not a simple question we can answer
right now and here? Unfortunately it is not. For some reason it is not easy
to see right away whether the subjectivity of experience and naturalism are
compatible. Searle has written about this:
We are not in agreement about how to ﬁt these subjective feelings into our overall view
of the world as consisting of objective reality.
And:
[A third diﬃculty in our present intellectual situation is that] we don’t have anything
like a clear idea of how brain processes, which are publicly observable, objective phe-
nomena, could cause anything as peculiar as inner, qualitative states of awareness or
sentience, states which are in some sense “private” to the possessor of the state.
Both these passages lean in the direction of an incompatibility. However, it
is not the case either that the subjectivity of experience and naturalism are
obviously incompatible. For example, Feigl has written that there is no logical
inconsistency here:
(…) the terms “subjective” and “private” (…) in one of their commonly and proper
serviceable usages are not to be considered as logically incompatible with “objective”
or “public.” (…) Private states in this philosophically quite innocuous sense are then
simply central states.
ere is thus no consensus whether or not there is an incompatibility between
naturalism and the subjectivity of experience. However, by careful conceptual
 Searle : .
 Ibid.
 Feigl : .
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analysis and detailed study, we will be able to ﬁnd the answer to this question.
In order to do so, we need to understand what it means for two things to be
compatible. What does it mean for a particular theory and a phenomenon to
be ‘compatible’ with one another?
We use the term ‘compatibility’ not just to talk about whether a par-
ticular theory and a particular phenomenon go together, but we also use it
when we consider the compatibility of two theories, or of personality types,
or of kinds of food. Two theories are compatible when no elements of the
theories contradict one another; two personality types are compatible when
there is no principled conﬂict caused by their diﬀerences; two kinds of foods
are compatible when their combination does not give rise to a disagreeable
taste. Not surprisingly, then, there are diﬀerent kinds of compatibility. e
compatibility we are here interested in is logical compatibility. ere is no
consensus about what logical compatibility exactly means and entails, but we
will be using an intuitive understanding of this concept which boils down to
logical consistency. When are two things logically consistent?
Two things are logically consistent when they don’t contradict one an-
other. In line with this, for a theory and a phenomenon to be compatible, it
is a necessary condition that the theory does not entail that the phenomenon
does not exist, or, in other words, it is a necessary condition that the phe-
nomenon does not have any properties that the theory rejects. But is it a
necessary condition for a theory and a phenomenon to be compatible that
the theory can give an account of the phenomenon? at is, does a theory
need to provide an explanation of a phenomenon in order for the theory and
the phenomenon to be considered compatible? I think that a theory does not
need to include an explanation of the phenomenon, but it should in principle
be possible for a theory to include such an explanation if the theory and the
phenomenon are to be compatible. For example, if a theory contains certain
elements such that an explanation of the phenomenon could in principle not
be given, then a theory and a phenomenon are incompatible unless, of course,
the explanation could not be given for reasons other than ones obtaining or
following straight from the content of the theory, such as, for example, our
limited cognitive abilities. However, if such principled barriers are absent, a
theory and a phenomenon could be considered to be compatible also if an
account of the phenomenon has not been provided (yet) by the theory. What
we are looking for, then, is not so much whether the theory of naturalism
can account for the phenomenon of subjectivity, but rather if there are any
elements in the theory of methodological naturalism that, in one way or
another, contradict or show conﬂict with the phenomenon of subjectivity.
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is dissertation consists of ﬁve chapters. e ﬁrst two chapters concern the
subjectivity of experience; the second two are about naturalism. In the ﬁnal
chapter I ask the question whether the subjectivity of experience and natural-
ism are compatible and I conclude that they are incompatible.
e aim of the ﬁrst chapter is to clarify the notion ‘subjectivity’. e term
‘subjectivity’ or ‘subjectivity of experience’ or ‘subjectivity of the mental’ is
often used, but it is not always clear what exactly is meant by this term. What
is ‘subjectivity’? In order to ﬁnd out, I will discuss a number of deﬁnitions of
the subjectivity of experience that are given in the literature and some further
deﬁnitions suggested by the discussion of those (S-S). Since Nagel’s account
of subjectivity in his paper “What is it like to be a bat?” is a classic in this ﬁeld,
I start out by analyzing Nagel’s account. After inventorying a list of deﬁnitions
of experience, I turn to the question whether experience is actually subjective
in any of these senses. By coming up with examples of each sense in which
experience could be said to be subjective, I will show that experience is in
fact subjective in all these senses. I conclude the chapter by considering, only
brieﬂy, whether other mental phenomena have the same subjective-making
properties as experience does. I conclude that they almost all do.
We now know what the subjectivity of experience means, but are there
such things as experiences? is is the main question of Chapter . If there
are no such things as experiences, then there is no incompatibility between
the subjectivity of experience and naturalism either. I start out by consid-
ering arguments against the existence of experience, followed by a powerful
argument for the existence of experience. is argument is an adaptation
of Van Inwagen’s argument for the existence of properties and it turns on
Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment. According to Quine, anything
that we quantify over exists. is means that we have to say that experiences
exist since we quantify over experiences in ordinary and scientiﬁc sentences
which we genuinely endorse. e only ways out would be to either eliminate
or paraphrase away this kind of language. Eliminativism and behaviorism,
respectively, can be seen as attempts exactly to this eﬀect, which is why I
will continue with a discussion of these two theories. It will turn out that
eliminativism and behaviorism face so many problems of their own that we
have to conclude that they are untenable. is means that we are committed
to the existence of experiences. us, there is such a thing as the subjectivity
of experience.
We have now covered the expression ‘subjectivity of experience’ and can
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move on to the next term that is central in our question: naturalism. Chap-
ters  and  aim to clarify the notion ‘naturalism’. Chapter  starts out dis-
cussing the closely related terms ‘naturalism’, ‘materialism’ and ‘physicalism’.
It will become clear that the views that are called ‘naturalism’ can be divided
into two groups: ‘metaphysical naturalism’ and ‘methodological naturalism’.
e remainder of Chapter  concerns metaphysical naturalism. I will discuss
various forms of metaphysical naturalism: classical materialism, spatiotem-
poral materialism, causal materialism and anti-supernaturalism. It will turn
out that none of these versions of naturalism is tenable and therefore that
metaphysical naturalism, generally, is not tenable. e question whether or
not the subjectivity of experience is a problem for metaphysical naturalism
does not even arise.
In Chapter  I go on to consider if methodological naturalism is more
successful than its metaphysical counterpart. I will start out by getting clearer
on the meaning of the term ‘methodological naturalism’ and by making
some necessary distinctions. I will then ask the question whether the kind of
methodological naturalism that we formulated is in fact a tenable and credible
position. I will conclude that there are some serious issues but that they can
be sidestepped, as I will show, so that we can still work with the formulation
of naturalism as we found it. Now that methodological naturalism has turned
out to be a tenable position, we need to know what its ontological conse-
quences are. After all, we want to know whether methodological naturalism
is compatible with the subjectivity of experience. We will discuss the general
and speciﬁc ontological implications of methodological naturalism, which
will lead to a discussion of science and the scientiﬁc method and of a crucial
aspect of science: ‘objectivity’. I will discuss this aspect of science and the
ontological implications it has and conclude that according tomethodological
naturalism, the only (kinds of ) things that exist are public or intersubjectively
available. is concludes our discussion of methodological naturalism.
Now that we know what the terms ‘subjectivity’, ‘experience’ and ‘natu-
ralism’ mean, we can begin answering the question whether the subjectivity
of experience is compatible with naturalism, which is the topic of Chapter .
In this chapter we will ﬁnd that some ways in which experience is subjective
are incompatible with methodological naturalism as we have deﬁned it. We
will ﬁnd that subjectivity in the sense of (S), the fact that experience has
phenomenal character, is incompatible with methodological naturalism in
virtue of (S), the fact that experience is perspectival. We will then turn to
a full discussion of subjectivity in the sense of (S) and conclude that (S)
is incompatible with methodological naturalism. is will lead to a formu-
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lation and discussion of a number of arguments against naturalism based on
(S), including the argument from perspective, the knowledge argument, and
Nagel’s argument.
Subjectivity in the sense of (S), the fact that experience is private, will
also turn out to be incompatible with naturalism. We will state the privacy
argument against methodological naturalism, which relies on the premise that
token experience and token phenomenal character can only be had by one
person, which turns out to be problematic on our reading of methodological
naturalism. Subjectivity in the sense of (S), the fact that experience is only
known from a ﬁrst person point of view, will also prove incompatible with
naturalism and another argument against naturalism will be formulated. We
will conclude that it is not clear whether subjectivity in the sense of (S), the
fact that experiences are had by subjects or persons, is compatible with natu-
ralism without making further choices concerning the ontology of persons.
After formulating these arguments against naturalism, I will discuss ob-
jections to these arguments and replies to them. I conclude the chapter by
discussing three alternative approaches, which could possibly avoid the prob-
lem; however, it will turn out to be unlikely that the methodological naturalist
could adopt them. We cannot but conclude, then, that the subjectivity of
experience is incompatible with methodological naturalism.
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Finally, we need to consider how this project diﬀers from debates in its vicinity
and how it contributes to the ﬁeld in which it is situated.
First, how does this project diﬀer from and relate to debates in its vicinity
such as the qualia debate and the debates about the explanatory gap and the
hard problem? is project partly overlaps with the qualia debate (which I
will indicate where relevant), but it is much broader than that. One way of
interpreting what it means to say that experience is subjective is to say that
experiences have qualia, but this is merely one interpretation. I will discuss
many others as well. e explanatory gap, so called following Levine (),
refers to the fact that there is a hiatus in (and maybe principled limit to)
our understanding of how consciousness depends on something that is not
conscious. Even though I will discuss properties of (conscious) experience,
mainly its subjective character, I am here not concerned with the question
of how these conscious experiences depend on non-conscious properties or
states.e hard problem of consciousness can be summarized by the question:
xxii  
‘Why is all this processing [of the brain] accompanied by an experienced inner
life?’ Whereas the explanatory gap debate focuses on the relation between
consciousness and non-conscious brain states, the hard problem consists of the
question why there is consciousness at all, i.e. why there is an ‘inner aspect’
to experiences in the ﬁrst place. Even though I will discuss experiences to a
great extent in the second chapter, I will not address the question why we have
them.
Second, what does this project contribute to its ﬁeld? is project con-
tributes to the literature in at least two ways. First, this project aims to clarify
notions in the debate that are often used but that are nonetheless not very
clear. I am thinking mainly of the term ‘subjectivity’, the meaning of which
usually remains quite vague, and the term ‘naturalism’, which, for all its pop-
ularity, seems rather misunderstood. I think that the conceptual analysis that
I oﬀer in the ﬁrst, third and fourth chapters can add to our understanding of
these terms which are crucial in all the debates mentioned above. In addition,
this project aims to clarify just how the subjectivity of experience and natural-
ism are incompatible, which is often touched upon but not often analyzed in
depth. Hopefully, this knowledge will add to the understanding of this issue
and contribute to its solution – if there is one.
 Chalmers : xii.
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e Subjectivity of Experience
It is often assumed, as well as argued for, that subjectivity is a problem for
naturalism. It is nevertheless not clear what the phenomenon of subjectivity
exactly is, or, to put the same point diﬀerently, what it is that makes something
subjective. Nor is it obvious what the thesis of naturalism exactly is. In order to
be able to establish whether or not subjectivity is a problem for naturalism, it is
thus ﬁrst necessary to get clearer on the notions of subjectivity and naturalism.
In this chapter I will discuss the former and in Chapters  and  the latter.
e terms ‘subjectivity’ and ‘objectivity’ (and ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’
as well) play a role in many diﬀerent domains. One is daily life, where we
characterize judgments and attitudes as subjective or objective: ‘subjective’ in
this respect usually means something close to biased or opinionated, whereas
‘objective’ has the connotations of being well-informed or impersonally eval-
uated. Another domain is philosophy, where the terms ‘subjective’ and ‘ob-
jective’ are used in many diﬀerent areas. For example, in ethics it is often
discussed whether morality is subjective or objective, and in epistemology the
subjectivity or objectivity of truth is at stake. e terms are especially central
to some of the main issues in philosophy of mind, where it is often asserted
that there is something ‘subjective’ about the mind. It is this mysterious sub-
jectivity of the mental that many claim is a problem for naturalism. However,
what it means for the ‘mind’ or the ‘mental’ to be subjective is very obscure.
e etymology of the terms ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ is unfortunately
not very helpful; ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ have a Latin origin and can liter-
ally be translated as ‘thrown under’ and ‘thrown against’, respectively. Taken
literally this etymology is rather uninformative. As Lycan suggests, perhaps
the terms ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ derive from the grammatical distinction
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between ‘subject’ and ‘object’. is would mean that to be subjective has
something to do with being a grammatical subject, and to be objective has
something to do with being a grammatical object. However, as Lycan points
out, terms referring to the mind (and anything else for that matter) can be
either grammatical subjects or grammatical objects. erefore this cannot be
the way in which the mental is distinctively subjective. What, then, does it
mean to say that the ‘mind’ or ‘the mental’ is subjective?
Actually in the philosophy of mind there are a number of diﬀerent ‘mental’
phenomena that are said to be subjective in some sense or another: intention-
ality, self-consciousness, the ﬁrst person perspective, secondary qualities of ob-
jects, qualia (also called ‘phenomenal character’) and experience. All of these
have received a great deal of attention in the literature, and all of them at one
time or another have been claimed to be a problem for physicalism. For exam-
ple, Dretske has written on intentionality; Rosenthal has written about self-
consciousness; Baker has written on the ﬁrst-person perspective; McGinn
has written on the secondary qualities of objects; Jackson, Chalmers, Dennett
et al. have written on qualia and Nagel has written on experience. It goes
without saying that this is only the top of the iceberg and many, many more
philosophers have been involved in these debates and have written about these
topics.
Rather than begin by trying to understand how each of these phenomena
is subjective, since it is not obviously the case that they need to be subjective
in the same sense, it seems better to focus on one speciﬁc phenomenon and
determine what it means for it to be subjective. For the purpose of this chapter,
I will focus on the last of these – experience. at is, in this chapter I will seek
to understand what it means for experience to be subjective. More speciﬁcally,
I will be attempting to identify that property (or those properties) in virtue
of which experience is deemed subjective, which I will call the ‘subjective-
making’ property(/-ies). At the end of the chapter, however, I will return to this
point and consider whether the other mental phenomena might be subjective
in the way in which we have found experience to be subjective, in order to
establish whether or not ‘the mental’ is subjective in a univocal sense.
 See Lycan : .
 Paraphrased from Lycan : .
 See Dretske .
 See Rosenthal .
 See Baker .
 See McGinn .
 See Jackson ; Chalmers ; Dennett .
 See Nagel .
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is chapter consists of three major parts. e ﬁrst part concerns Nagel’s
account of subjectivity. Nagel’s discussion of the subjectivity of experience
in his paper “What is it like to be a bat?” has become classic and is virtually
always taken as a point of departure in contemporary discussions of this topic.
Accordingly, it is indispensible to begin with Nagel’s conception of the subjec-
tivity of experience, which I will do in the next section, .. From this classical
text, I will try to extract the subjective-making property of experience in the
ﬁrst subsection ... In section .. I will follow up on this discussion by
considering various interpretations of the concept ‘point of view’ and in this
subsection I will also discuss how a point of view relates to ‘knowing what it
is like’, a famous phrase in this context.
e second part of this chapter concerns other accounts of subjectivity.
is section, ., is in turn divided into three subsections. In the ﬁrst subsec-
tion, .., we will add three more deﬁnitions of subjective-making proper-
ties, which can be found in the literature, to our inventory. In section ..,
we will compare and contrast the ﬁve subjective-making properties that we
will have found with the twelve subjective-making properties that De Sousa
distinguishes in an attempt quite similar to mine. Finally, in .., I will show
how other accounts of subjectivity in the literature ﬁt my analysis.
e third part of this chapter does not concern the concept of subjectivity
so much as its application. Two questions are asked in this section, .. First,
does experience have these subjective-making properties that we have found?
Nagel claims that experience is subjective in these ways and in section ..
we will prove him right or wrong. Second, do other mental phenomena also
have these subjective-making properties? I will discuss this question in sec-
tion ...
en, in section ., I will draw conclusions and summarize this chapter.
. ’   
In this section I will present Nagel’s account of subjectivity. I will do so by
ﬁrst, in section .., discussing characterizations of subjectivity that we can
ﬁnd in Nagel’s work and then, in section .., discussing the notions ‘point
of view’ and ‘knowing what it is like’ that occur in his account of subjectivity
in more detail.
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.. Nagel on the Subjectivity of Experience
In this section I will discuss Nagel’s paper “What is it like to be a bat?” in
search of characterizations of the subjectivity of experience in order to ﬁnd
out what Nagel thinks it means to say that experience is subjective. At this
point I do not wish to discuss Nagel’s argument against physicalism – for
now my aim is solely to get clear on what Nagel means when he uses the term
‘subjective’.
Nagel ﬁrst uses the term ‘subjective’ in the following passage:
Fundamentally an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is some-
thing it is like to be that organism – something it is like for the organism. We may call
this the subjective character of experience.
First of all, I take ‘subjective character’ of experience to refer to that property
(or those properties) in virtue of which experience is subjective. So, experience
has a certain property – let us call it a subjective-making property. Of what is
this subjective-making property predicated? What Nagel calls the ‘subjective
character of experience’ is a property of what Nagel calls ‘conscious mental
states’. Although, in this passage, Nagel speaks of conscious mental states as
having subjective character, elsewhere in the paper he predicates this property
of ‘conscious mental phenomena’, ‘conscious experience’, ‘consciousness’ and
‘experience’. Obviously, these terms are all closely related and Nagel seems
to use them interchangeably and indiscriminately. For our purposes, we will
consider them to be equivalent, as is virtually always done in the literature.
For simplicity, I will use the term ‘experience’ in what follows to indicate
whatever is referred to by the terms mentioned above. For now I will not
go into the issue of what experience exactly is, i.e. whether experience is a
relation, an event, a property, etc. At this point it does not make a diﬀerence
for our study of the subjectivity of experience in which ontological category
experience falls.
Now what is the subjective-making property, according to Nagel? It is the
property of being such that there is something it is like for an organism to be
that organism. In order to get more grip on this somewhat obscure description
of the subjective-making property, it will be helpful to mention one of Nagel’s
examples.
 For a discussion of Nagel’s argument see Chapter .
 Nagel : .
 is issue is taken up in Chapter .
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Nagel’s primary example involves that (we think that) there is something
it is like to be a bat. We know that most bats perceive the world by sonar, but
we have no idea what it is like to perceive the world by sonar. As Nagel puts
it:
But bat sonar, though clearly a form of perception, is not similar in its operation to
any sense that we possess, and there is no reason to suppose that it is subjectively like
anything we can experience or imagine.
is creates a problem for the notion that there is something it is like to be a
bat, since how can we understand this notion if we cannot experience or even
imagine what it is like to be a bat? And, Nagel adds, even if we could imagine
what it would be like to be a bat, e.g. to navigate the world by ‘a system of
reﬂected high-frequency sound signals’ as bats supposedly do, still this would
only tell us what it would be like for us to be a bat (in this respect), not what
it is like for a bat to be a bat. Again in Nagel’s terms:
To the extent that I could look and behave like a wasp or a bat without changing my
fundamental structure, my experiences would not be anything like the experiences of
those animals.
What Nagel seems to be saying, then, is (at least) that there is something it is
like for an organism to have the experiences it has.
So, if Nagel is using the ‘subjective character of experience’ to pick out
that property in virtue of which experience is subjective, then the passage
cited above implies that that property is nothing other than (i.e. is identical
to) the property that there is something it is like to have an experience. More
formally, we can formulate what appears to be Nagel’s ﬁrst deﬁnition of what
it means for experience to be subjective as follows: Experience E is subjective
iﬀ there is something it is like for S to have E. So, for our inventory, the ﬁrst
deﬁnition of the subjectivity of experience is:
(S) E is subjective=df. For all subjects S, if S has E, then there is
something it is like for S to have E.
Although in this section I am focusing on Nagel’s work and his deﬁnitions
of subjectivity, which are put in terms of experience, I am not assuming here
that experience actually is subjective in this way. Nagel claims that it is, but I
 Nagel : .
 Ibid.: .
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will only later on in this chapter discuss the question whether experience or
anything else is actually subjective in this way.
Back to the ﬁrst deﬁnition. What does it mean to say that there is some-
thing it is like for an organism to have an experience? It’s diﬃcult to say more
about this aspect of experience, except for contrasting it with other aspects of
experience, such as the object of experience (if there is one) and the content of
experience (if there is any). To illustrate the diﬀerences between these aspects
of experience, let us take a particular example; suppose that I am having an
experience of seeing a red ﬂower.e object ofmy experience (if there is one) is
the ﬂower itself, a material object.e propositional content of the experience
(again, if there is any) is the way in which I represent the ﬂower as being, e.g.,
as being red, as being ﬂower-shaped, etc. Both of these aspects of experience
can be distinguished from what it is like to see the red ﬂower. is is the quale
of the experience, or the ‘phenomenal character’ of the experience, which is
how I will refer to this aspect of experience in what follows. Given this, we
can formulate an equivalent of the ﬁrst deﬁnition as follows: Experience E is
subjective iﬀ E has some phenomenal character C for S.
Nagel spends the rest of his paper ﬁlling in and spelling out the notion ‘for
S’ that occurs in (S) further. e ﬁrst thing he immediately goes on to say
to clarify the phrase ‘for S’ is that ‘every subjective phenomenon is essentially
connected with a single point of view’.
In this sentence, Nagel’s ‘subjective phenomenon’ refers to the phenom-
enal character of experience (i.e. what Nagel has termed the ‘subjective char-
acter’ of experience). is is clear from numerous passages of which the fol-
lowing are two examples:
Whatever may be the status of facts about what it is like to be a human being, or a
bat, or a Martian, these appear to be facts that embody a particular point of view.
Even to form the conception of what it is like to be a bat (and a forteriori to know
what it is like to be a bat) one must take up the bat’s point of view.
In both of these passages, Nagel makes it clear that ‘what it is like’ to be
some creature, what we have called the ‘phenomenal character’ of experience,
 is might sound confusing, since we have just given a deﬁnition of the subjectivity of
experience. However, we can deﬁne a term without there being anything the deﬁnition
applies to. I will address and explain this point in more detail at the beginning of sec-
tion ...
 Nagel : .
 Ibid.: , note .
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is essentially connected to a particular point of view. us Nagel seems to
suggest that it is in virtue of having phenomenal character, which has the
further property of being essentially connected to a single point of view, that
experience is said to be subjective. In what follows however, I will talk about
‘experience’ being essentially connected to a single point of view because, even
if it is the case that, strictly speaking, phenomenal character is connected to a
single point of view, nevertheless, in such a case, it follows that experience is
connected to a single point of view as well.
Now, Nagel devotes the bulk of the paper to discussing the property of
‘being essentially connected with a single point of view’. is seems to suggest
that Nagel thinks that it is this property, namely ‘being essentially connected
with a single point of view’, in virtue of which experience is subjective. is
suggests an alternative deﬁnition of what it means for experience to be sub-
jective:
(S) E is subjective =df. E is essentially connected to a single point
of view.
As we have seen, (S) expresses the idea that the fact that experience is sub-
jective just means that experience has phenomenal character, which in turn
means that there is something it is like to have a particular experience. How-
ever, according to (S), experience being subjective means that experience is
essentially connected to a single point of view. To put this distinction slightly
diﬀerently, according to (S), what it means for experience to be subjective is
that experience has phenomenal character. According to (S) however, what
it means for experience to be subjective is that the phenomenal character of
the experience has the further property of being essentially connected to a
single point of view. Now, it’s possible to hold that phenomenal character
itself must be analyzed in terms of a single point of view, but as we will see
in the next section, this is not what Nagel thinks. So we can conclude that
Nagel seems to be of two minds: Nagel’s use of the term ‘subjective’ in his
phrase ‘the subjective character of experience’ might seem to imply that (S)
is indeed what he has in mind as a deﬁnition of what it means for experience
to be subjective. Yet, Nagel’s examples and the largest part of the paper all have
(S) as their main focus. It is interesting to note, in anticipation of section .,
that other philosophers in the debate show the same ambivalence as Nagel –
most often after Nagel.
 Cf. Nagel: .
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Now, what does it mean for the phenomenal character of experience to be
essentially connected to a single point of view? Well, this means that it is only
possible for experience to have phenomenal character iﬀ it is connected to a
single point of view. It also means that experience could not lack phenomenal
character exactly because it is essentially connected to a single point of view.
We have thus been able to extract two subjective-making properties
from Nagel’s classical text about the subjectivity of experience. e second
subjective-making property of experience is ‘being essentially connected to
a single point of view’. We could classify this subjective-making property as
an ontological property. I will understand an ontological property to be the
kind of property that either speciﬁes an ontological category or that mentions
a relation that obtains between entities. e property of ‘being essentially
connected to a single point of view is an example of an ontological property.
is is important to note since there is a lot of confusion surrounding the term
‘subjectivity’ and part of the confusion is constituted by the fact that it is not
clear whether subjectivity is an ontological or an epistemological notion.
Now, experience’s subjective-making property of ‘being essentially con-
nected to a single point of view’ raises a number of questions. First of all, what
is a point of view? And, second, who can take up the same point of view? In the
next section I will address these questions. I will consider, generally, how we
should understand a point of view and I will discuss various interpretations
of who can take up the same point of view, most of them based on Nagel
(though not all endorsed by him).is discussion will hopefully yield a better
and more speciﬁc understanding of deﬁnition (S).
.. Point of View and Knowing What It Is Like
FromNagel’s paper we have been able to extract, among more, the property of
‘being essentially connected to a single point of view’ as a subjective-making
property. We know what it means for something to be essentially connected
to something else, but what is ‘a single point of view’ to which experience is
so connected? What does Nagel mean by ‘a single point of view’?
To start, we need to determine whether Nagel understands a single point
of view to be that of an individual (a token point of view) or of a certain
kind of individual (a type point of view), for example a species of organism.
Although the phrase ‘single point of view’ might seem to suggest the former,
Nagel insists that he means the latter:
     
I am not adverting here to the alleged privacy of experience to its possessor. e point
of view in question is not one accessible only to a single individual. Rather it is a type.
And later:
It is often possible to take up a point of view other than one’s own, so the comprehen-
sion of such facts is not limited to one’s own case.
So, in short, Nagel thinks that the phenomenal character of an experience is
essentially connected to a type point of view, not a token point of view. at
means: the point of view Nagel is interested in is not a point of view that only
one individual can take up; rather it is a point of view that more than one
individual can take up. But which individuals are able to take up the same
point of view? Given Nagel’s examples of bats, humans and Martians, one
might think that he means that individuals of the same species can take up
the same point of view. at is, on this simple reading, Nagel thinks that:
(PV) ‘A single point of view’ is the point of view of individuals of a
species S.
However, this can’t be right, because there seems to be no reason to think that
individuals of very similar species – for example, individuals of closely related
species of birds or even human beings and higher level primates – cannot
have experiences with the same phenomenal character and so know what it
is like for individuals of the other (closely similar) species to have experiences
with that phenomenal character. us, this taken into account, Nagel might
mean:
(PV) ‘A single point of view’ is the point of view of individuals of
suﬃciently similar species.
However, there is another problem. In addition to being too narrow, the
original formulation (PV) is also too broad, and so is the revised formulation
(PV). It seems that, even within a species, as Nagel admits, certain individuals
 Nagel : .
 Ibid.: -.
 Another problem is that species aren’t rigorously individuated, but I cannot go into this
problem further here.
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cannot know what it is like for other individuals of the same species to have
some experience. Nagel’s example involves persons blind and deaf from birth.
As he writes:
e subjective character of the experience of a person deaf and blind from birth is not
accessible to me, for example, nor presumably is mine to him.
No doubt there are other examples, but the point is clear. It is not enough to
be members of the same or even suﬃciently similar species, but individuals
have to be suﬃciently similar to each other in order to share knowledge of
what it is like to have certain experiences. With this in mind, Nagel’s claim
may be modiﬁed as follows:
(PV) ‘A single point of view’ is the point of view of individuals that
are suﬃciently similar.
When are two individuals suﬃciently similar? In light of Nagel’s claim that a
person blind from birth is not suﬃciently similar to a person who can see, it
seems reasonable to infer that he thinks that two individuals are suﬃciently
similar just in case they are able to have experiences with the same type of
phenomenal character; i.e., the reason why a person blind from birth is not
suﬃciently similar to a person who can see, is that the blind person cannot
have certain visual experiences with their distinctive phenomenal character
that the seeing person can have – and vice versa. No doubt there are expe-
riences with phenomenal character that blind persons share, which are not
accessible to people who can see, such as, for example, experiences with in-
credible auditive phenomenal character. If this is what Nagel means, then
(PV) can be modiﬁed as:
(PV) ‘A single point of view’ is the point of view of individuals who
are able to have experiences with the same phenomenal charac-
ter C.
(PV) seems to be Nagel’s considered account of which individuals can take
up the same point of view to which phenomenal character is essentially con-
nected. However, further improvements are called for.
 Nagel : .
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First, although being able to have experiences with the same type of phe-
nomenal character is necessary for two individuals to be suﬃciently similar
in the relevant sense, it is not suﬃcient. For example, it seems reasonable to
suppose that, even though I am able to have the experience of tasting vegemite,
I don’t know what it is like to taste vegemite or what it is like for someone
else to taste vegemite. I don’t know what it is like for anyone to taste vegemite
because I have never tasted it. In other words, a necessary condition for two
individuals being suﬃciently similar in the relevant sense is that they have
actually had an experience with the relevant phenomenal character. us, we
should modify (PV) as follows:
(PV) ‘A single point of view’ is the point of view of individuals who
have had an experience with phenomenal character C.
But as it stands, (PV) still isn’t quite right because there is one ﬁnal problem,
made famous by Hume, also called ‘the missing shade of blue’. e point is
easy to put. Suppose I have actually seen many shades of blue, including the
speciﬁc shades of blue  and blue , but I haven’t seen blue . It seems
unreasonable to think that I couldn’t know what it is like to see blue  just
because I haven’t seen it. Rather, it seems likely that I can know what it is like
to see the shade of blue  by inference from my experiences of blue  and
blue  (and their phenomenal character). erefore, (PV) should become:
(PV) ‘A single point of view’ is the point of view of individuals who
have had an experience with phenomenal character C or phe-
nomenal character suﬃciently similar to C.
What it means for two experiences to have suﬃciently similar phenomenal
character can be speciﬁed more. I hope, however, that it is clear enough what
it means for our purposes.
Now that we have considered these various interpretations of the concept
of ‘point of view’, a new question rises. We know now which individuals are
able to have or take up one and the same point of view (at least, according to
Nagel). But what does it mean exactly to take up or have the same point of
view regarding a certain experience with phenomenal character? e best way
of ﬁnding this out is to see what it entails and what it presupposes. As we have
seen, for two persons to take up the same point of view presupposes that both
persons have had a very similar experience. But what does it entail to share
a point of view? is is where Nagel’s famous phrase of ‘knowing what it is
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like’ comes in. If two persons are able to take up the same point of view, this
entails that they both know what it is like to have that experience with that
phenomenal character, which forms the basis of their shared point of view.
So, for example, if two persons both have had a certain kind of headache with
a certain kind of phenomenal character (say, a sharp pain on the side of the
head), then they can take up the point of view that is based on sharing this
experience. e fact that these persons are able to take up the same point of
view entails that they both know what it is like for the other person to have the
kind of headache in question. e idea, expressed in (PV), is that someone
who has not had an experience with suﬃciently similar phenomenal character,
for example, a third person who has only experienced a very diﬀerent kind of
pain (or maybe no pain at all, if a diﬀerent kind of pain would already be
suﬃciently similar to this particular pain), could not know what it is like to
have the experience and the phenomenal character in question.
e question arises whether the term ‘point of view’ is not superﬂuous.
Again, we know the conditions under which people are able to take up the
same point of view. e main condition that should be satisﬁed in order for
people to be able to take up the same point of view is that they should have had
an experience with the same phenomenal character.We also knowwhat taking
up the same point of view entails. When two people take up the same point of
view, this entails that they know what it is like for the other person to have an
experience that has the same phenomenal character. e question is whether
there is more to a ‘point of view’ than this condition and this implication. Or
can we say that a ‘point of view’ just is a more vague term for this condition
and this implication?at is to say, is there anything over and above ‘knowing
what it is like’ to a point of view? I would not know what this would be.
‘Point of view’ is a vague term, after all, that can only have literal meaning in
a perceptual context. When used in an epistemological context like this one,
it cannot be but a metaphor. is metaphor helps us visualize and grasp the
idea that is expressed, but should be discarded when we aim to analyze the
phenomenon more clearly.
Now, (PV) suggests that one can only know what it is like to have a
certain experience if one has had that experience (or one with suﬃciently
similar phenomenal character). But is this true? Here is one reason to think
that this is true. If the sort of knowledge that is involved in ‘knowing what
it is like’ is knowledge by acquaintance, then it follows that someone knows
what it is like to have an experience with phenomenal character C when that
person has had an experience with phenomenal character C. So this seems to
suggest that knowing what it is like to have a certain experience follows from
having (had) the experience. is does not necessarily exclude the possibility
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that someone who has not had a certain experience is unable to know what
it is like to have that kind of experience. But, Nagel argues that we can only
know what it is like to have an experience when we have had an experience
with suﬃciently similar phenomenal character.
Now that we know better what a point of view is and who can take up
the same point of view, we can understand deﬁnition (S) better: i.e. we can
understand one speciﬁc interpretation of (S) better. According to (S), what
it means for experience to be subjective is that it is essentially connected to
a single point of view. is description can clearly be interpreted in many
diﬀerent ways, but if we spell out the concept ‘point of view’ as we have in
(PV), we have one speciﬁc interpretation of what it means for experience to
be subjective in the sense of (S). is is what (S) looks like if you accept
(PV) as an interpretation of the concept ‘point of view’:
(S0) E is subjective=df. For all subjects S, S knows what it is like
to have E only if S has had an experience E*which either has
the same phenomenal character as E or phenomenal character
suﬃciently similar to the phenomenal character of E.
In what follows, I will mainly use the original formulation of this deﬁnition,
(S), and only sometimes will I use the more speciﬁc interpretation (S0). To
avoid any confusion I will always indicate whether I am using or referring to
(S) or (S0).
.    
e second part of this chapter concerns other accounts of subjectivity that
can be found in the literature. In section .., I will discuss three more
deﬁnitions of the subjectivity of experience. e ﬁrst two follow from our
discussion of (PV)-(PV) in the previous section. e third deﬁnition stems
from a paper from Kekes, in which he presents an account of subjectivity
that is close to Nagel’s, yet slightly diﬀerent. We will then have distinguished
ﬁve subjective-making properties overall. In the next section, .., we will
compare and contrast these ﬁve subjective-making properties with the twelve
subjective-making properties that De Sousa describes in his paper which at-
tempts to analyze the notion of subjectivity very much in the same way as I
do in this chapter. I will show that many of our deﬁnitions map onto one
 I will discuss a similar point later when we talk about (S).
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another and that some of De Sousa’s deﬁnitions can be reduced to some of
the others. In the last section of this chapter, .., I will show how other
accounts in the literature ﬁt the ﬁve subjective-making properties that I have
distinguished very well.
.. More Deﬁnitions of Subjectivity
In this section I will distinguish three more deﬁnitions of subjectivity. e
ﬁrst two follow from our discussion of (PV)-(PV) in the previous section;
the third can be found in a paper by Kekes.
A question that is raised by our discussion in the previous section is why
one can only know what it is like to have an experience if one has had an
experience with the same phenomenal character. It seems wemust say that you
know what it is like to have a certain experience because you remember what
it was like to have that kind of experience in the past and, as it were, access
your own past experience and its phenomenal character. I know what it is like
for you to have a headache because I remember having a similar headache a
few months ago and I remember how it felt. is seems to suggest that when
you know what it is like to have a certain experience, you do so by accessing
your own past experience which was (suﬃciently) similar. After all, what else
are you accessing? No one can access someone else’s experience. Even if you
can know what it is like for someone else to have a certain experience, there
is still a way in which you don’t have access: a particular token experience
and a particular token phenomenal character can only be had and accessed
by one person. I can know what your headache feels like because I have had
headaches in the past, but I cannot access your headache; I cannot literally
feel your pain. is suggests a further way in which experience can be said to
be subjective, which can be expressed by the following possible deﬁnition of
the subjectivity of experience:
(S) E is subjective =df. E is private.
Note that we are talking about token experiences and token phenomenal
character in this possible deﬁnition. Since it might not be clear what it means
for experience to be private, here is a paraphrase of deﬁnition (S) which spells
out exactly what that means:
(S0) E is subjective =df. For all subjects S, if S has E, then only S has
E.
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I will stick to the formulation (S), but (S) and (S0) are equivalent. I will
further consider whether experience is actually subjective in this way in sec-
tion ...
e discussion leading up to (S) suggests another interesting point. It
suggests that the point of view that we have been talking about is a ‘ﬁrst person
point of view’. After all, it seems that persons who are able to take up the same
point of view in fact are, as it were, ‘accessing their own past experience’. ey
know a certain experience from their ﬁrst person point of view on their own
past experiences. Moreover, no one without such a ﬁrst person point of view
can know the experience in question. is suggests yet another way in which
experience can be said to be subjective:
(S) E is subjective =df. E can only be known from a ﬁrst person
point of view.
Since the term ‘ﬁrst person point of view’ might cause confusion, here is the
deﬁnition with the term ‘ﬁrst person point of view’ unpacked:
(S0) E is subjective =df. For all subjects S, S knows E only if S has
(had) E.
(S0) looks very similar to (S0), but I think we should distinguish them
nevertheless. e ﬁrst reason to distinguish them is that (S) and (S), the
deﬁnitions that they are respectively derived from, are diﬀerent from one
another and (S0) and (S0) are not the only interpretations of (S) and (S).
e second reason to distinguish them is that philosophers talk (and have
talked) about experience in both ways. Even if one wants to argue that they are
the same property, and even if they would turn out to be the same property, it
is not obvious here and now that they are identical. In order for our account
of the subjectivity of experience to be as comprehensive as possible I think we
should discuss both (S0) and (S0). A third reason to distinguish (S0) and
(S0) is that there does seem to be a diﬀerence between them: according to
(S0) one can only know what it is like to have an experience if one has had
the experience (or an experience with suﬃciently similar phenomenal charac-
ter), whereas (S0) does not concern knowledge of phenomenal character but
knowledge of experience.
Deﬁnition (S) is also quite similar to deﬁnition (S), according to (S)
an experience can only be known from a ﬁrst person point of view and,
according to (S), experience is private. Don’t these two descriptions mean
the same thing? I think there are, again, good reasons to distinguish these
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deﬁnitions. Deﬁnition (S) is an ontological deﬁnition: it is about having a
token experience, whereas deﬁnition (S) is an epistemic deﬁnition: it is about
knowing an experience. One can argue that, despite this theoretical diﬀerence,
they always go together in real life: as soon as you have an experience, you
know the experience and vice versa. However, even if it would be the case
that in real life the one is not instantiated without the other, this does not
mean that (S) and (S) mean the same thing. eir reference or extension
might be identical, but their sense does not need to be.
For these reasons, I will not reduce (S) to either (S0) or to (S). I will
consider whether experience is actually subjective in the way (S) speciﬁes in
section ..
Before moving on, a more general remark that should be made about the
possible deﬁnitions that we have encountered so far is the following. It seems
that there is a general diﬀerence between deﬁnitions (S) on the one hand and
(S), (S) and (S) on the other.Whereas (S) is a deﬁnition of the subjectivity
of experience where the term ‘experience’ is used to refer to a type, deﬁnitions
(S), (S) and (S) are deﬁnitions of experience in which the term ‘experience’
refers to a token experience.
In the remainder of this section I will discuss one paper in the literature
that presents an account of subjectivity that is similar to Nagel’s, yet not
identical. From this account we can infer one more deﬁnition of a subjective-
making property of experience. It should be noted that I am not presently
concerned with the argument and thesis of the paper discussed in this section,
nor will I consider in this section whether experience actually is subjective
in any of the senses here deﬁned. In this section, I am solely interested in
inventorying possible deﬁnitions of the subjectivity of experience and I only
discuss Kekes’ paper in this section because it oﬀers an alternative deﬁnition of
the subjectivity of experience. e other papers in the debate oﬀer deﬁnitions
that are identical to the deﬁnitions we have already found or that can be
reduced to these.
e additional deﬁnition of subjectivity worth discussing is from Kekes’
paper “Physicalism and Subjectivity”. In this paper, Kekes defends that the key
to understanding what the subjectivity of experience is, is to compare a zombie
case of ‘pain’ with a normal experience of pain. In the zombie case, a subject is
presented with the usual physiological correlates of pain (by a future scientist
who is in control of manipulating the subject’s brain), but when asked, the
subject denies having any feelings of pain, or rather, the subject would be
puzzled just by the notion of pain. In a normal case, of course, a subject
in a physiological state of pain would report having feelings of pain. Now
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according to Kekes, this tells us the following about the subjective character
of experience:
e subjective quality is just this feeling, which, if it was absent would mean that no
experience has occurred. Subjectivity is thus an essential component of experience.
ere could no more be an experience without a subjective component than there
could be a human being without a body.
According to this passage, Kekes seems to think that subjectivity is a necessary
property of experience. Kekes identiﬁes the subjective property of experience
with ‘this feeling, which if it was absent would mean that no experience has
occurred’. Now, which feeling could this refer to? One obvious option is that
‘this feeling’ refers to the phenomenal character of the experience. After all,
phenomenal character (or what it is like to have a certain experience) could
be described as ‘a feeling’, and it is exactly this which is present in a normal
case of pain and is absent in a zombie case of ‘pain’. For a zombie, there is
nothing it is like to be in such a physiological state that, if a normal human
being would be in that state, the human being would be in pain. For a normal
human being to be in a physiological state of pain comes with feelings of pain,
i.e. particular ‘painful’ phenomenal character. Here Kekes seems to be saying,
then, that the subjective property of experience is identical to the phenomenal
character of experience (and that phenomenal character is a necessary property
of experience). is is the same as Nagel’s deﬁnition (S), which reads: ‘E is
subjective =df. For all subjects S, if S has E, then there is something it is like
for S to have E.’
However, Kekes makes one other remark about what the subjectivity of
experience is:
What more is the subjective component [of experience] than the having of the expe-
rience?
In this second passage, Kekes seems to be saying that the subjective property of
an experience is nothingmore than ‘having the experience’.is is a confusing
thesis for the following reason. If Kekes’ two passages should be consistent,
Kekes must be saying that subjectivity is a necessary property of experience
and that this (subjective) property is identical to ‘having the experience’. It is,
however, unclear if ‘having the experience’ is a property of the experience, or
of the person who has the experience, or if it is an event, or a relation (or yet
 Kekes : .
 Ibid.: .
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something diﬀerent). But, setting this issue aside, we can say, then, that ‘hav-
ing the experience’ is that property in virtue of which experience is subjective,
i.e. the subjective-making property. How could ‘having the experience’ be the
property in virtue of which experience is subjective? One explanation would
be that if the experience in question is to be had, it has to be the case that it is
had by someone, i.e. by a particular subject.e fact that the experience is had
speciﬁes a way in which the experience is tied to a subject. In this sense, ‘having
the experience’ can thus be said to make experience ‘subjective’.us, this sec-
ond passage suggests the following deﬁnition of the subjectivity of experience:
(S) E is subjective=df. ere is some subject S which has E.
Since it is a necessary condition for anything to be an experience that it is the
experience of a particular subject, this means that, according to this deﬁnition,
experience is necessarily subjective.
is section has thus led us to infer three more deﬁnitions of subjective-
making properties, bringing the total to ﬁve. In section .., we had already
found two deﬁnitions of the subjectivity of experience. e ﬁrst deﬁnition,
(S), expresses the idea that the subjective-making property of experience is
the phenomenal character of experience. e second deﬁnition, (S), which
I think most accurately reﬂects Nagel’s own account, departs from this idea
and claims that the subjective-making property of experience is the property of
being essentially connected to a single point of view. In this section, we found
three more deﬁnitions of the subjectivity of experience. e third deﬁnition,
(S), expresses the idea that the subjective-making property of experience is
that only one person can have and access a given token experience and its phe-
nomenal character. According to the related deﬁnition, (S), the subjective-
making property of experience is that experience can only be truly known
from a ﬁrst person point of view. According to the ﬁfth deﬁnition, (S), the
subjective-making property of experience is that experience is had by a subject.
At this point one might wonder what the logical relations between these
deﬁnitions of the subjectivity of experience are: if experience is subjective in
one way, is that suﬃcient for experience being subjective in another way?
From the formal form of the deﬁnitions, it is easy to infer which logical
relations obtain between them. ere are only three formal relations that
obtain between some of these deﬁnitions, viz. (S), (S) and (S) each are
suﬃcient for (S). is means that if experience is subjective in the senses of
either (S), (S), or (S), it is also subjective in the sense of (S). is also
means that deﬁnition (S) is necessary for deﬁnitions (S), (S) and (S).
ere may be other kinds of connections (e.g. metaphysical ones) between the
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diﬀerent deﬁnitions, but the connections just mentioned are the only logical
connections that obtain.
In section .., I will consider whether experience and other mental
phenomena are actually subjective in these ways.
.. Mapping onto De Sousa
In our aim to establish what it means for something to be subjective, we have
distinguished ﬁve deﬁnitions of subjective-making properties. In his paper
called “Twelve Varieties of Subjectivity: Dividing in Hopes of Conquest”,
De Sousa undertakes a task very similar to mine, namely to analyze the notion
of subjectivity. In his quest, De Sousa has found no less than twelve subjective-
making properties. is raises a number of interesting questions, viz.: which
subjective-making properties does De Sousa distinguish? And how come he
ﬁnds twelve where we found ﬁve? Are theremore subjective-making properties
than we thought, or is there another reason for this diﬀerence?
Starting with the last questions, there is an obvious reason whyDe Sousa is
able to distinguish twelve interpretations of subjectivity even though we only
found ﬁve. e reason is that De Sousa analyzes the notion of subjectivity per
se, not within a speciﬁc philosophy of mind context as we have done. As I
mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the term ‘subjectivity’ is not
just used in the philosophy of mind, but also in other areas of philosophy and
in non-philosophical contexts such as daily life. Some of the interpretations
of subjectivity that De Sousa oﬀers clearly concern subjectivity within the
philosophy of mind, namely subjectivity of the mental or subjectivity of con-
sciousness. But, as we will see, some of his interpretations concern subjectivity
as it is understood in diﬀerent areas of philosophy or outside of philosophy.
Despite this, De Sousa’s paper is still very interesting for us to look at closely,
since we want to make sure we found all the deﬁnitions of subjectivity that are
relevant for our purposes. Also, it is interesting to see which of his deﬁnitions
map onto the ones that we have found and in which ways the term ‘subjec-
tivity’ is understood outside the philosophy of mind. For these reasons, I will
discuss all twelve interpretations of subjectivity that De Sousa oﬀers.
Here are De Sousa’s twelve interpretations of subjectivity:
. Perspective.
. Agency.
. Titularity or ownness.
 De Sousa .
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. Privileged access.
. e incorrigibility of appearance.
. Proprioceptive sense.
. Ipseity.
. Tone or color.
. e subjectivity in intersubjectivity.
.Projection.
. Seeing-as.
.Phenomenal experience.
Not all of these descriptions of subjectivity are illuminating at ﬁrst glance.
In the following I will go through this list and see for each interpretation of
subjectivity whether it maps onto one of the deﬁnitions that we have found
and, if it does not, why it does not and whether we should add it to our
inventory or not.
De Sousa’s ﬁrst interpretation of subjectivity, according to which sub-
jectivity means that individuals have a point of view and that their mental
states are perspectival, is one which we have already encountered in the work
of Nagel. We introduced a deﬁnition for this interpretation of subjectivity
earlier, namely (S). De Sousa’s ﬁrst interpretation of subjectivity thus maps
onto one of the deﬁnitions that we found.
De Sousa’s second interpretation of subjectivity concerns the ‘subjectivity
of agency’, which De Sousa deﬁnes as ‘freedom of the will’. is is a topic
that lies beyond the scope of our project. If freedom of the will implies a
certain subjectivity of agency, then this is a diﬀerent kind of subjectivity
than the kind that we have been talking about, namely the subjectivity of
experience, or of the mental. is interpretation thus does not map onto one
of our deﬁnitions of subjectivity, but I do not think we need to add it to our
inventory either, since it does not concern the subjectivity of the mental and is
not relevant within the context of the philosophy of mind.is interpretation
of subjectivity is important in metaphysics and ethics instead.
e third interpretation of subjectivity thatDe Sousa discusses, namely the
one of ‘titularity or ownness’, is relevant in the philosophy of mind and to our
project. What does ‘titularity or ownness’ mean? De Sousa clariﬁes as follows:
Sergio Moravia () has labeled “titularity” the fact that my mental attributes (in-
cluding but not only including qualia) are my own in a unique sense of ownership.
 Ibid.
 Ibid.
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For this reason, De Sousa also calls this form of subjectivity ‘special owner-
ship’. e ownership of our mental states is special in two ways:
One is that every mental state necessarily belongs to someone or other; and the second
is that every mental state necessarily belongs to whoever it belongs to and not anyone
else.
We have encountered and distinguished the ﬁrst kind of ownership, viz. that
for every mental state there is a subject that has that mental state as well and
captured the idea in deﬁnition (S). e second kind of ownership that is
expressed is also a form of subjectivity that we have encountered, namely that
a particular token mental state can only be had by one subject and not by
anyone else. We have expressed this sense in which experience is subjective
in deﬁnition (S). is interpretation of subjectivity thus maps onto our
deﬁnitions very well.
e fourth interpretation of subjectivity that De Sousa distinguishes is
very closely related to the third one; it is the interpretation of subjectivity as
privileged access, which we have encountered as well in deﬁnition (S). is
interpretation of subjectivity thus also maps onto one of ours.
Number ﬁve on De Sousa’s list is the ‘incorrigibility of appearance’. e
idea that how things appear or seem to us is incorrigible is an interesting idea
in its own right. However, hardly any philosophers these days think that our
appearances are incorrigible, and, moreover, the (supposed) incorrigibility of
appearance falls beyond the scope of this project, since it is an issue in the
philosophy of perception (which is indeed part of the philosophy of mind, but
a diﬀerent part). So, even though it does not map onto one of our deﬁnitions,
I do not think that we need to add it to our inventory since it concerns an
issue in the philosophy of perception, which is not directly relevant to our
project.
e sixth interpretation of subjectivity is ‘proprioceptive sense’, which is
the sense by which we can directly know where our body parts are without
having to look at our body or infer or reason about it. For example, I just know
where my left foot is right now (without having to look down or think about
it). is is an interesting phenomenon, but it is not the kind of subjectivity
with which we are here concerned. If this is a form of subjectivity, I think
it is so only in virtue of De Sousa’s third interpretation, namely the one of
‘ownness’. Proprioceptive sense is special in the sense that only I can have this
kind of sense of my own body; anyone else wanting to know where my left
 Ibid.
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foot is would have to look around for it. Similarly, you are the only one who
can know where your left foot is without looking for it or thinking about it.
We are each in a unique epistemic position when it comes to the location of
our body parts because our body parts are ours and ours only. Proprioceptive
sense thus depends for its subjectivity on the following other interpretations
of subjectivity: perspective, ownness and privileged access, or according to our
scheme: (S), (S) and (S).
De Sousa’s seventh interpretation of subjectivity is ‘ipseity’, which is the
idea that when we refer to ourselves, we don’t just refer to the person who
happens to be us, but we refer to ourselves. at is to say: when we refer to
ourselves we do not refer to ourselves under a third person description such
as our name, but we refer to ourselves under a ﬁrst person description, such
as ‘I’. Nagel has described this idea very well in e View From Nowhere and
Perry () has illustrated this with a pointing example. e fact that we
can refer to ourselves in this unique way is a result of the fact that we each
are ourselves and stand in a unique relation to ourselves. I am the only one
who can refer to myself using the word ‘I’ because I stand in a unique relation
to myself, just like you stand in a unique relation to yourself. is kind of
subjectivity thus seems to depend on the ﬁrst and fourth forms of subjectivity
that De Sousa described: perspective and privileged access, our (S) and (S).
e eighth interpretation of subjectivity is called ‘tone or color’ and, de-
spite its name, does not refer to ordinary color perception. Instead, ‘tone or
color’ should here be understood as ‘one’s experience of oneself ’ or ‘my feeling-
of-being-me’. De Sousa stresses that this kind of subjectivity cannot be
reduced to ipseity. However this may be, I think that this kind of subjectivity
can be reduced to another kind of subjectivity that De Sousa distinguishes
later (number ), which is a deﬁnition that we have seen before, namely (S):
E is subjective=df. For all subjects S, if S has E, then there is something it is
like for S to have E. As we have talked about in our discussion of Nagel, there
is something it is like to have experiences, including the experience of being
ourselves or having our own experiences. One of Nagel’s main examples is that
there is something it is like for a bat to be a bat, and that there is something it
is like for us to be ourselves. I don’t see a reason why ‘tone or colour’ couldn’t
be reduced to this kind of subjectivity – De Sousa’s number  and our (S) –
and, in fact, I think it should be so reduced.
e ninth interpretation of subjectivity is ‘subjectivity in intersubjectivity’.
 See Nagel ; Perry .
 De Sousa .
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e idea here is that our identity is intersubjective in a sense. is is an
interesting idea, but it does not concern the subjectivity of the mental, but
rather a phenomenon in social philosophy that has also been called ‘social
identity’, which is the ‘part’ of our identity that has been formed under the
inﬂuence of others. I don’t think that we need to add this interpretation of
subjectivity to our deﬁnitions for the reason that this is a kind of subjectivity
that is relevant in social philosophy and maybe in daily life, but this is not the
kind of subjectivity that is relevant in the philosophy of mind.
e tenth interpretation of subjectivity is ‘projection’ or ‘projective illu-
sion’, in a Freudian sense. is is how De Sousa describes ‘projection’:
Now projection is actually a pathological condition, to the extent that it represents a
mistake, an illusion based on a sort of confusion between a characteristic of oneself
(which isn’t acknowledged) and which is ascribed to others though it isn’t actually
there.
According to De Sousa, this kind of projection is an instance of an interpre-
tation of subjectivity. e best way for me to understand this is to interpret
De Sousa as saying that projection is an instance of ‘interpretation of reality’
or ‘subjective truth’: the truth according to one person, which is not the
truth according to anyone else (and, of course, strictly speaking no truth at
all). Maybe this kind of ‘interpretation of reality’ is comparable to, or the
same as, an opinion, with the diﬀerence that ‘projection’ is an opinion that
is necessarily inaccurate, while opinions generally can be accurate. As I said
in the introduction to this chapter, in daily life opinions are a paradigm case
of something to which the term ‘subjective’ applies. is interpretation of
subjectivity is thus a form of subjectivity which we speak about in daily life and
ordinary contexts, but this is not a form of subjectivity that is relevant within
the philosophy of mind. I will therefore not distinguish a separate deﬁnition
for this interpretation of subjectivity.
e eleventh interpretation of subjectivity is ‘seeing-as’, by whichDe Sousa
means that we often, if not always, perceive things as being such and such.
ere is an interesting debate in the philosophy of perception about the ques-
tion whether or not all observation has conceptual content, but this debate
does not concern the form of subjectivity in which we are here interested.
e twelfth and ﬁnal interpretation of subjectivity that De Sousa distin-
guishes is phenomenal experience, which we have captured in deﬁnition (S).
 Ibid.
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is ends our discussion of the twelve interpretations of subjectivity that
De Sousa distinguishes. What can we conclude from this discussion? First,
the term ‘subjectivity’ can be interpreted in many ways and not all of these
interpretations of the term ‘subjectivity’ fall within the philosophy of mind
or, in other words, concern the subjectivity of the mental or of experience.
De Sousa’s interpretations of subjectivity include, among others, ones that are
relevant in social philosophy, ethics, metaphysics, philosophy of perception,
daily life, etc. Of these interpretations, we have said that they fall beyond the
scope of our ﬁeld or this project, which is why we haven’t formulated any new
deﬁnitions for these kinds of subjectivity.
e second conclusion we can draw from this discussion is that all the
interpretations of subjectivity that De Sousa distinguishes that are within the
scope of this project, map onto our deﬁnitions of subjectivity perfectly. We do
not have to add any new deﬁnitions to our inventory. Here is the schematic
result of mapping onto De Sousa:
. Perspective. (S)
. Agency. (not relevant)
. Titularity or ownness. (S)
. Privileged access. (S)
. e incorrigibility of appearance. (not relevant)
. Proprioceptive sense. reduces to (S), (S) and (S)
. Ipseity. reduces to (S) and (S)
. Tone or color. reduces to (S)
. e subjectivity in intersubjectivity. (not relevant)
.Projection. (not relevant)
. Seeing-as. (not relevant)
.Phenomenal experience. (S)
De Sousa’s ﬁrst, third, fourth and twelfth interpretation of subjectivity all
correspond to deﬁnitions that we have also distinguished. On top of that, his
sixth, seventh and eighth interpretations can be reduced to deﬁnitions that we
distinguished, which means that all the interpretations that are relevant in a
philosophy of mind context are covered by the ﬁve deﬁnitions that we found
earlier. As is also clear from the above schema, deﬁnition (S) that we distin-
guished does not occur on De Sousa’s list. According to (S) E is subjective
=df. E is private. is might be covered either by De Sousa’s ‘ownness’ or by
his ‘privileged access’.
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.. How Other Accounts Fit (S)-(S)
In this section, I will show that the other accounts of subjectivity in the
literature ﬁt my schema of subjective-making properties (S)-(S). I will do
so by discussing a number of diﬀerent papers and books in the literature in
which deﬁnitions or descriptions of subjectivity are oﬀered. Since there are
so many of these, the question is which ones made it in here. For obvious
spatio-temporal reasons, I have limited my discussion to two sets of three or
four accounts of subjectivity that can be found in the literature.
e ﬁrst set consists of the accounts of subjectivity proﬀered by Mandik,
Sturgeon, Perry and Kriegel. All four of them oﬀer accounts of subjectivity
that are inspired by Nagel’s account and are very similar to it. As such this
set represents the many more papers in the literature that are very similar to
Nagel’s. e reason to include this set is to show that Nagel’s account, which
we have used as a basis for gathering deﬁnitions of subjectivity, is not obscure
or single-minded but an ideal and solid foundation for the analysis of this
concept, as the adoption and defense of it have been shown time and time
again by similar-minded papers.
e second set that I will discuss consists of three accounts of subjectivity
found in the work of Searle, Georgalis and Farkas who have all three written
extensively on the topic of subjectivity but in a much more independent way
than the members of the previous set. Even though these accounts are more
independent of Nagel’s account, they all end up describing subjectivity in a
fashion very similar to Nagel’s (S).
I hope that this section shows that it is justiﬁed to base the analysis of
the conception of subjectivity on Nagel’s account since it has inﬂuenced and
convinced many, and it corresponds to the accounts of others. I will start with
the ﬁrst set of four: Mandik, Sturgeon, Perry and Kriegel.
In the abstract of his paper “eNeurophilosophy of Subjectivity”Mandik
gives the following description of subjectivity:
Subjectivity is the alleged property of consciousness whereby one can know what it is
like to have certain conscious states only if one has undergone such states oneself.
Two things should be noted about this description of subjectivity. First, ac-
cording to this deﬁnition, subjectivity is an epistemic property. After all,
Mandik uses the term ‘can know what it is like (to have certain conscious
states)’ instead of using the term ‘having (certain conscious states)’. Second,
 Mandik : .
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it should be noted that, according to this deﬁnition, subjectivity is a property
of consciousness and conscious mental states. At least, that is what it seems
like. However, on the same page, Mandik gives a diﬀerent description of
subjectivity, according to which it is not the case that subjectivity is a property
of consciousness and conscious mental states:
Subjectivity is an alleged property of phenomenal character, namely, the property of
being one-way knowable. More speciﬁcally, the claim that phenomenal character is
subjective is the claim that the only way to know some phenomenal character is by
having a conscious experience that has that character.
According to this second description, subjectivity is a property of phenomenal
character, not of consciousness. It is remarkable that Mandik uses diﬀerent
terms in these two descriptions of subjectivity that occur on the same page
of the paper. Since he does not explain this, and since he uses the second
description in the rest of his paper, I will assume he actually has this deﬁnition
in mind, in which subjectivity is a property of phenomenal character. Also,
as we have seen in the previous section, if it is the case that phenomenal
character is subjective, and conscious mental states have phenomenal charac-
ter, then conscious mental states would still be subjective in virtue of having
phenomenal character. e reverse does not hold, if conscious mental states
are subjective, it does not follow that phenomenal character is subjective.is
is another reason to stick with Mandik’s second description.
Now, what does Mandik claim exactly? Mandik claims that what it means
for phenomenal character to be subjective is that ‘the only way to know some
phenomenal character is by having a conscious experience that has that char-
acter’. We can paraphrase this in the following way: for phenomenal character
to be subjective means that ‘only individuals who have had an experience of
type E can know what it is like to have E.’ Put in terms of types of phenom-
enal character rather than types of experience, this becomes ‘only individuals
who have had an experience can know what it is like to have an experience.’
Now, this is very close to Nagel’s deﬁnition (S) in combination with the
point of view that we called (PV), so (S0). Mandik uses the combination of
the deﬁnition of subjectivity together with the description of the particular
point of view as a description of subjectivity. is can be taken to mean that,
even though he does not explicitly formulate them as such, Mandik agrees
with Nagel’s (S0). Mandik’s description of the subjectivity of experience is so
 Ibid. Mandik adds to qualify: ‘is is a ﬁrst pass and will be reﬁned further later’.
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similar to deﬁnition (S0) that we have found, that we can say that it can be
reduced to (S0).
Mandik indeed mentions that his description of the subjectivity of experi-
ence is based on the work of Nagel. He oﬀers his own interpretation of Nagel’s
account of subjectivity:
For all types of phenomenal character, in order to know what it is like to have a
conscious experience with a phenomenal character of a type, one must have, at that
or some prior time, a conscious experience with a phenomenal character of the same
type.
Mandik recognizes that many philosophers, including ones supporting
Nagel’s argument, would reject this deﬁnition for the reason that this principle
does not seem to hold for all types of phenomenal character. at is, this
analysis falls prey to the ‘missing shade of blue’ objection (as we have discussed
in section ..). is is why Mandik suggests adjusting the principle in the
following manner:
For at least one type of phenomenal character, in order to know what it is like to have a
conscious experience with a phenomenal character of a type, one must have, at that or
some prior time, a conscious experience with a phenomenal character of a relevantly
similar type.
is deﬁnition is equivalent to our (S0), which means that Mandik conﬁrms
our reading and interpretation of Nagel. It also conﬁrms that, even though we
cannot ﬁnd this last modiﬁcation in Mandik’s own analysis of the subjectivity
of experience, he would certainly agree with adding it, which would mean
that his description would become even more similar to Nagel’s. In the rest of
the paper, Mandik discusses the phenomenal concept strategy to account for
the subjectivity of experience thus characterized and judges it on its merits,
which I will not be able to go into at this point.
Next, let’s turn to “e Epistemic View of Subjectivity” from Sturgeon. In
this paper Sturgeon gives a characterization of the subjectivity of experience
that is very similar to (S). He writes:
I assume that perceptions and sensations do, at least on occasion, manifest conscious
subjectivity. I further assume they do so by possessing “phenomenal properties”. I call
such properties qualia.
 Ibid.: . Note: this is Mandik’s interpretation of Nagel, not Nagel’s own words.
 Ibid.
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Qualia are (identical to) the features that give certain perceptions and sensations their
characteristic subjectivity. 
Sturgeon clearly seems to hold, then, that subjective character is identical to
phenomenal character, which is expressed by (S).
Later on, Sturgeon makes the following two claims about knowing what
it is like to have an experience with certain phenomenal character:
To understand the nature of a given kind of subjective experience, one must know
what it is like to have that kind of experience.
To know what it is like to have a given kind of subjective experience, one must have
had that experience.
As we have already seen, Sturgeon does not think that these theses about
‘knowing what it is like’ describe a subjective-making property. Instead, he
thinks that the subjective-making property of experience is identical to its
phenomenal properties (or phenomenal character). Sturgeon’s two statements
about ‘knowing what it is like’ should therefore be interpreted as statements
indicating which persons can take up the same point of view and so which
persons can know what it is like to have a particular experience. Although it
is not spelled-out in as much detail, Sturgeon’s statements closely resemble
(PV). I think we can therefore say that Sturgeon’s description of subjectivity
is more or less identical to (S) and that he also agrees with (PV).
In Knowledge, Possibility, And Consciousness, Perry also oﬀers an account of
subjectivity that is quite similar to Nagel’s. Here are the relevant passages:
We are feeling an intense pain. We focus on that pain and on a certain aspect of it.
Not on its cause, nor on the injury it might lead to, but on what it is like to have it.
is aspect of the experience is sometimes called its “subjective character”, and such
aspects are sometimes called “qualia”.
But common sense also supports what Chalmers calls the phenomenal concept of
mind, it holds that some of our mental states, which I’ll call “experiences” have sub-
jective characters in Nagel’s sense.at is, experiences are those mental states that have
the property that it is like something to be in them. What it is like to be in a brain
state is its subjective character.
 Sturgeon : .
 Ibid.
 Ibid.
 Perry : .
 Ibid.: .
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According to Perry, then, subjectivity is identical to phenomenal character
or qualia, just as Sturgeon argues. Perry’s interpretation of the subjectivity of
experience is thus identical to (S), which we have found in Nagel’s work.
e fourth and ﬁnal paper in this set is Kriegel’s “Naturalizing Subjective
Character”. ere are three relevant passages in this paper in which subjectiv-
ity is described. Here is the ﬁrst relevant passage of the paper:
When I have a conscious experience of the sky, there is a bluish way it is like for me to
have or undergo my experience. I suggest that we distinguish two aspects in this bluish
way it is like for me: (i) the bluish aspect, which wemay call the experience’s qualitative
character, and (ii) the for-me aspect, which we may call its subjective character.
In this ﬁrst passage, Kriegel describes the subjective property of experience as
the ‘for-me’ aspect of the experience. It is not entirely clear what Kriegel means
by the ‘for-me’ aspect of experience. It is not the phenomenal character of the
experience, which would be, as Kriegel calls it, ‘the experience’s qualitative
character’. If it isn’t anything qualitative then it seems the ‘for-me’ aspect of
experience is purely formal and can only refer to the fact that (say) I am having
the experience, i.e. either to the relation the object of experience and I stand
in or the relation between the phenomenal character of the experience and
me. However, there are two more relevant passages. Let’s take a look at the
second one:
Not only is the experience bluish, but I am also aware of its being bluish. Its being
bluish constitutes its qualitative character, while my awareness of it constitutes its
subjective character.
In this second passage, Kriegel describes the subjective property of experience
in terms of ‘my awareness of it’. ‘It’ in this sentence probably refers to ‘the
experience’, although this is not entirely clear. In any case, this quotation
makes one think that our interpretation of the ﬁrst passage is not accurate,
and all Kriegel means by the ‘for-me’ aspect of experience is that we are aware
of the phenomenal, or qualitative, character of our experiences. So, Kriegel
thinks that the subjective-making property of experience is identical to our
awareness of the (phenomenal character of ) experience. Kriegel thinks, then,
that that which makes an experience a conscious experience is identical to the
property which makes an experience a subjective experience. Is this in line
with the third passage? Here it is:
 Kriegel : .
 Ibid.
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e subjective character, or for-me-ness, of an experience consists, then, in the inner
awareness the experience involves.
In this third passage, Kriegel describes the subjective property of experience
as ‘the inner awareness the experience involves’. I take it this is supposed to
express the same idea as the idea expressed in Kriegel’s second passage, namely
that the subjective property of experience is identical to that (property) which
makes experience conscious. According to Kriegel, then, what it means for
experience to be subjective is that the person having the experience is aware
of it. is is how we could put it more formally: Experience E is subjective
=df. S is aware of E. Now, why don’t we distinguish this deﬁnition as a separate
deﬁnition of the subjectivity of experience?
We don’t distinguish this as a separate deﬁnition of the subjectivity of
experience because it can be reduced to (S). According to (S), experience
is subjective in the sense that only the person who has (had) an experience
knows the experience. Obviously, Kriegel’s account of the subjectivity of expe-
rience is not in terms of knowledge but in terms of awareness. However, these
terms are closely related, if not used in the same way in this context. Imagine
having a particular experience, say a headache. Once you realize you have
a headache, you are aware of this experience and you know the experience.
One could argue about the diﬀerence between these two cases or about their
chronological or causal relations, but all in all we can say that that they both
concern an individual standing in an epistemological relation to his or her
own experience.is common base is suﬃcient for not distinguishing an extra
deﬁnition of the subjectivity of experience here.
is concludes the discussion of the ﬁrst set of four accounts of subjectivity
that are similar to Nagel’s. Now I will move on to the second set of three:
Searle, Georgalis and Farkas.
e ﬁrst alternative account of subjectivity of this second set that should
be considered is Searle’s account. In e Mystery of Consciousness and e
Rediscovery of the Mind, Searle has written extensively about the subjectivity of
consciousness. Like Nagel, Searle is a defender of the idea that consciousness
is subjective, as is clear from passages such as the following:
Conscious mental states and processes have the special feature not possessed by other
natural phenomena, namely subjectivity.
 Ibid.: .
 Searle : .
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Consider, for example, the statement ‘I now have a pain in my lower back.’ at
statement is completely objective in the sense that it is made true by the existence of an
objective fact (…). However, the phenomenon itself, the actual pain, has a subjective
mode of existence.
Now, what does Searle mean by pain having a ‘subjective mode of existence’?
e following two passages can help us understand what Searle thinks the
subjectivity of experience is:
Well, ﬁrst it is essential to see that in consequence of its subjectivity, the pain is
not equally accessible to any observer. Its existence, we might say, is a ﬁrst-person
existence. (…) Subjectivity has the further consequence that all of my conscious forms
of intentionality that give me information about the world independent of myself are
always from a special point of view. e world itself has no point of view, but my
access to the world through my conscious states is always perspectival.
Conscious states are qualitative in the sense that for any conscious state, such as
feeling a pain or worrying about the economic situation, there is something that it
qualitatively feels like to be in that state, and they are subjective in the sense that they
only exist when experienced by some human or other sort of “subject”.
I will discuss the latter passage ﬁrst, since the former passage speaks of ‘conse-
quences’ of subjectivity, which might not be descriptions of subjectivity itself.
In the latter passage, Searle distinguishes between consciousness states (which
can also be called ‘mental states’ or ‘experiences’) being ‘qualitative’ on the one
hand and ‘subjective’ on the other hand. Searle’s description of a mental state
being ‘qualitative’ is that there is something it is like to be in that state (just
as Kriegel uses the term ‘qualitative’). is is the property of experience that
we have called ‘phenomenal character’ or ‘qualia’. Searle distinguishes this
from experience being ‘subjective’, which for him has a diﬀerent meaning.
What does it mean for experience to be subjective or, in other words, for
experience to have ‘a subjective mode of existence’, according to Searle? ere
are two ideas that we can extract from Searle’s writing. First, for experiences
to be subjective means that experiences only exist when experienced by a
person or some other sort of ‘subject’. is is very similar to the deﬁnition of
experience that we found in Kekes. To recall: (S) E is subjective =df. ere
 Ibid.: .
 Ibid.: .
 Searle : xiv.
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is some subject S which has E. is deﬁnition expresses a form of ontological
dependence: experiences only exist when they are had by a person or ‘subject’.
Second, there is the idea in Searle’s writing, notably in the ﬁrst passage,
that a direct consequence of subjectivity is that we have a point of view and
that experiences are perspectival. Now Searle calls this a ‘consequence of ’
subjectivity rather than a deﬁnition of subjectivity, which makes sense given
the fact that his interpretation of subjectivity is the same as Kekes’. at is to
say, according to Searle, what it means for experience to be subjective is that
the experience is had by a subject. Now, it follows from this, and is telling of
subjectivity, that experiences are perspectival. After all, each person or subject
has his/her own ‘point of view’. We have already encountered the term ‘point
of view’ in Nagel and we distinguished the following deﬁnition of subjectivity
based on it: (S) E is subjective =df. E is essentially connected to a single point
of view. It seems, then, that Searle thinks that (S) is the subjective-making
property of experience, but that experience is also, as a consequence, subjective
in the sense of (S).
e second account of subjectivity in this set that I want to look at is from
Georgalis. Ine Primacy of the Subjective, Georgalis writes extensively about
the subjectivity of experience. What does this term mean according to him?
Certainly a crucial element in an agent’s phenomenal subjective state is the particular
perspectival view she enjoys. is is the kernel of truth in the view of those – for
example, William Lycan (, ) and Gilbert Harman () – who would
analyze subjectivity, in part, as consisting in the subject’s unique perspective.
According to this description of subjectivity, subjectivity consists (in part)
in ‘the subject’s unique perspective’. Leaving the ‘in part’ qualiﬁcation aside,
what does it mean to say that subjectivity consists in ‘the subject’s unique
perspective’? is is to say that persons, or subjects, have a point of view and
that their experiences are always experiences from this point of view, which
makes them perspectival. Georgalis’ account of subjectivity is thus very similar
to (S) and can be reduced to it.
Ine Subject’s Point of View, Farkas also describes mental facts and mental
states as being perspectival and essentially so. Let’s take a look at the following
passages:
e mind is essentially revealed from the subject’s point of view.
 Georgalis : .
 Farkas : .
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It may seem strange that some portion of reality is knowable by one person in this
special way. An explanation of this circumstance is oﬀered by the observation that
mental facts are perspectival facts.
For a minded being, things do not just surround one, but they appear to one in a
certain way, they feel a certain way, they are enjoyed or they ﬁll one with despair,
things are desired or believed. is perspective includes not only the world around us,
but also ourselves.
In these passages, Farkas does not deﬁne subjectivity in particular as the fact
that experiences are perspectival, but she does deﬁne ‘the mind’ as such. Even
so, she does agree with Searle and Georgalis that experiences are perspectival.
Both Georgalis’ and Farkas’ account of subjectivity can be captured by the
deﬁnition of subjectivity (S) that we found in Nagel’s work. is concludes
the discussion of the second set of three alternative accounts of subjectivity.
Before concluding this section, it should be noted that Jackson’s knowl-
edge argument is not discussed in this section or chapter since his argument is
an argument that concerns the phenomenal character, or qualia, of experience.
As we have seen, many philosophers identify qualia and subjective character
of experience, but there are also many philosophers who don’t. I will discuss
Jackson’s knowledge argument in Chapter  section .., where I consider
whether the subjectivity of experience interpreted as identical to qualia is a
problem for naturalism or not.
What have we learned from looking at these two sets of accounts of sub-
jectivity? From looking at the ﬁrst set of papers in this section, we learned that
many philosophers agree with Nagel’s ﬁrst or second deﬁnition, (S) or (S),
in combination with (PV). We have also seen that the ambiguity in Nagel’s
paper is reﬂected in the ambiguous and diﬀerent positions other philosophers
have taken in the debate since Nagel. On the one hand, it seems that Nagel
is saying that experience is subjective solely in virtue of having phenomenal
character, but, on the other hand, it seems as though he thinks that experience
is only subjective in virtue of this phenomenal character having the further
property of being accessible only from a particular point of view. In the debate
after Nagel, as has become clear in this section, philosophers have taken both
positions and have sometimes taken a position similarly ambiguous.
From the second set of papers we learned that even accounts of subjectiv-
ity that are more independent from Nagel’s account still end up describing
subjectivity in a very similar fashion. is shows that Nagel’s account has not
 Ibid.
 Ibid.
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only been inﬂuential, but is also plausible, since others have arrived at the
same conclusions as he has.
Overall, the conclusion that we can draw from this section is that other
accounts of subjectivity in the literature ﬁt the list of subjective-making prop-
erties (S)-(S) that we have composed. So it is not the case that we have
adopted an idiosyncratic eccentric account, which does not correspond to
any of the other ones in the literature. Quite the opposite: we have based our
deﬁnitions on an inﬂuential and plausible account of subjectivity.
. - 
In this section, I will focus on two questions concerning the subjective-making
properties (S)-(S). e ﬁrst question I will address is whether experience is
actually subjective in the ways speciﬁed by (S)-(S). In other words: does
experience have the subjective-making properties that (S)-(S) describe? As
we have seen, Nagel thinks that experience does have these properties. But,
even though we have abstracted some of our deﬁnitions from Nagel’s paper,
we never presupposed that experience is in fact subjective in these ways. In
section .., I will discuss whether or not it is.
e second question that I will address in this section is whether other
mental phenomena have these subjective-making properties. I will discuss this
in section ...
.. Does Experience Have ese Subjective-Making Properties?
In the previous sections we found ﬁve possible deﬁnitions of subjectivity. In
order to be able to establish in Chapter  whether or not the subjectivity
of experience is a problem for naturalism, we ﬁrst need to know whether
experience actually is subjective in any of the senses deﬁned in the previous
sections. As we have seen, Nagel claims that experience is subjective in these
ways, but, in our search for deﬁnitions of subjectivity, we have bracketed the
question whether anything is subjective in these ways. Now, it might cause
confusion that we have deﬁned the subjectivity of experience, yet that we have
bracketed the question whether experience is actually subjective in these ways.
Is there no contradiction there?
ere is no contradiction between deﬁning something and then going on
to ask if that thing exists. Let me give some examples. In science, we deﬁne a
particle (e.g. the Higgs particle) and then we do experiments to see if it exists.
In general, we can ask what a predicate means and then see if anything satisﬁes
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this predicate. For example, we can deﬁne a golden mountain as a mountain
made of gold, and then we can go on to ask if there are such things as golden
mountains. Similarly, even though we came up with possible deﬁnitions of
the subjectivity of experience, this does not mean that experience actually is
subjective. So far, we know what it means to say that experience is subjective
(S)-(S), and now it is time to ask the question whether experience actually
is subjective in any of these senses. After all, if nothing is subjective in any of
these senses, then we need not consider whether these deﬁnitions of subjec-
tivity are a problem for naturalism, since then there will not exist anything
subjective.
In what follows, I will discuss each deﬁnition and see if there are rea-
sons to think that experience is subjective in the speciﬁed sense, i.e. if it has
the subjective-making property expressed by the deﬁnition. e ﬁrst possible
deﬁnition of subjectivity that should be discussed is (S). To recall:
(S) E is subjective=df. For all subjects S, if S has E, then there is
something it is like for S to have E.
According to (S), the subjectivity of experience is identical to the phenom-
enal character of experience. at is, what it is like to have an experience is
the phenomenal character of the experience, as well as that property which
makes the experience subjective (i.e. the subjective-making property). Now,
is it the case that ‘there is something it is like for S to have E’? at is, is it the
case that there is something it is like for a person to have a particular experi-
ence? Not many philosophers, including naturalists, would want to deny this.
However, some do. erefore it is not uncontroversial to say that experience
is subjective in this way. However, common sense does seem to suggest that
there is something it is like to have an experience. After all, there is something
it is like to see a red tomato, which is very diﬀerent from what it is like to
taste that same tomato. is means that diﬀerent experiences have diﬀerent
phenomenal character, which implies that they have phenomenal character in
the ﬁrst place. And, even though one could deny that there is anything it is
like to either see or taste a tomato (or for that matter, have any other kind of
experience), this position has undesirable consequences. For example, if one
wants to hold that there is no such thing as pain, then how does one explain
its resulting behavior, such as the person in pain calling a doctor? If it would
not be painful to be in pain, then why act on it? And if one thinks that there
is nothing it is like to experience either pleasure or pain, then why do people
strive to maximize the former and avoid the latter? It does not seem possible
to make sense of our behavior (or even our concepts, in case of ‘pain’) if we
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deny that there is something it is like to have experiences. Neither could we
understand emotions, moods, art, music, motivations for actions, etc. Since
I cannot see a way in which we can deny that there is something it is like to
have experiences and make sense of these very important and basic things in
our lives at the same time, I think we can safely say that the burden of proof
lies on the side of those who want to deny that there is something it is like to
have experiences. I cannot but tentatively conclude that there is something it
is like to have experiences.
e next possible deﬁnition of experience, (S), was also found in Nagel’s
work. Here it is again:
(S) E is subjective =df. E is essentially connected to a single point
of view.
Is experience actually subjective in the way speciﬁed by (S)? It seems like it
is. After all, it seems impossible to have experiences without a point of view,
i.e. without there being a particular subject (of experience), or in other words,
a person. ere has to be a subject, or person, in order for a token experience
to be had, and for there to be anything it is like to have that experience.
e claim that experiences need to be had by a subject has been denied by
a number of philosophers, most famously by Hume. According to Hume
there is no such thing as the self or ‘the ﬁrst person’, but there are only bundles
of impressions and ideas. Hume’s reason for thinking that there are no persons
or ‘selves’ is that in introspection we are aware of our impressions and ideas,
but we never encounter a ‘self ’. is does not seem to be a particularly good
argument against the existence of the self, for why would we expect the self to
appear to us in the same way as an impression or idea? And why couldn’t we
say introspection is cognitive instead of purely observational? e fact that we
do not observe the self in introspection in the same way we observe ideas does
not seem to be a good reason to think there are no subjects of experience.
In addition to the fact that experiences are had by a subject, there are
no token experience that more than one subject can have, which means that
each token experience can only be had by one subject. Moreover, there are
no experiences ‘from a view from nowhere’. All these points together seem
to suggest that experience is connected to a single point of view. Naturally,
there is more to be said about what a point of view exactly is. However, for
our purposes here it suﬃces to establish that there is an essential connection
between a point of view and persons. In this light, it becomes clear that it is
 Hume .
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impossible for there to be experiences without a point of view. It also becomes
clear that it is impossible for there to be a person without experiences – given
that this person is not a zombie, but in fact has consciousness, which I assume
to be an essential feature of a person. It seems clear, then, that experience is
subjective in the way speciﬁed by deﬁnition (S).
But is experience also subjective if you interpret the concept of ‘point
of view’ the way we have done in (PV) or, in other words, is experience
subjective in the way of (S0)? According to (S0), one can only know what it
is like to have an experience if one has had that experience or an experience
with suﬃciently similar phenomenal character. Now, is it the case that you
cannot know what it is like to have an experience if you have never had a
similar experience? ere are two points I want to make in answer to this
question. First, I do think that it is unlikely that we can know what it is like
to have an experience that is very diﬀerent from any experience we have ever
had. Nagel’s claim that we do not know what it is like to perceive the world by
sonar is a good example in this respect. Similarly, I think I do not know what
it is like to taste vegemite because I never have tasted it, and I do not know
what it is like to be blind or deaf because I am not. I think that if anyone wants
to argue that in fact you can know what it is like to have experiences that are
very diﬀerent from any experiences you have ever had, then the burden of
proof lies on their side. Personally, I do not have these imaginative powers.
e second point I want to make here is that even though I think experi-
ence is subjective in the sense of (S0), there is a weakness in its formulation. A
crucial term used in (S0) is the term ‘suﬃciently similar’: you can know what
it is like to have an experience if you have had experiences with suﬃciently
similar phenomenal character. But when is phenomenal character suﬃciently
similar? As I indicated before, there is room for debate here, which means
that whether or not one accepts (S0) partly depends on the interpretation of
the term ‘suﬃciently similar’. Despite the fact that people might not agree on
which kinds of phenomenal character are suﬃciently similar, I do think that
the gist of (S0), that we cannot know what it is like to have experience with
phenomenal character that is not suﬃciently similar, is true.
It seems, then, that, so far, experience has these two subjective-making
properties. But does it have even more subjective-making properties? Let’s
take a look at the next possible deﬁnition:
(S) E is subjective =df. E is private.
We already discussed this deﬁnition a little bit in the relevant section. We said
there that indeed a token experience and its token phenomenal character can
   
only be had and accessed by one person. For example, you can know what it is
like for me to taste lemon, since you have tasted lemon before (and thus have
had an experience with suﬃciently similar phenomenal character), but you
cannot accessmy ‘taste’ of the lemon and, as it were, sharemy token experience
and its token phenomenal character. Granted, you can have an experience
of the same kind and it can be very similar for you what it is like to have
this experience as it is for me, but token experiences and their phenomenal
character can only be had and accessed by one person. Experience is thus
clearly subjective in the way that experience and its phenomenal character are
always and necessarily private.
What about the next, related, possible deﬁnition of subjectivity?
(S) E is subjective =df. E can only be known from a ﬁrst person
point of view.
From the fact that token experiences are private (S) it follows that one cannot
know (at least not directly) what someone else experiences. After all, only
Jack has his token experiences and consequently only Jack can know (that
he has) them from a ﬁrst person point of view. However, it might seem that
even though we cannot access Jack’s token experiences and even though we
cannot have knowledge of them ‘directly’, there are ways to ﬁnd out what
Jack is experiencing. Clues can be obtained from studying Jack’s behavior
(such as facial expressions, actions) and even more easily by listening to Jack’s
description of his experiences. If Jack tells Jill ‘I have a headache’, Jill can take
this as pretty reliable evidence that Jack has a headache and, since Jill has had
headaches before, she knows what Jack experiences. But does she? Dowe really
know (about) other people’s experiences?
On the one hand, it seems that we do. If we cannot trust language to be
a reliable, we would not only be in the dark about other people’s experiences,
but we could not have any sort of knowledge from testimony, which would
leave us in a rather dim place in general. But this does not take away that there
are limitations to what can be conveyed by language – especially when there is
no way to verify statements – as is the case when the objects of such statements
are private, such as experiences. Let me explain. If Jack tells Jill he bought a
new car, Jill can verify this statement by going out to his garage, checking his
insurance papers, checking his bank transactions and so on. However, if Jack
 at is, if you are not an identity-theorist and think that experiences are identical to brain
states. I will address the identity theory as an objection against my overall argument in
section ...
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tells Jill he is having a terrible pain, there is not much she can do to verify this
statement. If Jack is ﬂat out lying, Jill could maybe pick up on certain signals:
e.g. if his face is relaxed or he is smiling she might doubt that he is speaking
the truth. But if Jack’s behavior and facial expression match with what he is
saying, Jill can only believe Jack is speaking the truth (or not).
Let’s say Jack says he is in pain and he is not lying, his behavior is in line
with his claim and, from everything Jill has to go on, it seems that Jack is in
pain. But in how much pain is Jack? is is where the trouble starts. It seems
we don’t have an objective way to measure pain. ere are some things we can
do to narrow it down, such as asking Jack to rate his pain on a scale from -
( being themost pain and  being pain-free) and we can ask Jack to compare
the pain he is currently having with past pains of the same type or with past
pains of a diﬀerent type. For example, we can ask Jack: ‘Does your headache
hurt more than the one you had last month?’ or ‘Does your headache hurt
more than the toothache you talked about  months ago?’ Answers to these
questions might help Jill establish just how bad Jack’s headache is, but it will
not enable her to pin down exactly and most importantly ‘comparatively’ how
bad the headache really is. at is, not only will Jill not know exactly where
to place Jack’s headache on a scale of -, she will also not be able to know
whether his headache is worse than the one she had a few days ago. After all,
if Jack rates his headache a , how does he come to this rating? e way we
rate our own pains is, presumably, based on comparing and contrasting them
with our pain-free state as well as past and/or other pains. is means that
the rating of a particular pain is only signiﬁcant in a particular context: the
subject’s own context. Jill’s headache could be as bad objectively, but shemight
only rate it a  or a , in comparison with her past pains (e.g. if she has had
worse headaches more often than Jack). So, even if we use a tool to express
the intensity of our pains (the scale -), this informs us to some extent, i.e.
we can place someone’s pain in relation to their other pains, but it does not
inform us fully; we will still not be able to compare the intensity of this pain
to anyone else’s pain. e tool cannot be used ‘objectively’.
An additional diﬃculty is that even if one can know someone else’s expe-
riences, one cannot know that one knows. Let me explain. Say that Jack and
Jill would both rate the headache that Jack has as a ; Jack does so because
he feels that this is how his headache compares to his previous headaches and
pains and Jill does so out of pure luck (or out of great imaginative powers; it
does not matter for the argument how she comes to rate it this way). Now,
even though Jill ‘knows’ Jack’s experience, there is no way for her to verify
and check that she does. We have reason to believe that experience can only
be accurately described from a ﬁrst person point of view, fromwhich it follows
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that only from a ﬁrst person point of view can it be established whether or
not that description is correct. is means that, even if we think we know
someone else’s experiences, there is no way to verify. is seems to suggest
that (S) is true and one can only fully know experiences from a ﬁrst person
point of view.
e next possible deﬁnition of the subjectivity of experience is the one we
found in Kekes’ paper:
(S) E is subjective=df. ere is some subject S which has E.
Can we give examples of (S)? As we already discussed, an experience is
necessarily an experience of a subject: there are no experiences without an
‘experiencer’. Since experience is always had by a subject, just any example of
any experience will show experience to be subjective in this way.
In sum, then, it seems that experience is actually subjective in all ﬁve
senses that we have found: there is something it is like to have experiences,
experiences are connected to a single point of view, experiences are private,
experiences can only be fully known from a ﬁrst person point of view and
experiences are had by a subject. ese claims are not uncontroversial, but
we have given examples and/or reasons to think that experience is subjective
in these senses. For now, we can therefore conclude that experience is in fact
subjective.
.. Do Other Mental Phenomena Have ese Subjective-Making
Properties?
At the end of this chapter, I brieﬂy want to consider the question whether
other mental phenomena have the same subjective-making properties that ex-
perience has. After all, it is not only said of experience that it is subjective, but
of the mental in general. Now, as I said at the beginning of this chapter, there
is no reason to assume a priori that every mental phenomenon is subjective in
the same way(s), viz. by having the same subjective-making property(/ies). But
now that we have found several properties that make experience subjective, we
can check whether other mental phenomena are subjective in the same ways.
One qualiﬁcation is in place, which is that about each of these phenomena
many books can and have be(en) written. erefore I do not pretend to cover
much ground or make any exhaustive claims by discussing them brieﬂy. e
only intention of this section is a brief reﬂection on the applicability of the
subjective-making properties that we have found to these mental phenomena.
Do other mental phenomena have the same subjective-making properties
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that experience has? Since the deﬁnitions of subjectivity that we have found,
(S)-(S), are all in terms of ‘experience’, we will need to abstract a general
deﬁnition for each deﬁnition of the subjectivity of experience. Which general
deﬁnitions of subjectivity can we abstract from our deﬁnitions (S)-(S)?Here
is a list of the general deﬁnitions of subjectivity that we can abstract:
(S*) X is subjective =df. For all subjects S, if S has X, then there is
something it is like for S to have X.
(S*) X is subjective =df. X is essentially connected to a single point
of view.
(S*) X is subjective =df. X is private. Or: X is subjective =df. For all
subjects S, if S has X, then only S has X.
(S*) X is subjective =df. X can only be known from a ﬁrst person
point of view.
(S*) X is subjective =df. ere is some subject S which has X.
In what follows, I will check whether or not other mental phenomena have
these subjective-making properties that experience has.
Does ‘phenomenal character’ have the same subjective-making properties
as experience? ‘Qualia’ or ‘phenomenal character’ is a (supposedly) mental
phenomenon that receives a great deal of attention in the literature and that we
have already encountered in this chapter. Earlier we described what it means
for experience to have phenomenal character but, to refresh our memory, here
is another description of the hand of Tye:
Feelings and experiences vary widely. For example, I run my ﬁngers over sandpaper,
smell a skunk, feel a sharp pain in my ﬁnger, seem to see bright purple, become
extremely angry. In each of these cases, I am the subject of a mental state with a
very distinctive subjective character. ere is something it is like for me to undergo
each state, some phenomenology that it has. Philosophers often use the term ‘qualia’
(singular ‘quale’) to refer to the introspectively accessible, phenomenal aspects of our
mental lives.
As we established before, and as is clear from this passage, phenomenal char-
acter is a phenomenon that is very closely related to the subjectivity of expe-
 Tye .
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rience, so closely, that as a matter of fact the subjectivity of experience and its
phenomenal character are often identiﬁed. According to one of the deﬁnitions
of subjective-making properties that we found, (S), – the deﬁnition that, as
we saw, is among the most popular in the literature – the subjective-making
properties of experience are identical to the phenomenal properties (phenom-
enal character, or ‘qualia’) of experience. According to (S), we can thus say
that phenomenal character is the subjective-making property of experience.
But does phenomenal character have the other subjective-making properties?
Phenomenal character turns out to have all the subjective-making prop-
erties that we distinguished and that experience has as well. After all, phe-
nomenal character is essentially connected to a single point of view (S*):
what it is like to have a certain experience is not the same for everyone but
depends on the (kind of ) subject that is having the experience. Phenomenal
character is also private (S*): token phenomenal character can only be had
by one individual and what the phenomenal character of an experience is like
cannot be known directly by anyone other than the subject of the experience.
is means that phenomenal character can only be known from a ﬁrst person
point of view (S*). Phenomenal character is had by a subject (S*), albeit in
an indirect way, since phenomenal character is a property of experience, which
is had by a subject. Phenomenal character thus has all the subjective-making
properties (S*)-(S*).
Next, I want to consider whether the phenomenon self-consciousness has
these ﬁve subjective-making properties. Before we can answer this question,
another question needs to be answered: What is self-consciousness? As the
word suggests, self-consciousness is the kind or part of consciousness that
concerns the self; it is consciousness or awareness of the self. Here is a
description of a phenomenological view of self-consciousness:
On the phenomenological view, a minimal form of self-consciousness is a constant
structural feature of conscious experience. Experience happens for the experiencing
subject in an immediate way and as part of this immediacy, it is implicitly marked as
my experience. (…) In the most basic sense of the term, self-consciousness is not some-
thing that comes about the moment one attentively inspects or reﬂectively introspects
one’s experiences, or in the instant of self-recognition of one’s image in the mirror, or
in the proper use of the ﬁrst-person pronoun, or in the construction of a self-narrative.
Rather, these diﬀerent kinds of self-consciousness are to be distinguished from the pre-
reﬂective self-consciousness which is present whenever I am living through or under-
going an experience, i.e., whenever I am consciously perceiving the world, whenever
 It is open for debate how self-consciousness relates to consciousness simpliciter. Accord-
ing to some, self-consciousness is identical to consciousness (e.g. Kriegel), though these
phenomena are often distinguished. Whether self-consciousness is a kind or ‘part’ of con-
sciousness is also open for debate.
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I am thinking an occurrent thought, whenever I am feeling sad or happy, thirsty or in
pain, and so forth.
Now, does self-consciousness have the ﬁve subjective-making properties? Does
self-consciousness have the property that there is something it is like for a
person to have it (S*)? Yes, there is deﬁnitely something it is like for a person
to have self-consciousness. Moreover, self-consciousness is strongly related to
qualia and phenomenal character; without self-consciousness we would have
no way of knowing whether there is something it is like for us to have experi-
ences. And, without any kind of consciousness, there would not be anything
it is like to have any kind of experience. It is in part due to self-consciousness
that we know about phenomenal character, so it is certainly true that self-
consciousness has the property that there is something it is like for a person to
have it. It must be said here, though, that for anything that we can experience,
there is something it is like to have it. Asking this question is therefore most
often an open door, which is why I will not repeat the same discussion for all
the other mental phenomena.We can safely assume that they are all subjective
in the sense speciﬁed by (S*) if I do not discuss this matter explicitly.
But is self-consciousness subjective in any of the other ways?We can group
deﬁnitions (S*) and (S*) together, since they both rely on the same premise,
namely that the phenomenon should be had by a subject and as such is essen-
tially connected to a single point of view. Now, self-consciousness without
a doubt has these subjective-making properties. After all, self-consciousness
is essentially connected to a point of view (S*) and self-consciousness is
had by a subject (S*). We can therefore say that self-consciousness has these
subjective-making properties.
Does self-consciousness also have the subjective-making properties ex-
pressed by (S*) and (S*)? Is self-consciousness private and can it only be
known from a ﬁrst person point of view? Yes, self-consciousness is private
and can only be known from a ﬁrst person point of view. Self-consciousness,
if anything, can only be accessed by one person. Also, it can clearly only
be fully known from a ﬁrst person point of view since the only way to ac-
cess self-consciousness is by introspection. Self-consciousness thus has all the
subjective-making properties that experience has.
Let’s look at intentionality next.What is intentionality?emental is con-
sidered to be intentional because the mental is always directed at something
other than itself and it is always about something: our thoughts are about the
world that surrounds us; our beliefs, desires and hopes all have objects, etc.
 Gallagher and Zahavi .
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Intentionality is the power of minds to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things,
properties and states of aﬀairs.
Is intentionality subjective in the same way in which experience and self-
consciousness are subjective? Whether intentionality is subjective according
to (S*) is a topic of debate. It used to be thought that intentionality and phe-
nomenal consciousness are two separate issues, but more and more philoso-
phers seem to think that they are indeed intertwined. e idea that inten-
tionality does not have anything to do with phenomenal character is not so
common.
Intentionality is also essentially connected to a single point of view (S*).
After all, without a point of view, there could be no intentionality. For the
mental to be intentional means that it is always directed at something. If it is
directed at something, it needs a point of view from which it is so directed.
ere has to be something which is ‘doing’ the directing or the ‘aboutness’.
Our token experiences, thoughts and feelings that are intentional can only
be had and accessed by ourselves, which means that intentionality also has the
subjective-making property described by deﬁnition (S*): privacy. For this
reason, it can also be said that intentionality can only be fully known from a
ﬁrst person point of view (S*).
Intentionality is also always had by a subject (S*). is claim is not
uncontroversial. For example, Dretske argues that anything that refers to
something else is intentional, including a rash on your skin and words on
paper. Even though this should be considered, I think there is a good case to
be made for the conclusion that only subjects can have intentionality in the
true sense of the word. erefore we can say that intentionality has all the
subjective-making properties that experience and self-consciousness have.
e next mental phenomenon that should be discussed is the ﬁrst person
perspective. e term ‘ﬁrst person perspective’ is vague, but Baker oﬀers a
helpful description of it in her paper “e First Person Point of view: A Test
For Naturalism”. Here she writes that the ﬁrst person point of view is a
certain ability that self-conscious organisms have. Which ability is this?
One has a ﬁrst person perspective iﬀ one has the ability to conceive of oneself as oneself,
where this ability is signaled by the linguistic ability to attribute as well as to make ﬁrst
person reference to oneself.
 Jacob .
 Baker .
 Ibid.: .
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As such, the ﬁrst person perspective is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for
self-consciousness. As Baker writes:
A conscious being becomes self-conscious on acquiring a ﬁrst person perspective –
a perspective from which one thinks of oneself as an individual facing a world, as a
subject distinct from everything else.
Does the ﬁrst person perspective, if we interpret it the way Baker does, have
the ﬁve subjective-making properties that we found? I think we should say that
there is something it is like to be able to conceive of yourself as yourself, i.e. to
have a ﬁrst person perspective. e ﬁrst-person perspective thus is subjective
in the sense of (S*).
Trivially, the ﬁrst person perspective is subjective in the sense of (S*):
a ﬁrst person perspective is essentially connected to a single point of view.
e ‘perspective’ and ‘point of view’ in question might be two metaphors for
the same phenomenon. e term ‘ﬁrst person point of view’ also functions
in deﬁnition (S*), which suggests that the ﬁrst person perspective is also
subjective in the sense of (S*): a ﬁrst person perspective can only be known
from a ﬁrst person perspective. A ﬁrst person point of view is also private
(S*); after all, only one person can conceive of him- or herself as him- or
herself. It seems then that a ﬁrst person point of view is also subjective in the
sense that experience is subjective.
Finally, I want to consider whether secondary qualities of objects have
the same subjective-making properties as the phenomena above. What are
secondary qualities of objects? Here is McGinn’s description:
Secondary qualities are properties that produce sensations in observers, such as colour,
taste, smell, and sound. ey can be described as the eﬀect things have on certain
people.
According to the Lockean tradition, secondary qualities are deﬁned as those whose
instantiation in an object consists in a power or disposition of the object to produce
sensory experiences in perceivers of a certain phenomenological character; whereas
primary qualities are said not to consist in such dispositions to produce experiences.
Do secondary qualities of objects have the same subjective-making properties?
It seems to depend on one’s understanding of secondary properties how one
would answer this question. If you think that secondary properties are just a
 Ibid.: .
 McGinn .
 Ibid.
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special kind of primary properties that have an objective basis in the object of
which they are predicated (e.g. like Van Inwagen thinks), then they are not
essentially connected to a single point of view, they are not had by a subject, we
do not always know them and they can be experienced and described by more
than one person. However, if one is inclined to think secondary properties are
identical to the sensations that they cause (e.g. like Berkeley), then secondary
properties are essentially connected to a single point of view, they are had by
a subject, we know them from a ﬁrst person point of view and they cannot be
experienced and described by more than one person. It would present us with
too much of a detour to go into this more fully and decide on the nature of
secondary qualities of objects here.
e most appropriate conclusion to draw here is that it is unclear whether
secondary properties of objects have the same subjective-making properties as
the other mental phenomena do. Of course, secondary qualities of objects are
very diﬀerent in nature than the other ‘mental phenomena’ on our list and,
therefore, it makes sense to ﬁnd that it is not clear whether they have the same
subjective-making properties.
In this section we have found, then, that most other mental phenom-
ena have the same subjective-making properties as experience: qualia, self-
consciousness, intentionality and the ﬁrst person perspective all do. e only
phenomena for which we were unable to establish, at this point, whether it has
the same subjective-making properties are the secondary qualities of objects.
As we pointed out before, secondary qualities of material objects are diﬀerent
in kind than the other purely mental phenomena that we discussed; therefore
it makes sense that the results are (possibly) diﬀerent. Since all the ‘purely’
mental phenomena are all subjective in the same ways, it could be the case
– even though we haven’t shown this here – that subjectivity applies univocally
to the mental.
. 
In this chapter we have looked at a number of deﬁnitions of the subjectivity
of experience that are given in the literature and some further deﬁnitions
suggested by the discussion of those.We started out in section . by analyzing
Nagel’s account of subjectivity in his paper which is a classic in this ﬁeld.
We found two possible deﬁnitions of the subjectivity of experience in Nagel’s
 Van Inwagen .
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work and we extensively discussed the notion of ‘point of view’, which plays
an important role in his account of the subjectivity of experience.
en, in section ., we discussed several other papers in the literature to
see if they oﬀer any alternative deﬁnitions of the subjectivity of experience.We
added a few possible deﬁnitions to our inventory and then we compared our
deﬁnitions to other accounts of subjectivity in the literature. We concluded
that the other accounts in the literature ﬁt our deﬁnitions (S)-(S) very
well. We discussed in detail whether De Sousa’s inventory of senses in which
experience is subjective maps onto ours and concluded that it does.
In the last section of this chapter, ., we considered whether experience is
actually subjective in any of these senses by giving examples of the particular
phenomena. We also brieﬂy discussed whether other mental phenomena have
the same subjective-making properties or not. We found that, in fact, experi-
ence is subjective in these ﬁve senses and that most other mental phenomena
seem to have the same subjective-making properties. Only secondary qualities
of objects might not have the same subjective-making properties.
In Chapter  we will see if the deﬁnitions of which we were able to give
examples, i.e. the deﬁnitions that describe the subjectivity of experience as it
actually occurs, are a problem for naturalism or not. Basically, then, we have
taken the very vague notion of ‘subjectivity’ and we have oﬀered several possi-
ble deﬁnitions of it. If any of these deﬁnitions is incompatible with naturalism,
then we can say that, if this is what subjectivity means, then the subjectivity
of experience is incompatible with naturalism in this particular way. For our
purposes, i.e. to establish whether the subjectivity of experience is compatible
with naturalism or not, it does not matter which of the deﬁnitions we have
considered is actually the best deﬁnition of the subjectivity of experience (if
there even is one); we have therefore not considered this question in this
chapter.
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Do Experiences Exist?
So far, I have assumed that experiences exist, or, that there is such a thing
as experience. In the ﬁrst chapter, where I analyzed what it means to say
that experience is subjective, I relied on an intuitive understanding of the no-
tion of experience. Using this intuitive notion, we concluded that experience
– assuming that there is such a thing – is subjective in the ﬁve senses that
we distinguished. But the crucial question remains: Is there such a thing as
experience? If there isn’t, then there is also no such thing as the subjectivity of
experience and, in that case, we need not worry about its possible incompati-
bility with methodological naturalism. In that case, the question whether the
subjectivity of experience is compatible with methodological naturalism does
not even arise. e purpose of the present chapter is to determine whether or
not there are such things as experiences, an important question that we have
put on the shelf since the Introduction.
e organization of this chapter is as follows. I will set out by addressing
the question of what I mean when I use the term ‘experience’, section ...
After a number of clariﬁcations, I will brieﬂy consider which kinds of experi-
ences there are and which aspects experience has, section ... I will conclude
this section by considering what the ontological structure of experience is;
section ...
After sorting out these terminological issues, I will consider two arguments
against the existence of experience in section .: (i) an argument from awk-
wardness, in section .. and (ii) Byrne’s argument against the existence of
experience, in section ...
Having seen some of the arguments against the existence of experience,
I will then turn to a strong argument for the existence of experience, in sec-
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tion .. With help of Van Inwagen Quine’s criterion of ontological commit-
ment presents a strong argument in favor of the existence of experience. is
will lead to a discussion of behaviorism and eliminative materialism, which
present two potential ways of reply to this powerful pro argument, sections
. and . respectively.
In the last section, ., I will draw conclusions and summarize this chapter.
.   
In this section, I will explain what I mean and, more importantly, what I
don’t mean, by the term ‘experience’. In section .. I will list six points of
clariﬁcation concerning my use of the term ‘experience’. In section .. I
will present a small inventory of the diﬀerent kinds and aspects of experience.
Finally, in section .. I will discuss which ontological categories experience
could be said to fall into or, in other words, what the ontological structure of
experience can be said to be.
.. e Term ‘Experience’
First of all, I want to make clear that I am here not interested in the nature
of experiences, i.e. in the question whether or not experiences are ‘mental’
or ‘physical’ (or possibly ‘neutral’). Any decision in this matter would beg the
question since themain question of this dissertation is whether the subjectivity
of experience is compatible with naturalism. Moreover, the meanings of the
terms ‘mental’ and ‘physical’ are troublesome. In Chapters  and  I write
extensively about what ‘naturalism’, ‘physicalism’ and ‘materialism’ mean and
what it means for something to be ‘natural’, ‘physical’ or ‘material’ and not any
of these terms has a clearly deﬁned and commonly acceptedmeaning. It is even
less clear what the term ‘mental’ means, partly so since ‘mental’ often is taken
to mean ‘non-physical’. For these reasons, I will not make any assumptions
about the nature of experiences, nor will this be a topic of discussion. As
long as there are experiences – which the current chapter addresses – it is not
necessary for our purposes to know about their nature.
Second, I want to make clear that I am furthermore not interested in
 e form that the ﬁrst part of this chapter takes, i.e. a section contra experience, followed
by a section pro experience, and the use of Quine’s metaontology as a way out of the created
impasse, is inspired by Van Inwagen’s paper “Aeory of Properties” (), where he uses
this model in developing his argument for the existence of properties.
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determining into which ontological category ‘experiences’ fall. Experiences
could be properties, property-instances, tropes, universals, states of aﬀairs,
events, activities, etc. Despite the fact that this is an interesting question in its
own right, I will here not try to decide upon the matter. Whatever ontological
category experiences fall into, if they exist, they are subjective (according to
the ﬁrst chapter) and the question whether or not their subjectivity is compat-
ible with methodological naturalism arises. It is not necessary for answering
this question into which ontological category experiences fall. What I will
do, however, is give an overview of the possible ontological categories into
which experience could be said to fall. I believe this will clarify the concept of
experience, even if we will not determine which of these classiﬁcations is the
best one.
is leads us to a third important point of clariﬁcation. In this chapter,
I will both be using the term ‘experience’ and the term ‘experiences’. I will
be using either term where it seems to make more intuitive or grammatical
sense but do not intend for it to exclude the other term at that instance. I
assume the general term ‘experience’ refers to a type and the term ‘experiences’
refers to tokens of that type. So, I think that there are token as well as type
experiences.
Fourth, obviously the term ‘experience’ is closely related to a great number
of other terms, such as ‘consciousness’, ‘awareness’, ‘mental states’, etc. No
doubt the connection between these terms is as interesting as it is complicated.
Unfortunately, getting into a discussion about all these connections would
be monumental and a distraction from the task at hand. In what follows,
therefore, I will be focusing exclusively on the concept of experience and I
will leave its relationship to these other concepts to the side.
Fifth, there is a popular distinction between experience considered as an
‘object’ and experience considered as an ‘act’. Although this act-object dis-
tinction is interesting in its own right, I will be neutral on this topic. Just as
I am not interested in the ontological category that experience should be said
to fall into, I am also not interested in defending the claim that experience is
either an object or an act.
Sixth, there is an ongoing debate about whether we can distinguish be-
tween two species of experiences: conscious experiences on the one hand and
non-conscious experiences on the other hand. In what follows, I will primarily
be interested in conscious experience, because these are the paradigm cases of
‘experiences’. But nothing hangs on whether there are such things as non-
conscious experiences, as long as there are at least experiences of one of the
types. e argument in this chapter will follow through independently of the
outcome of this debate.
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.. Kinds of Experiences
Despite the fact that I will not try to determine what the nature of experiences
is or which ontological category ‘experience’ should be said to fall into, there
are two things about experience that I do want to consider brieﬂy. First,
what are the diﬀerent kinds of experiences? And, second, which aspects or
properties do experiences have?
ere are many diﬀerent kinds of (conscious) experience. e kind of
experience that is talked about most and which provides us with most of
our examples and intuitions is perceptual experience. Perceptual experiences
include: visual experiences; auditory experiences; tactile experiences; olfactory
experiences and gustatory or taste experiences. Possibly perceptual experiences
also include bodily sensations such pain(s), itches, hunger, proprioception,
etc.
en there are, less often mentioned and less straightforward, cognitive
experiences, such as having a certain insight; drawing a conclusion; having a
particular thought, etc. In his catalogue of conscious experiences, Chalmers
calls this kind of experience ‘conscious thought’, and he holds that there is
something it is like to have such thoughts:
It is often hard to pin down just what the qualitative feel of an occurrent thought
is, but it is certainly there. ere is something it is like to be having such thoughts.
When I think of a lion, for instance, there seems to be a whiﬀ of leonine quality to
my phenomenology: what it is like to think of a lion is subtly diﬀerent from what it
is like to think of the Eiﬀel tower.
Closely related to cognitive experiences is a form of experience constituted by
visual or mental imagery. is kind of experience includes: visual memories;
fantasies; having dreams. Another kind of experience is emotional experiences
such as getting mad, feeling sad, experiencing relief, etc. Chalmers puts it very
well:
e sparkle of a happy mood, the weariness of a deep depression, the red-hot glow of a
rush of anger, themelancholy of regret: all of these can aﬀect consciousness profoundly,
although in a much less speciﬁc way than localized experiences such as sensations.
In addition to these kinds of experiences that are often distinguished,
Chalmers distinguishes an extra kind, which he calls ‘the sense of self ’. is
 Chalmers : .
 Ibid.: .
 Ibid.
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kind of experience is supposed to be the phenomenology of self that we expe-
rience in the background of all our other (kinds of ) experiences. In Chalmers’
own words:
One sometimes feels that there is something to conscious experience that transcends
all these speciﬁc elements: a kind of background hum, for instance, that is somehow
fundamental to consciousness and that is there even when the other components are
not. is phenomenology of self is so deep and intangible that it sometimes seems
illusory, consisting in nothing over and above speciﬁc elements such as those listed
above. Still, there seems to be something to the phenomenology of self, even if it is
very hard to pin down.
I trust that these are the most important kinds of experiences and that we now
at least have some idea of what we mean when we talk about ‘experience’.
Second, there are not only diﬀerent kinds of experiences, but experiences
also have diﬀerent aspects, or properties. We have already encountered phe-
nomenal character as one set of properties of experiences, namely phenomenal
properties. But experiences have other aspects as well: experiences have objects
and contents, which we already brieﬂy discussed in the ﬁrst chapter. What
are the contents of experiences? e content of an experience is the way the
experience represents the world as being.is is why the content of experience
is also called the representational content. Other forms of content include:
conceptual content and propositional content (and various combinations of
these).
.. Structure of Experiences
What are experiences, ontologically speaking? Or, in other words, what is the
metaphysics or structure of experiences? Even though we won’t decide on this
matter in this chapter, I do want to make clear what the possible structures of
experiences are. ere are a number of options here.
e ﬁrst major distinction between rival ontological categories of ex-
periences can be drawn between those according to which experiences are
monadic and those according to which experiences are relational. ere are
two options for those who consider experiences to be monadic. First, one
can be an adverbialist. According to the adverbialist, experiences are monadic
properties. For example, in the case in which I see a blue cup, I would have
the property of ‘seeing bluely’ or ‘being appeared to bluely’. According to this
view, having perceptual experiences, by itself, does not amount to the percep-
tion of physical objects. We do not stand in a relation to physical objects, but
 Ibid.
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we have the properties of seeing objects and colors, or being appeared to in
certain ways.is view has the problem that it seems undesirable that we never
perceive any objects. Another problem is that it works better for perceptual
experiences than for other kinds of experiences.
e second option for regarding experiences as non-relational is to say that
experiences are events. An event is an occurrence of something or something
that happens. Examples of non-mental events include: the Iraq invasion; the
election of BarackObama as president of the United States in ; a passerby
smiling, and so on. ere is some dispute as to whether events should be
considered to form their own ontological class, but there is even more dispute
about the notion of mental events. Mental events, if there are such things,
would include: Jack’s decision to move to France, Jill’s desire to go to Asia,
my remembering what day the party is, etc. e question is whether these
events are genuinely of a diﬀerent kind than physical events, or if the distinc-
tion between mental and physical events is merely semantic. In the former
case, one would have a sort of physicalism, in the latter a form of monism.
ere is much left undecided in the debate about mental events. Setting these
diﬃculties aside for now, it is an option that experiences are in fact events and
there are some philosophers who have embraced this option. Byrne, who does
not endorse this option himself, describes it this way:
Granted that experiences are particulars, there is only one plausible basic category
under which they fall: they are events. Experiences are like ﬂashes, bangs, conferences,
cricket matches, parties and races. ey are particular things that occur and happen;
they are (at least paradigmatically) extended in time, and have a beginning, a middle
and an end.
Famous philosophers mentioned by Byrne who think that experiences are
events are Searle and Peacocke. Searle writes about experiences: ‘visual and
other sorts of experiences are conscious mental events’. More about events
in section ..
ere are also those who think that experiences should be considered to
be relational, i.e. for a subject to have an experience is for a state of aﬀairs
 An option that I am not discussing here is the disjunctivist view according to which we do
perceive objects in cases of veridical perception, which is perceptually and phenomenally
indistinguishable from cases of illusion and hallucination in which we merely have the
monadic property of ‘being appeared to bluely or pink-rat-ly’.
 It should be noted that Byrne () does not endorse the idea that experiences are events.
In fact, Byrne defends the claim that experiences do not exist.
 Byrne : .
 Searle : .
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to obtain such that the subject bears a relation to the relevant relatum. What
is the relevant relatum? e relevant relatum is the object of the experience.
In turn, there are several options for what the object of experience is. e
ﬁrst option is to regard experiences as states of aﬀairs in which subjects bear
relations to peculiar kinds of mental entities, which are sometimes called sense
data. is view is problematic and not very widely defended.
e second option is to say that the object of experience, and so the
relatum other than the subject, is simply an object in the world. is view
is known as naive realism. For example, if I am looking at a blue cup, the
experience could simply be the state of aﬀairs that obtains because of the
relation between the blue cup and me. Even though this seems a better option
than the previous one, it does seem that the internal aspect of experiences
is somewhat overlooked on this conception of experiences. For perceptual
experience, there is the further diﬃculty that this kind of view cannot account
for hallucinations – after all, if experience is simply a relation between the
perceiver and the object of perception, a form of direct realism is entailed.
is view is also problematic for experiences that are of a diﬀerent type
than perceptual experiences. A case where someone is in pain is just not as
straightforward as a case wherein someone perceives a blue cup: is the pain
the object of the experience, the other relatum? at seems strange. But if
not the pain, but, say, my (hurting) knee is the object of experience, and the
experience merely results from the relation between my knee and myself (or,
my consciousness), then where does the pain go? A related problem is that
there are many diﬀerent mental attitudes that we can have towards the same
object. For example, I can remember the blue cup, I can hate it, I can imagine
it, I can like it, etc. In all these cases, it seems that on this view, the experience
would be captured by a relation between the cup and me. But where do the
diﬀerences between all these mental attitudes go? To hate something and to
imagine it are certainly two very diﬀerent mental states, but the relations in
question would be the same. Unless of course, we use a three-place relation
and reserve a variable exactly for the mental attitude that relates the subject
and object of experience. en, however, it seems that we reintroduce the
concept of ‘experience’ through the back door.
A third option is to regard experiences as states of aﬀairs in which subjects
bear relations to propositions. For example, if I perceive a blue cup in this
case, the state of aﬀairs involves the relation between the proposition ‘ere
is a blue cup on the table’ and me. If this view is accurate, then in perception
we would only be related to abstract objects, namely propositions, and not
 is is why disjunctivists say that hallucinations are not experiences, but something else.
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to anything concrete or particular. is part of the view is often taken to be
implausible.
It should be noted that in all these cases, the state of aﬀairs in question is
a particular, token state of aﬀairs, not a universal. is is why these relational
views of experience can also be seen as events, namely as property instances. In
general it should be noted that, even though we have treated ‘experience’ and
‘mental state’ as synonyms, this does not exclude the option of experiences
being events in those cases. Even though experiences are sometimes called
‘states’, this does not rule out that they are in fact events (it also does not rule
out that they aren’t). Byrne writes the following about this issue:
Sometimes experiences are said to be states, which suggests that they are properties
or conditions of a certain sort, not events. But although in some contexts states are
contrasted with events, in philosophy of mind ‘state’ not infrequently functions as
a convenient umbrella word, with ‘mental state’ meaning ‘mental condition, event,
phenomenon, or whatever’.
is concludes our discussion of the diﬀerent ontological structures that ex-
periences can be said to have. As I indicated before, there is no space here to
consider each of these options more than brieﬂy or to try to determine which
one is the best one. For this section, it was merely intended to provide an
overview of the diﬀerent kinds, aspects and structures that experiences can be
said to have.
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So far I have assumed that there are such ‘things’ as experiences, but are there?
Maybe experiences are just ‘illusions’ and, thus strictly speaking, non-existent.
What are the reasons to think that there is no such thing as experience or, in
other words, that experience is an illusion? In order to answer this question I
will look at two arguments against the existence of experience. In section ..
I will discuss the argument from awkwardness and in section .. I will
discuss Byrne’s argument against the existence of experience.
.. Argument from Awkwardness
e ﬁrst argument against the existence of experience is an argument from
awkwardness. Even though I call it an argument, as a matter of fact, it is not
 Byrne : .
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really an argument – it is more a pre-theoretical intuition that people might
have when they consider whether or not experiences should be said to exist.
e intuition in question is that experiences are very diﬀerent from medium-
sized dry goods, such as tables and chairs, which are the paradigm cases of
things that exist. e question whether or not experiences exist might, in this
light, seem awkward and one might think that, in any case, they don’t exist
in the same way as ordinary material objects do. Or one might even think
that, if what it means to exist is to be relatively similar to a table or chair, that
experiences certainly do not exist.
Two things should be said in response to this intuition. First, however
common it might be, it would be biased to think that ‘that which exists’
has the same extension as ‘that which is physical’. Perhaps medium-sized dry
goods are the paradigm case of existing things, but many of us believe that
numbers exist, that sentences have meaning, that there is love and that there
are beautiful ideas that we can enjoy. Naturally, this does not take away the
intuition that, if they exist, experiences are awkward entities unlike tables
and chairs. I think that would be fair to say. I even think it would be fair
to say that if we could do without them, we should. In this respect, the case of
experiences is similar to the case of universals. Universals are unlike tables and
chairs in a number of ways and are therefore awkward entities that some of us
are not happy to admit into our ontologies. However, it seems that we need
universals to do work for us, so, even though it would be better to do without
them, many think we simply can’t without paying a high price. Similarly, the
intuition that experiences would be awkward entities might be a prima facie
argument against their existence; it is not suﬃcient. ere are other awkward
entities and although awkward, we just might need them to do work for us.
.. Byrne’s Argument against Experience
Byrne’s argument against the existence of experience relies on a distinction
made by Hinton between our ordinary notion of experience and the philo-
sophical notion of experience. Hinton has argued that such a distinction
should be made and Byrne describes it as follows:
Ordinary talk of one’s ‘experiences’ is talk of what happened to one, what one did,
what one encountered or witnessed. Although this often concerns events, it is not talk
of experiences in the special philosophical sense.
 Byrne : , note .
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Byrne argues that even though we have experiences in the ordinary sense of
the word, this does not imply that we have experiences in the philosophical
sense of the word and, in fact, there are no such experiences. What does Byrne
mean by ‘experiences in the philosophical sense of the word’?
Byrne ascribes the distinction between the philosophical and ordinary
sense of the word ‘experience’ to Hinton, though he indicates that his descrip-
tion of the ‘special philosophical notion’ diﬀers from Hinton’s. How does
Byrne understand the philosophical notion of experience? Basically, Byrne
sums up a number of aspects of the philosophical notion of experience and,
although this does not amount to a very systematic description, I will list these
aspects below. First, according to Byrne, if one hears as well as sees something,
then, in the special philosophical sense, a distinction can be made between
the visual and the auditory experience. e suggestion here is that, in daily
life, we would not distinguish between an auditory and a visual experience
if we were both seeing and hearing something. Second, according to Byrne,
philosophical experiences are supposed to be particulars. ird, Byrne holds
that philosophical experiences are supposed to be events.
Now, I grant that it might be the case that it is ‘philosophical’ rather than
‘ordinary’ to distinguish between diﬀerent kinds of experiences and to wonder
about their ontological structure. However, I do not think that, when one
interprets the notion of experience in a philosophical way, that there is only
one way to interpret it, namely as a particular and an event. One could easily
interpret the notion of experience in a philosophical sense but hold that ex-
periences are universals, or that they are property-instances, or yet something
diﬀerent.at is, I disagree with Byrne that the philosophical interpretation of
the notion ‘experience’ commits one to experience falling into one ontological
category rather than another. To be clear: I think that experiences might be
particulars and they might be events, but I don’t think that interpreting the
notion of experience in a philosophical sense implies this.
In the next section of the paper Byrne provides another description of the
distinction between the ordinary and philosophical concept of experience.
Here is the passage:
Ordinary talk of one’s ‘experiences’ is talk of what happened to one, what one did, what
one encountered or witnessed. Although often this concerns events, it is not talk of
experiences in the special philosophical sense. If it were, then presumably an utterance
of ‘I had the experience of seeing a galah for two minutes’ (equivalently, ‘I saw a galah
 Hinton .
 Cf. section ..
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for two minutes’) would report the occurrence of a certain ‘visual experience’ lasting
for two minutes. However, as Vendler pointed out, ‘I saw a galah for two minutes’,
bears no grammatical hint of an event or process unfolding in time – unlike, say, ‘I
chased a galah for two minutes’.
is passage helps to see better what Byrne takes to be the diﬀerence between
the ordinary and philosophical sense of experience. In ordinary language ‘ex-
periences’ refer to things one has done or things that have happened to one,
such as: traveling in Asia, going to college, going to the movie, etc. Something
as ‘seeing a red ball for two minutes’ would not often be called an experience
in ordinary language, whereas it would be in a philosophical sense. Even
though this seems right, I don’t think it has much to do with whether or not
experiences are considered to be events by the metaphysician. It seems, rather,
that the individuation of experiences works according to diﬀerent standards
in ordinary versus philosophical language, or contexts. at is, in philosophy,
experiences are generally taken to last for a short amount of time (the time
it takes to look at a speckled hen, for instance) and any change in the visual
ﬁeld is, most often, considered to result in a change in the experience (shifting
our eyes from the red to the orange paint chip, for instance). In ordinary
life ‘experiences’ are usually taken to last longer and to survive many changes
in properties. In this way ‘traveling to Asia’ can be said to be a good and
interesting experience, even though ‘the experience’ is made up of millions of
experiences in the philosophical sense.
Even though there is a diﬀerence here, I think the diﬀerence only makes
sense. When one wants to study experiences, as one does in philosophy, one
wants to focus on a simple, basic and small example, such as looking at a paint
chip for two minutes. It also only makes sense that in an ordinary context of
life one talks about ‘experiences’ as bigger events since life is constituted by
these kinds of ‘experiences’. Also, it seems that the latter kind of experiences do
not bear a very complicated relation to the simple shorter kind.e experience
of ‘traveling to Asia’ is just a composition of the million visual, auditory
and other kinds of short simple experiences that one studies and describes
in philosophy.
After introducing and describing the distinction between experiences in
the ordinary sense and experiences in the philosophical sense, Byrne goes
on to argue that experiences in the philosophical sense do not exist. Why
does Byrne think that there are no experiences in the special philosophical
 Byrne : .
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sense? Byrne’s reason is that we don’t see experiences, not if we look inwards
(introspection), nor if we look outwards. I will discuss both of these claims,
starting with the ﬁrst.
Byrne’s ﬁrst claim is that we do not observe our experiences by intro-
spection. e idea that is involved here is also called ‘the transparency of
experience’, for example byMartin. What is the transparency of experience?
Here is Tye’s description of the transparency thesis:
In turning one’s mind inward to attend to the experience, one seems to end up con-
centrating on what is outside again, on external features and properties.
Why are experiences considered to be transparent, by some philosophers?e
reason is that, if we try to observe our experiences, we end up focusing on
properties of the objects of our experiences; we cannot observe the experiences
themselves. For example, you look out of the window and see a tree in front
of the neighbor’s house. Now instead of observing the tree in front of the
neighbor’s house, you want to observe your experience. What do you do? You
look more closely at the tree, notice in more detail all its branches and leaves,
etc. What else can you do? e idea of the transparency of experience is that,
when we try to focus on our experience of a particular object, we end up
focusing even more on the object of experience since we cannot observe our
experiences themselves. Before presenting arguments against this claim, let’s
turn to the second claim.
Byrne’s second claim is that we do not observe our experiences by looking
outward. What does he mean by this second claim? Here is the passage where
Byrne describes this phenomenon:
If I am undergoing the visual experience of a pig, then I can know that by attending
to the pig. Fine. But why think I am undergoing a visual experience of a pig? (In the
special philosophical sense of ‘experience’, this is not a prolix way of saying ‘I see a pig’.)
ere are, of course, numerous events in the causal chain starting from the pig and
continuing into my brain. If I am undergoing an experience of a pig, the experience
is presumably to be found in that causal chain. But since the issue is whether I am
undergoing an experience in the ﬁrst place, this is of no help at all.
I think Byrne’s point in this passage should be understood as follows. Even
though we seem to see things around us (when we are not unconscious, asleep,
 Martin .
 Tye : .
 Byrne : -.
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blind or have our eyes closed), it does not follow that we need to postulate
a ‘philosophical’ entity such as ‘visual experience’. at is, there certainly is a
causal chain involving light rays, the pig, the workings of the eye and the brain
(and doubtless many more physical processes), but there is not one entity
in this chain that is ‘the experience’. Despite the fact that we seem to have
experiences in daily life, and despite the fact that we talk as if we do in ordinary
language, strictly speaking there is no philosophical entity to be encountered
when we look outward into the world of objects (of experience). I will discuss
this second claim in more detail below and proﬀer an argument against it, but
ﬁrst I want to consider arguments that work against both the ﬁrst and second
claim.
e argument Byrne gives against the existence of experiences in a philo-
sophical sense is that experiences are transparent; we don’t observe our experi-
ences, whether we look inside ourselves, or into the world. Now, I grant that
you do not strictly speaking observe one particular entity in the causal chain
that is ‘the experience in the philosophical sense of the word’. However, there
are a number of reasons to think that this does not mean that they don’t exist:
(i) for something to be visible is not identical to what it is for something to
exist, and (ii) observation is not a good guide to existence (think of numbers,
propositions). Even though that which we can observe often gets confused
with that which exists, this is still based on confusion. ere is no unbiased
reason to assume that things that cannot be observed do not exist, or that there
does not exist anything that we cannot observe. As a matter of fact, there
are plenty of examples of things that we often take to exist that we cannot
observe. ink of electrons or quarks, sound waves, love, the number , etc.
If one would want to insist that things that we cannot observe do not exist,
then, certainly, arguments for this thesis should be given. However, arguments
against it are manifold. Until this matter is settled, the thesis cannot be used
as an argument for the further thesis that experiences do not exist because we
cannot observe them.
So, it seems that the fact that we cannot observe experiences is not a good
argument against their existence. I would like to add that, on top of that,
there is a diﬀerent way in which we do observe our experiences. Even though
we do not observe our experiences in introspection, and we don’t observe
them in the same way that we observe e.g. a tree, we certainly know of and
about our experiences. at is, even though I do not observe my experience
in the way that I observe a tree, and, even though we should maybe say that I
don’t observe them at all, I do have knowledge of, or acquaintance with, my
experience. I know that I have the experience, ﬁrst of all, and I know what the
experience of seeing a tree is like (and not just what the tree is like). Similarly,
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I know that I am not unconscious, I know whether or not I have a headache,
I know that my knee itches, I know that I enjoy my experience of the sunlight
shining on the trees outside, I know that particular experiences make me feel
bad, good, etc.
Since the fact that we cannot observe experiences is not a reason to think
that they do not exist, in conjunction with the idea that we seem to have
knowledge of our own experiences, it seems that there is a diﬀerent mode
of observation (if we should call it ‘observation’ at all) when it concerns our
experiences. Let’s call it ‘acquaintance’. Just like we know what mood we
are in, even though moods are not observable, we know whether or not we
have certain experiences, what they are of and what they are like. e fact that
we have this kind of epistemic access to them seems to suggest that they do
exist; we might not observe them, but we have them and we are acquainted
with them. Possibly ‘acquaintance’ is the sort of relation we can stand in
to experience and possibly this relation is an alternative, cognitive form of
introspection.
A second objection against Byrne’s argument is that it is supposed to be
an argument against the philosophical sense of experience, not against the
ordinary sense of experience. Now, it seems to me that the argument that
we cannot observe experiences would, if anything (i.e. if it would be a good
argument at all), be an argument against the ordinary sense of experience.
Why? Well, the argument is based on an ordinary experience: when you try
to focus on features of your experience, you end up focusing more on the
(features of the) object of your experience. Maybe in ordinary contexts people
do not tend to try this, but ironically, it is an observation from ordinary
experience and not e.g. a theoretical argument against the existence of events.
As such, it is not a very good argument against the philosophical sense of
experience. It only would be if everything that seems to be the case, is the case,
but, as we all know too well, it does not need to be the case that everything
that seems a certain way is that way – ultimately, in a philosophical sense. In
this case, the fact that we do not observe experiences and they do not seem
any way at all to us does not mean that they don’t exist. e whole reason
why we do philosophy is because things are not always what or how they
seem. erefore, this is not a good argument against the philosophical sense
of experience.
On top of this, if this would have been a good argument against the
philosophical sense of experience, it would have been as good of an argument
 I am following Feigl in calling the epistemological relation of direct epistemic access that
we stand in to our experiences ‘acquaintance’. More on this in Chapter .
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against the ordinary sense of experience. After all, if the argument were to go
through, we would not observe our experiences full stop. at is, we would
not observe experiences in the philosophical sense but also not in the ordinary
sense.at would mean that experiences in the ordinary sense would not exist
either according to this argument. However, Byrne does not want to say that
our ordinary experiences do not exist, which means that the argument is too
strong for its own good.
A third objection against Byrne’s argument is that experiences do not exist
like tables and chairs, i.e. like objects of our experiences, but they don’t have
to be the kinds of things that we can observe in the same way. ere are other
reasons that can lead us to conclude that they exist. In this way there is an
analogy between the case of experiences and the case of universals: universals
cannot be observed by looking inside or outside ourselves, universals don’t
exist like tables and chairs and they are odd objects, but we need them to do
work for us. In the same way we might need experiences to do work for us.
It seems odd that Byrne would hold it against experiences that they are not
readily observable like tables and chairs, especially since he argued earlier that
experiences in the philosophical sense, despite the fact that they don’t exist,
are events. Now, (some) events might be observable, but not as easily as a table
or chair. For example, take an election and try to observe it. It is not clear if
you even can observe an election. Surely, you can observe people voting, the
polls, and you can even observe the results, but do you thereby observe an
election? In any case, events are not as easy to observe as medium-sized dry
goods.
One reason why Byrne’s second claim seems to have some intuitive power,
I think, is because it seems like he is there arguing against the postulation (or
existence) of sense data. He seems to assume that experiences are mysterious
entities similar (or identical) to sense data. However, even though we observe
objects of experiences, it does not follow that there are sense data that are
involved in this process. If this is what Byrne is arguing then I agree with him.
However, it does not seem to me that the only interpretation of ‘experiences’
is the one according to which experiences are sense data and, interestingly, this
is not Byrne’s interpretation of experiences in the philosophical sense either.
In this section, we have seen two arguments against the existence of expe-
rience. e ﬁrst is an argument from awkwardness and the second is Byrne’s
argument. Byrne is willing to grant that it seems as if we have experiences but,
according to Byrne, they don’t exist in a philosophical sense because we cannot
observe them. As I have shown, these are both not very good arguments
against the existence of experience. Now let’s turn to an argument in favor
of the existence of experience.
   
. :       
e question of this chapter is whether experiences exist. On the one hand
there are arguments for the claim that experiences are mere illusions, such as
we have seen in the previous section. On the other hand, it certainly seems to
us that we are conscious and have experiences and it’s hard to imagine this
is not the case, moreover to know what this would even mean. It seems that
people have experiences and it seems to follow from the fact that people have
experiences that experiences exist. But does it really follow that experiences
exist? In general, how can we tell if a sentence entails that certain things exist?
A popular and widely accepted method for answering questions exactly
like these is Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment, which is part of
his metaontology. A prominent contemporary defender of Quine’s criterion
of ontological commitment is Van Inwagen, who has used this criterion to
answer, among other things, the question whether or not properties exist. Let’s
look at Van Inwagen’s exposition of Quine’s metaontology, a clear explanation
of which appears in his paper “A eory of Properties” and in the chapter
“Meta-ontology” in his bookOntology, Identity, andModality. In the former,
Van Inwagen says that: ‘According to Quine, the problem of deciding what to
believe about what there is is a very straightforward special case of the problem
of deciding what to believe.’ Now, how do we decide to believe anything?
e answer Quine’s metaontology oﬀers for answering this question is that
we should look at the true propositions that we already sincerely believe, or
seriously endorse, and see if they, when translated into so-called ‘canonical
notation’, commit us to there being entities which are bound by the existential
quantiﬁer. Now the following is not an example about properties, but just a
very basic example of how a sentence can commit us to the existence of those
entities over which the sentence quantiﬁes. For example, suppose I sincerely
believe that ‘ere are barking dogs, which keepme up at night’.is sentence
in canonical notation is: ‘At least one thing is such that it is a dog and it barks
and it keeps me up at night.’ e purpose of translating a sentence of natural
language into canonical notation is that inference rules of ﬁrst order logic can
be applied to such sentences. Since in this sentence ‘dogs’ are bound by the
 is term was coined by Van Inwagen .
 Van Inwagen  and Van Inwagen .
 Van Inwagen : .
 See Van Inwagen  for a full account and explanation of canonical notation.
 I take this point from Van Inwagen: ‘e justiﬁcation of this regimentation lies in one fact:
the rules of quantiﬁer logic, a simple set of rules that captures an astonishingly wide range
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existential quantiﬁer, which is to say that this sentence quantiﬁes over dogs,
by endorsing this sentence I am thereby committed to the existence of dogs.
Van Inwagen uses Quine’s metaontology to argue for the conclusion that
properties exist. He starts out from the claim that there are true sentences like
the following that, when translated into canonical notation, quantify over
properties: ‘Spiders share some of the anatomical features of insects.’ How
does this sentence get translated into ﬁrst order logic? Van Inwagen:
We ﬁnd that what it says is this:
ere are anatomical features that insects have and spiders also have.
Or in the “canonical language of quantiﬁcation”,
It is true of at least one thing that it is such that it is an anatomical feature and
insects have it and spiders also have it.
Since this sentence, translated into canonical notation, quantiﬁes over
‘anatomical features’, this means, according to Quine’s metaontology, that if
someone sincerely endorses this sentence, they are committed to the existence
of anatomical features and so, to the existence of properties. In Van Inwagen’s
words again:
It is a straightforward logical consequence of this proposition that there are anatomical
features: if there are anatomical features that insects have and spiders also have, then
there are anatomical features that insects have; if there are anatomical features that
insects have, then there are anatomical features – full stop.
More generally, this is how Van Inwagen describes the strategy for using
Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment:
e strategy is this: one takes sentences that the other party to the conversation accepts,
and by whatever dialectical devices one can muster, one gets him to introduce more
and more quantiﬁers and variables into those sentences. (…) If, at a certain point in
this procedure, it emerges that the existential generalization on a certain open sentence
F can be formally deduced from the sentences he accepts, one has shown that the
of valid inference (…), can be applied to sentences in the regimented language.’ :
-.
 Van Inwagen : .
 Ibid.
 Ibid.: .
   
sentences that he accepts, and the ways of introducing quantiﬁers and variables into
those sentences that he has endorsed, formally commit him to there being things that
satisfy F.
And here is how Quine puts it himself:
We are convicted of a particular ontological presupposition if, and only if, the alleged
presuppositum has to be reckoned among the entities over which our variables range
in order to render one of our aﬃrmations true.
An entity is assumed by a theory if and only if it must be counted among the values
of the variables in order that the statements aﬃrmed in the theory be true.
Before looking at diﬀerent avenues, a nominalist – who believes that universals
don’t exist – might take in response, it is worth looking at the plausibility
of Quine’s metaontology. Is this a good method to determine which things
exist? In order to answer this question we’ll have to look at the assumptions
of this view. e ﬁrst assumption is that many sentences can be translated
in canonical notation without changing the meaning of these sentences. It is
not necessary that all sentences are so translatable, but many should be. With
respect to this, Van Inwagen gives the argument that we can get canonical
notation out of ordinary English sentences by means of adding operators
and replacing names with variables. ese operators (quantiﬁers) and vari-
ables should be understood as abbreviations of English phrases. Since we
are especially interested in the existential quantiﬁer in this section (since we
want to know how to decide which things exist), what can we say about the
relation between an ordinary English phrase and a phrase using a quantiﬁer?
Van Inwagen writes:
e meaning of the quantiﬁers is given by the phrases of English – or of some other
natural language – that they abbreviate.
And:
It will be clear that the quantiﬁers so introduced are simply a regimentation of the “all”
and “there are” of ordinary English.
 Van Inwagen : .
 Quine : .
 Ibid.: .
 Or phrases of any other natural language.
 Van Inwagen : .
 Ibid.: .
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is ﬁrst assumption seems reasonable: many sentences in ordinary English
can be translated into canonical notation by the introduction of variables and
operators.
e second assumption of this view is that being is the same as existence.
ese days, this is a widely held and accepted view. To deny this thesis makes
one a Meinongian. Meinongians distinguish between being and existence,
which leads them to aﬃrm that there are things that do not exist – a claim
that Meinongians are infamous for defending. Since it is hard to understand
what it would mean for there to be things that don’t exist, I take it that this
second assumption can be accepted without much trouble.
e third assumption of this view is that being is univocal and that exis-
tence, which on this view is the same as being, is also univocal. Even though
this is now a widely held and accepted view, the thesis that existence is
equivocal has at diﬀerent times and in diﬀerent ways been defended. Hei-
degger, for example, was a philosopher who thought that what it means for
material objects to exist means something diﬀerent than what it means for
minds or consciousness to exist. And Sartre held that there are two kinds
of being, being-for-itself and being-in-itself. Now, the thesis that existence
is equivocal is not very appealing. As mentioned before, most contemporary
analytic philosophers do not make a distinction between existence and be-
ing and think existence and being are the same thing. However, what most
philosophers believe could just be the whim of fashion. How can one argue
for the thesis that existence is univocal? Van Inwagen has oﬀered such an
argument:
No one would be inclined to suppose that number-words like “six” or “forty-three”
mean diﬀerent things when they are used to count diﬀerent sorts of object. e very
essence of the applicability of arithmetic is that numbers may count anything: if you
have written thirteen epics and I own thirteen cats, then the number of your epics is
the number of my cats. But existence is closely tied to number. To say that unicorns
do not exist is to say something very much like saying that the number of unicorns
is ; to say that horses exist is to say that the number of horses is  or more. And to
say that angels or ideas or prime numbers exist is to say that the number of angels,
or of ideas, or of prime numbers, is greater than . e univocacy of number and the
intimate connection between number and existence should convince us that there is
at least very good reason to think that existence is univocal.
 Although not all analytic philosophers believe this. For example Parsons () thinks that
there are non-existent objects.
 Held and accepted by most, if not all, analytic philosophers.
 By among others, Sartre, Heidegger, Ryle ().
 Van Inwagen : .
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is argument is convincing. Put more strongly: it’s hard to see how one can
defend that existence is equivocal such that one does not contradict oneself.
e third assumption stands.
e fourth assumption of this view is that there are no multiple existential
quantiﬁers, but that there is only one existential quantiﬁer, which adequately
captures existence (and also being, since that is the same on this view). It
has sometimes been argued that there are several existential quantiﬁers, e.g.
Carnap is sometimes interpreted this way. For example, Gallois thinks that
Carnap holds that existence statements are not absolutely true but only ever
true relative to a certain framework. AlsoHirsch and Putnam are often called
‘ontological pluralists’. Here is a description of ontological pluralism:
ere are a number of diﬀerent languages we could speak, such that (a) diﬀerent exis-
tence sentences come out true in these languages, due to the fact that the ontological
expressions (counterparts of “there is”, “exists”, etc.) in these languages express diﬀer-
ent concepts of existence and (b) these languages can somehow describe the world’s
facts equally well (…).
I will very brieﬂy discuss Putnam’s ‘ontological pluralism’, which he calls
‘conceptual relativity’. According to this conceptual relativity, it is relative to
our concepts which things we think exist. In a world with objects x, x and
x, a realist will hold that there exist three objects, a believer in mereological
sums will hold that there exist seven objects, and Van Inwagen, assuming that
x, x and x are material objects, will think there exist zero objects. e
existential quantiﬁer is thus restricted and relative to a certain domain (which
is constituted by e.g. language, concepts, ontological convictions). We cannot
say of the above world howmany objects there are simpliciter; there is not one
existential quantiﬁer.
Even though there is something appealing about this view, it is not very
plausible. at is, even though it seems plausible that our concepts shape our
world to a certain extent, this does not necessarily imply that we should think
that there is more than one existential quantiﬁer. Moreover, things get very
complicated and problematic were we to accept this. e assumption that
there is one existential quantiﬁer is thus secure.
Given these assumptions, this view is very plausible. After all, if the as-
sumptions are true, then the following is a good argument: If we can translate
 Eklund . However, not all interpreters of Carnap agree with Gallois on this point.
 Ibid.: . Eklund mentions that Hirsch and Putnam are sometimes even called “neo-
Carnapians”.
 Ibid.
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a true sentence into canonical notation, then that which is bound by a variable,
exists. And since to quantify over something is to say it exists, a person cannot
express a sentence such as ‘spiders share some of the anatomical features of
insects’ and say that anatomical features do not exist without contradicting
himself.
Now, these things said, if we accept Quine’s criterion of ontological com-
mitment, what avenues are open to the nominalist in this case? Van Inwagen
explains that there are four options, which I will paraphrase below:
. To become a Platonist, id est: giving up the nominalist’s position.
. To declare the sentence ‘spiders share some of the anatomical fea-
tures of insects’ to be false.
. To deny that it follows from the sentence ‘spiders share some of
the anatomical features of insects’ that there are such things as
anatomical features.
. To declare the inconsistency between the sentence ‘spiders share
some of the anatomical features of insects’ and the non-existence
of anatomical features is apparent, not real, even though he or she
cannot point out what is wrong with it.
I will discuss these options brieﬂy. Naturally, the ﬁrst option is not so attrac-
tive for a nominalist, and neither is the fourth. e second option is a little
more attractive than the ﬁrst and fourth but is not that attractive in itself. Van
Inwagen gives two reasons why it isn’t:
First it seems to be a simple fact of biology that spiders share some of the anatomical
features of insects. Secondly, there are many, many simple facts that could have been
used as the premise of an essentially identical argument for the conclusion that there
are properties.
e nominalist is therefore not only supposed to explain that the sentence
about spiders and insects is false, but, for that matter, that all sentences that
quantify over properties are false.
With the third option the nominalist seems to have a better shot. is
is the option of paraphrase: the nominalist can claim that it does not follow
from the sentence ‘spiders share some of the anatomical features of insects’
that there are such things as anatomical features, because the sentence can
be paraphrased such that it does not quantify over anatomical features. If
 Paraphrased from Van Inwagen : .
 Ibid.: -.
   
this paraphrase does not quantify over anatomical features, then we are not
committed to there being such things. It would then merely be apparent that
the sentence ‘spiders share some of the anatomical features of insects’ implies
that there are such things as anatomical features, but this would not be a
real implication. Even though it might be hard or impossible to ﬁnd such a
paraphrase, at least this option has a better chance than the other three.
Let’s now turn from properties to experience. Are there sentences that we
all take to be prima facie literally true and that we sincerely endorse but that
quantify over experiences? Yes, there are such sentences. For example: ‘Jack
and Jill have the same experience’, ‘My experience of college is very diﬀerent
from yours’, ‘is was a strange experience’, etc. Our ordinary language is full
of sentences which, when translated into canonical notation, quantify over ex-
periences. Also, in scientiﬁc contexts, sentences are used which quantify over
experiences. For example, psychologists use sentences that compare people’s
experiences, or compare diﬀerent experiences of one subject at diﬀerent times.
For now I will take the ﬁrst sentence as the paradigm case of a sentence that
quantiﬁes over experiences.
() Jack and Jill have the same experience.
I’m picking this sentence for the following reasons: (i) it clearly quantiﬁes
over experiences, and (ii) it is similar in structure to the sentence that Van
Inwagen uses in his argument for the existence of properties, which means
that Van Inwagen’s model applies to our case very well.
How can we argue for the existence of experiences based on our paradigm
sentence? Well, the sentence ‘Jack and Jill have the same experience’ entails
that there are experiences, because the standard translation of this sentence
into canonical notation is:
() ere exists an x such that x is an experience and Jack has x and Jill
has x.
e problem with this sentence is that when we say that Jack and Jill have
the same experience we don’t intend to say that Jack and Jill literally have
something in common, which is what is expressed by the sentence. More
 It is worth noting here that Quine himself was a behaviorist and not a sympathizer of
‘experiences’. However, Quinean metaontology as a method is independent of this fact
and can still be used to determine whether experiences exist.
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precisely, we intend to say that Jack and Jill have (token) experiences of the
same type. e modiﬁed sentence in canonical notation then becomes:
() ere exists an x and there exists a y, such that x is an experience
and y is an experience, and Jack has x, and Jill has y, and x and y
are of the same type.
is sentence entails that there are such things as experiences, in particular
token experiences: the kinds of things that Jack and Jill each have, but which
cannot be had in common.
However, one might think that one can paraphrase this sentence such that
it does not quantify over experiences. How could one do this? One could try
to paraphrase this sentence, so as not to quantify over experiences, as follows:
() ere exists an x such that x is an event and Jack experienced x and
Jill experienced x.
e idea here is that we can paraphrase sentences that talk about experiences
in terms of sentences that talk about events. e result of this paraphrase, if
it is a good and accurate paraphrase, is that someone who believes it does not
have to be committed to the existence of experiences. All they are committed
to is the existence of Jack, Jill and events or activities (and maybe types of
events or types of activities, but I will leave this out of account). However,
this sort of paraphrase is open to counterexamples; I will discuss two such
counterexamples.
e ﬁrst counterexample is the possibility of a case of hallucination. Take a
case where Jack and Jill both have the experience of eating ice cream. Jack and
Jill have token experiences of the same type, but Jack really is eating ice cream,
while Jill is deceived by en evil demon (or she is a brain-in-a-vat) and is de facto
not eating ice cream at all. In this case, sentence () is true, but paraphrase ()
is false. So a simple case of hallucination is enough to show that this sort of
paraphrase fails. However, there is an easy solution to this particular problem,
namely to take a disjunctivist view. According to a disjunctivist view, if Jack
and Jill have the same experiences, Jack and Jill are either undergoing the same
event, or one of them (or even both of them) are hallucinating.e paraphrase
in terms of events can thus be saved in this way by disjunctivism. However,
there is also a more mundane counterexample against this kind of paraphrase
that does not involve hallucination.
e second counterexample to paraphrase () is that for two people to
undergo the same event is not suﬃcient for them to have experiences of the
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same type. Let me explain. Suppose Jack and Jill witness someone dropping a
cocktail glass at a party. Surely this is a single event – and since any event is of
the same type as itself, Jack and Jill are witnessing events of the same type, i.e.
the same event(s). Nevertheless, Jack and Jill’s experiences of this event might
be very diﬀerent, such that we would be inclined to say, in ordinary language,
that they did not have the same experience, or in others words, that they did
not have experiences of the same type. For example, their relative positions
with respect to the shattering glass and the diﬀerent lighting might have made
a diﬀerence in Jack and Jill’s experience such that Jack saw a beautiful reﬂection
of light in the shattering glass, whereas Jill didn’t at all. Jack’s experience of
the shattering glass would then have been aesthetically pleasing, whereas Jill’s
wasn’t. ere might be other diﬀerences between their respective experiences,
but I will conﬁne myself to the diﬀerences in visual phenomenology and only
the part of their visual phenomenology that seems relevant. e fact that
Jack and Jill have diﬀerent experiences of the same event means that, if you try
to paraphrase experiences in terms of events, the paraphrase fails. e issue is
that events aren’t ﬁne-grained enough: people can experience the same event,
yet not have the same experience(s). Experiencing the same event is thus not
suﬃcient for having the same experience. In the counterexample sketched
above, paraphrase () does not have the same truth conditions as sentence ()
of which it is supposed to be a paraphrase. But if the truth conditions come
apart, then () cannot be said to be an accurate paraphrase of ().
Now, one could object that if Jack and Jill do not have the same experience,
then no one ever has the same experience as another person and our original
sentence ‘Jack and Jill had the same experience’ is simply false. But this is
not true. ere are cases in which people have experiences of the same type,
for example if Jack and Jill have a suﬃciently similar physiology, had been
standing right next to each other and the lightning would have hit the glass
in the exact same fashion, and so on.
ere are two kinds of replies someone defending paraphrase in terms of
events could oﬀer to this objection. e ﬁrst kind of reply to this objection
consists in simply claiming that sentence () is false. In this case no paraphrase
would be necessary, since a false sentence does not commit one to anything.
But why would sentence () be false? e defender of paraphrase in favor of
events could claim that this sentence is false because all very general sentences
 ere are other diﬀerences in visual phenomenology between Jack and Jill’s experiences, for
example, the door is to the left of the shattering glass for Jack and to the right for Jill, but
these sorts of diﬀerences are not relevant here. I am here focusing on the visual experience
of the shattering glass.
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about experiences, which do not specify which experiences they exactly in-
volve, are false. Since sentence () is a very general sentence about experience,
it is false. However, if one were to specify which experience Jack and Jill both
have, the sentence expressing that could be true. Take the following sentence:
() Jack and Jill have the same experience of eating ice cream.
is sentence could be true (i.e. it is true if Jack and Jill indeed have the
same experience of eating ice cream) and it could be paraphrased successfully.
e problem with this option however, is that there does not seem to be any
principled reason why we should say that general sentences about experiences
are false, while sentences that specify which experiences exactly are involved
are true – except for the reason that, then, one could also paraphrase general
sentences about experiences, which would be a totally ad hoc and therefore
unacceptable reason.
e second kind of reply is that I might have misrepresented the position
of the defender of paraphrase in terms of events. Maybe the events over which
these paraphrases quantify are not physical events, but mental events. In that
case, the event that we should use in paraphrases is not, for example, ‘the
shattering of the glass’, but instead Jack or Jill’s ‘seeing the glass shatter’.
Jack’s ‘seeing the glass shatter’ and Jill’s ‘seeing the glass shatter’ are (or aren’t)
events of the same type. A paraphrase in terms of mental events avoids the
counterexamples we have presented. ere is a big objection against this in-
terpretation though, which we can express by the following question: What
are these ‘seeings’? It seems that ‘seeings’ are experiences by another name and
by using this term experiences are reintroduced through the back door.
Paraphrasing sentences about expriences in terms of events is thus prob-
lematic.e person who yet wants to deny that there are experiences obviously
has the same options that Van Inwagen allows for the nominalist. Let’s con-
sider the ﬁrst and the fourth options ﬁrst.e ﬁrst option is to convert, give up
on the denial of the existence of experience and aﬃrm that experiences exist.
is is presumably not such an appealing option for the experience-denying
philosopher. e fourth option is to declare that the inconsistency between
the sentence ‘spiders share some of the anatomical features of insects’ and the
claim that there are no such things as anatomical features is merely apparent
without being able to say how and why exactly it is not real. Van Inwagen says
about this option: ‘always an option, but no philosopher is likely to embrace
it except as a last resort.’
 Van Inwagen : .
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What about the second and third option? e second option is to declare
the proﬀered sentence false; the third option is to ﬁnd a paraphrase for the
sentence that is not ontologically committing. Now, interestingly, one can
see eliminativism and behaviorism, respectively, as precisely such attempts.
According to eliminativism, folk psychological sentences, such as the sen-
tences we have seen about experiences, are false and mental concepts should
be eliminated. According to behaviorism, mental terms should be replaced by
behavioral terms to achieve a paraphrase that does not commit one to there
being the things to which mental terms would refer. In the next two sections,
I will discuss both these options and see if they provide the naturalist with a
way out of the ontological commitment to experiences.
We have just seen that simply paraphrasing sentences about experiences
in terms of events does not work, but a diﬀerent paraphrase strategy, such
as behaviorism, might work. Behaviorism as a paraphrase strategy is worth
discussing since it is a prominent movement that has tried to give paraphrases
of these sorts of sentences, and it is more involved and sophisticated than the
paraphrase strategy we discussed in this section.
.  : 
In section . we already discussed arguments for the claim that there are
no experiences. In this section and the next section, we will discuss replies
to the argument from the previous section that there are experiences. Even
though the arguments from this and the next section are also arguments for the
conclusion that there are no experiences (just as the arguments in section .),
these are arguments against an argument for the existence of experiences.
As we have just established, there are only two respectable ways to avoid
the result of the application of Quine’s methodology, which means that there
are two replies to it:
. To say that ordinary claims should be paraphrased so as not to
quantify over experiences, which is what the theory of behaviorism
aims to do.
. To say that ordinary claims, in which we quantify over experiences,
are false, which is attempted by eliminativism.
In this section I will discuss the ﬁrst of these two options, which is the para-
phrase strategy we can ﬁnd in behaviorism and see if it presents the experience-
denying philosopher with a good reply against Quine’s metaontology.
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What is behaviorism exactly? To start answering this question, let’s ﬁrst
look at the following description of behaviorism from Graham:
Behaviorism, the doctrine, is committed in its fullest and most complete sense to the
truth of the following three sets of claims.
. Psychology is the science of behavior. Psychology is not the science of mind.
. Behavior can be described and explained without making reference to mental
events or to internal psychological processes. e sources of behavior are external
(in the environment), not internal (in the mind).
. In the course of theory development in psychology, if, somehow, mental terms or
concepts are deployed in describing or explaining behavior, then either (a) these
terms or concepts should be eliminated and replaced by behavioral terms or (b)
they can and should be translated or paraphrased into behavioral concepts.
For our purposes, the third assumption is the most important. Unfortunately,
this passage is at the same time a little confusing, since there does not seem to
be a principled diﬀerence between (a) and (b): in case of (a) the mental terms
should be eliminated and replaced by behavioral terms and in case of (b) the
mental terms should be translated and paraphrased into behavioral terms.
Now, replacing, translating and paraphrasing are not the same verbs, but the
result for the mental terms is the same: they will not be part of the newly
constructed sentence.
Philosophical behaviorism thus does not present a positive theory with
regard to mental states; it is rather a theory about the language we use to talk
about mental states. More speciﬁcally, behaviorism is a theory that aims to
replace all reference to experience andmental states with behavioral references.
Sentences containing mental concepts will thus need to be paraphrased such
that the paraphrase does not contain any ‘mental concepts’. If this could
be done for all sentences, then this would show that we are not committed
to the existence of mental concepts. It should be noted that behaviorism is a
theory about language and is, as such, in theory, compatible with ontological
 Graham .
 Since the term ‘elimination’ is used here, the question is raised how eliminativism and
behaviorism relate to one another. In both eliminativism and behaviorism mental con-
cepts are eliminated. In the case of behaviorism, however, this happens by translating
or paraphrasing these concepts into other concepts, which is a crucial interest for the
behaviorist. After all, the behaviorist does not simply think that mental concepts should
be eliminated, but that anything usually called ‘mental’ can be explained in behavioristic
terms.e eliminativist would be satisﬁed with and aims for elimination simpliciter – since
he thinks that mental concepts do not refer at all, not even to behavior.
 I’m using the term ‘mental concept’ for any concept that refers to a mental state.
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dualism. Not that there are (m)any behaviorists who are dualists, but it should
be kept in mind that even if we could do without mental concepts, this does
not necessarily imply that there are no mental things; it just means that if
we wanted to speak as if they were non-existent (for some other reason), at
least we could do so in a coherent way, and in a way in which our ordinary
talk is not rendered false. But what would this mean for our ordinary lan-
guage, in which we use mental concepts? is is Churchland’s answer to that
question:
[T]alk about emotions and sensations and beliefs and desires is not talk about ghostly
inner episodes, but is rather a shorthand way of talking about actual and potential
patterns of behavior.
Here is how Graham puts the same idea in diﬀerent words:
Don’t human beings talk of introspectible entities even if these are not recognized by
behaviorism? Psychological behaviorists regard the practice of talking about one’s own
states of mind, and of introspectively reporting those states, as potentially useful data
in psychological experiments, but as not presupposing the metaphysical subjectivity
or non-physical presence of those states. ere are diﬀerent sorts of causes behind
introspective reports, and psychological behaviorists take these to be amenable to
behavioral analysis.
So, mental concepts do not (need to) refer to mental entities. Mental con-
cepts can and should be paraphrased away, so that it is clear that there is no
ontological commitment there. In Churchland’s terms:
Philosophical behaviorism claims that any sentence about a mental state can be para-
phrased, without loss of meaning, into a long and complex sentence about what
observable behavior would result if the person in question were in this, that or the
other observable circumstance.
Since it is hard to see how this can be done in the abstract, I proﬀer we
look in detail at an example that Churchland gives of this sort of paraphrase.
Churchland, himself by the way no friend of behaviorism, provides us with
a helpful analogy to understand what is involved in such a paraphrase. e
analogous case is the dispositional property of ‘being soluble’ that a sugar cube
 Churchland : .
 Graham .
 Churchland : .
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has. As Churchland explains: ‘To say that a sugar cube is soluble is not to say
that the sugar cube enjoys some ghostly inner state. It is just to say that if the
sugar cube were put in water, then it would dissolve.’
Knowing this, how would this kind of paraphrase for mental concepts
work? Churchland argues that paraphrases for mental concepts are, in fact,
at least apparently, analogous to the soluble sugar cube case. He analyses the
mental state ‘wants a Caribbean holiday’. According to Churchland to say that
Anne wants a Caribbean holiday is to say that:
. If asked whether that is what she wants, she would answer yes, and
. If given new holiday brochures for Jamaica and Japan, she would peruse the ones
for Jamaica ﬁrst, and
. If given a ticket on this Friday’s ﬂight to Jamaica, she would go, and so on.
e paraphrase for ‘Anne wants a Caribbean holiday’ thus consists of the
conjunction of all these claims. ere are examples of mental concepts that
are easier to analyze in this way than others; if someone is sad and crying,
for example, the behaviorist has an easy time. However, if someone is merely
having ‘an orange sensation’, then the behaviorist is limited to the answers
given to questions he asks.
Even though it seems at least kind of promising that behaviorists have
something to oﬀer when it comes to ﬁnding a paraphrase for these kinds of
mental states that do not come with clearly observable behavior, there are
still three big problems with this kind of paraphrase that are problems for
behaviorism in general.
e ﬁrst big problem is that such paraphrases ignore the inner aspect of
mental states or the inner aspect of the reference of mental concepts. Church-
land has formulated this criticism in the following way:
To have a pain, for example, seems to be not merely a matter of being inclined to
moan, to wince, to take aspirin, and so on. Pains also have an intrinsic qualitative
nature (a horrible one) that is revealed in introspection, and any theory of mind that
ignores or denies such qualia is simply derelict in its duty.
To a certain extent, this ‘supposed’ problem could be said to beg the question.
However, I am not sure matters are that easy for the behaviorist. ere is
 Ibid.
 Ibid.
 Ibid: .
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something disturbing about the idea that the intrinsic quality of mental states,
such as feelings of pain, could simply be ignored and left out of account.
e second big problem with this kind of paraphrase, and so with behav-
iorism in general, appears when the details of the necessary paraphrases are
considered. Even though we have seen the kind of paraphrase that could be
given for the mental state ‘wants a Caribbean holiday’, this paraphrase merely
approaches or indicates the sort of paraphrase that is needed but is itself not
suﬃcient to count as a successful paraphrase. Why not? Well, the paraphrase
is a conjunction of conditionals, but these conditionals are not all sound and,
in turn, all need to be qualiﬁed. Churchland has recognized this of his own
example. Here is how he formulates the problem:
Supposing that Anne does want a Caribbean holiday, conditional  above will be true
only is she isn’t secretive about her holiday fantasies; conditional  will be true only
is she isn’t already bored with the Jamaica brochures; conditional  will be true only
is she doesn’t believe the Friday ﬂight will be hijacked, and so forth. But to repair
each conditional by adding in the relevant qualiﬁcation would be to reintroduce a
series of mental elements into the business end of the deﬁnition, and we would no
longer be deﬁning the mental solely in terms of publicly observable circumstances and
behavior.
Not only are mental concepts reintroduced through the back door, this diﬃ-
culty also means that the paraphrases are endlessly long. is creates a further
problem, since, to cover all qualiﬁcations of the conditionals, the paraphrases
might be inﬁnitely long or indeterminately long. In Churchland’s words:
e list of conditionals necessary for an adequate analysis of ‘wants a Caribbean holi-
day’, for example, seemed not just to be long, but to be indeﬁnitely or even inﬁnitely
long, with no ﬁnite way of specifying the elements to be included. And no term can be
well-deﬁned whose deﬁniens is open-ended and unspeciﬁc in this way. Further, each
conditional of the long analysis was suspect on its own.
If the ﬁrst problem with paraphrase was relatively easy for the behaviorist to
reply to, this second problem seems more serious and very hard to avoid. After
all, the whole theory hangs on the possibility of paraphrasing mental concepts
and the theory is as good as the paraphrases it can oﬀer. However, if there are
 Naturally, the behaviorist will deny that anything is left out of account. However, they still
haven’t shown how they can account for the intrinsic quality of mental states.
 Churchland : .
 Ibid.
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principled problems with paraphrase, and it seems unlikely that paraphrase
can be successful in this way, then there is not much left of behaviorism.
A behaviorist might defend himself by claiming that these issues with
paraphrase are merely practical yet not principled problems. However, if it
is unlikely that accurate paraphrases can be given, the plausibility of this
view is seriously challenged. Granted, it is possible that someday the sought-
after paraphrases will be found, in which case we have to revise our verdict
of behaviorism, but, until that day, it cannot be assumed that the necessary
paraphrases can or will be provided. Behaviorism, as a paraphrase strategy, is
thus not successful.
.  : 
Following Van Inwagen’s model, we established four avenues the naturalist,
who wants to deny that there are such things as experiences, can take. Two of
those had to be rejected right away, and the third paraphrase-option had to be
rejected in the previous section.is means that there is one possible rejoinder
for Quine’s metaontology left, which is to say that ordinary claims, in which
we quantify over experiences, are simply false. Eliminativism, or eliminative
materialism, can be seen as exactly such an attempt.
What is eliminative materialism? Contemporary eliminative materialism,
eliminativism for short, is the doctrine that common sense or folk psychology
is radically false and that some or all of the mental states that we ordinarily
assume to exist, do not exist. Here is how Churchland, a famous eliminativist
himself, describes the position of eliminativism: ‘Our common-sense psycho-
logical framework is a false and radically misleading conception of the causes
of human behavior and the nature of cognitive activity.’
ere are two diﬀerent ways in which eliminativism has been spelled out.
e ﬁrst is in line with Broad’s early idea that mental attributes, in fact, have
no reference. e reference category will thus turn out to be empty on this
view. e second way in which eliminativism can be spelled out is as the view
that the conceptual framework that future physics will propose will replace
the common sense conceptual framework that we have now. Ramsey writes
about these two ways of being an eliminativist: ‘Given these two diﬀerent
conceptions, early eliminativists would sometimes oﬀer two diﬀerent charac-
terizations of their view: (a)ere are no mental states, just brain states and, (b)
 Ibid.: .
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ere really are mental states, but they are just brain states (and we will come to
view them that way).’
Eliminativism knows parallels that can be found in scientiﬁc history. More
than once something that was thought to exist by the lights of an older theory
was eliminated when a newer theory was introduced that could do without
it – and that was better. ink of moods, which were thought to be diﬀerent
kinds of ﬂuids in body, such as black (gal), yellow (gal), etc. In Mind and
Consciousness, Churchland discusses some other examples. He mentions, for
example, how heat was thought to be a ﬂuid held in bodies called ‘caloric’,
until it turned out that heat is not a substance. e diﬀerence between
these cases and the case of eliminative materialism is that, at least so far, the
other new theories have been proven to be accurate and whether eliminative
materialism is accurate remains yet to be seen.
Now, how does eliminativism deny that there are experiences? Elimina-
tivism denies every common sense or folk notion of the mental, including the
idea that we have experiences and that experiences have phenomenal char-
acter. One way to say these ordinary sentences are false is by saying that the
concepts are incoherent, which is, for example, what Dennett argues about the
concept of pain. However, the fact that we use concepts in diﬀerent ways
in diﬀerent contexts, and the fact that in ordinary language we sometimes
say things about pain that are, strictly speaking, false, are not good arguments
that these concepts do not refer at all. Concepts and their applicationmight be
problematic, which is the case for the concept ‘pain’ but also for the concept
‘knowledge’, but this does not mean that there are not such things as pain and
knowledge.
ere are two other main kinds of arguments against eliminativism. e
ﬁrst kind of argument is that eliminativism is in some way self-refuting. e
second kind of argument is that the eliminativist’s assessment of folk psychol-
ogy is, in one way or other, mistaken. In the remainder of this section I will
discuss both these kinds of arguments, starting with the ﬁrst kind.
It has been argued by many and in many diﬀerent ways that eliminativism
is, in some sense, self-refuting. To recall, the eliminativist does not only
 Ramsey .
 Churchland : .
 Dennett .
 Needless to say, there are many diﬀerent kinds of arguments against eliminativism, but
there are two kinds that are more common, important and powerful than others.
 For example by Baker ; Boghossian ; Boghossian ; Hannan ; Putnam,
Churchland and Pylyshyn. I am here not discussing each version of the argument from
self-refutation, since they tend to be quite similar. e aim of this section is not to give an
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think that there is no (phenomenal) consciousness but also that there are no
beliefs. Now, this creates a problem, since, as is often argued, in order for any-
one (including the eliminativist) to make an assertion in ordinary language,
this person has to believe that which is asserted. So if the eliminativist wants to
assert that eliminativism is true, then the eliminativist is doing something that
is contradictory to his own thesis: he has a belief. It is thus not the case that the
proposition ‘ere are no beliefs’ refutes the eliminativist’s assertion directly,
but the self-refutation lies in the (supposed) necessity for the eliminativist
asserting his view to have the corresponding belief. In Hannan’s words:
It is a consequence of EM [eliminativist materialism] that there are no propositional
attitudes. But to accept EM, or to assert EM’s truth, inescapably involves taking an
attitude toward a proposition.erefore, in the very act of endorsing or asserting EM,
one proves that EM cannot be correct.
Next to this pretty straightforward argument involving self-refutation, there
is Baker’s argument from self-refutation. In Saving Belief, Baker distinguishes
three ways in which eliminativism can be said to be self-refuting. First, ac-
cording to Baker, ‘accepting a theory’ and ‘having good reason to accept a
theory’ are concepts that are part of folk psychology, which eliminativism
wants to eliminate. is means that an eliminativist cannot coherently accept
his own theory or claim (or think) that he, or anyone else, has good reason to
accept his theory. Second, and this is the argument we have discussed above,
the eliminativist cannot coherently assert eliminativism because any assertion
involves a belief in some way (see above). ird, the eliminativist cannot
coherently claim that eliminativism is true, since ‘truth’ and ‘falsehood’ are
also concepts of folk psychology, which the eliminativist claims is mistaken
and should be rejected.
Another argument for the thesis eliminativism is self-refuting, from
Pylyshyn featured in Hannan (), draws on the idea that propositional
attitudes are necessary to explain rational behavior. Since also eliminativists
think that rational actions are the central data that need explanation, they are
committed to their being propositional attitudes, which is exactly what they
want to deny.
Now, after considering these diﬀerent arguments for the thesis that elimi-
nativism is self-refuting, let’s see what the eliminativist can say in his defense.
exhaustive overview of arguments against eliminativism, but to give a sense of the general
idea of them.
 Hannan : .
 For a detailed account of this argument, see Hannan : .
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Basically, with respect to all these versions of the self-refutation argument,
the eliminativist can claim that these arguments beg the question. I will ﬁrst
discuss this reply with respect to the ﬁrst argument and Baker’s versions of
the argument. e eliminativism can claim that the arguments according to
which the eliminativist needs to believe what he asserts just beg the question.
After all, the eliminativist’s claim is exactly that the common sense idea that
beliefs play a role in assertions is false. at is: the idea that beliefs need to
be involved in assertions is part of the folk psychology that the eliminativist
rejects. As Ramsey writes:
According to eliminative materialism, all of the various capacities that we now explain
by appealing to beliefs do not actually involve beliefs at all. So the eliminativist will
hold that the self-refutation critics beg the question against eliminative materialism.
To run this sort of objection, the critic endorses some principle about the necessity of
beliefs which itself presupposes that eliminative materialism must be false.
So, even though it might be argued that the eliminativist cannot assert elimi-
nativism because that would involve beliefs which the eliminativist claims do
not exist, the eliminativist can (should and will) simply deny that this folk
psychological idea is accurate. Now, even though this is a good reply, it does
not mean that, thereby, the eliminativist is out of shot. It might not be the
case that eliminativism is self-refuting in this sense, but it is the case that the
eliminativist needs to tell some story about how it is possible and likely for
eliminativists to assert the truth of eliminativism. What is going on in such a
situation if beliefs do not exist? What makes them assert this view and claim it
is true?e eliminativist will have to present us with an account of these kinds
of situations that sounds reasonable and could be accepted. Until that time,
though, the burden of proof lies on the side of the eliminativist. After all, he
cannot just get away with claiming that it is possible to assert (the truth of ) a
view without having beliefs, if he cannot explain just how this would work.
What about the argument from Pylyshyn? e eliminativist can take the
same position here and argue that Pylyshyn’s argument simply begs the ques-
tion. e eliminativist will deny that propositional attitudes are necessary to
explain rational behavior. It is, of course, another question how the elimina-
tivist proﬀers to do this exactly and he will have to show and prove that this
is in fact possible. We might again say that the burden of proof lies on the
side of the eliminativist until he has shown just how he can explain rational
behavior without appealing to propositional attitudes. Even though it is not
 Ramsey .
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clear that eliminativism is self-refuting in the sense here speciﬁed, again, that
does not mean he is out of trouble. ere is still something in this argument
to which an answer must be given.
e second kind of argument against eliminativism is that the elimina-
tivist’s assessment of folk psychology is, in one way or other, mistaken. Just
as with the ﬁrst argument against eliminativism, there are many diﬀerent ver-
sions of this argument. Common to these arguments is that the eliminativist’s
assessment of folk psychology is mistaken; just how it is mistaken varies. In
the following, I will look at three diﬀerent variations of this argument.
One version of the argument is that folk psychology cannot conceivably
prove false. For example, Fodor has argued for this in the following way:
Even if [commonsense psychology] were dispensable in principle, that would be no ar-
gument for dispensing with it. (…)What’s relevant to whether commonsense psychol-
ogy is worth defending is its dispensability in fact. And here the situation is absolutely
clear. We have no idea of how to explain ourselves to ourselves except in a vocabulary
which is saturated with belief/desire psychology. One is tempted to transcendental
argument: What Kant said to Hume about physical objects holds, mutatis mutandis,
for the propositional attitudes; we can’t give them up because we don’t know how to.
Fodor thus thinks that, at least for now, it is inconceivable that folk psychology
is false. is is one way to argue that the eliminativist’s assessment of folk
psychology is mistaken.
Another version of the argument is that the eliminativist wrongly holds
that folk psychology fails to explain that which it is supposed to explain.
According to eliminativism, folk psychological explanations are not any good
and should be jettisoned, but what if these explanations actually are good and
are a lot more successful than the eliminativist claims? Ramsey has explained
this argument as follows:
Apart from the strong intuitive evidence that seems to reveal beliefs and desires, we
also enjoy a great deal of success when we use common sense psychology to predict
the actions of other people. Many have noted that this high degree of success pro-
vides us with something like an inference-to-the-best-explanation argument in favor
of common sense psychology and against eliminativism. e best explanation for the
success we enjoy in explaining and predicting human and animal behavior is that folk
psychology is roughly true, and that there really are beliefs.
is view is held by, among others, Kitcher () and Fodor ().
 Fodor : -.
 Ramsey .
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An argument in the proximity of this one is the argument that elimina-
tivism relies on a certain prediction of the future of scientiﬁc psychology that
does not have a secure basis. After all, folk psychology will need to be replaced
by scientiﬁc psychology, if eliminativism is correct, but we don’t even know
yet whether that is going to develop, how it will develop, etc. us, elimina-
tivism relies on something very futuristic and uncertain. Ramsey formulates
this argument as follows:
Of course, some claim that these concerns are quite premature, given the promissory
nature of eliminative materialism. After all, a pivotal component of the eliminativist
perspective is the idea that the correct theory of the mind, once discovered by psychol-
ogists, will not reveal a system or structure that includes anything like common-sense
mental states. us, for eliminative materialism to get oﬀ the ground, we need to
assume that scientiﬁc psychology is going to turn out a certain way. But why suppose
that before scientiﬁc psychology gets there?What is the point of drawing such a drastic
conclusion about the nature of mentality, when a central premise needed for that
conclusion is a long ways from being known?
How can the eliminativist defend himself against these arguments? According
to Ramsey, the eliminativist should recall developments in the philosophy of
science, which have shown that a theory can seem successful when in fact it
isn’t. e fact that we think we couldn’t do without folk psychology and the
fact that folk psychology might seem successful, does not mean that it actually
is successful:
A common eliminativist response to this argument is to re-emphasize a lesson from
the philosophy of science; namely, that any theory —especially one that is as near and
dear to us as folk psychology —can often appear successful even when it completely
misrepresents reality. History demonstrates that we often discount anomalies, ignore
failures as insigniﬁcant, and generally attribute more success to a popular theory than
it deserves. Like the proponents of vitalism or phlogiston theory, we may be blind to
the failings of folk psychology until an alternative account is in hand.
Now, this is true, but if we bring Fodor’s argument back in mind, this argu-
ment loses its force. Naturally, it might be the case that folk psychology is
not any good, and it might be the case that the concepts of folk psychology
will be overturned in the future, but these are speculations about what would
be possible in principle, but not what is likely, or what actually is the case, in
 Ibid.
 Ibid.
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fact. I think that these arguments against eliminativismmake a very important
point to which the eliminativist does not have a good reply.
What should we conclude with respect to eliminativism? Is it a theory that
we should accept and is this theory a reason to think that experiences and
consciousness do not exist? Based on the arguments against eliminativism, we
have to come to the conclusion that, in fact, eliminativism should be rejected.
As we have just seen, there are many good arguments against eliminativism
that seriously undermine the view, which is as such no longer tenable. Unfor-
tunately, this last option open to the naturalist who wants to deny that there
is such a thing as experience turns out not to be a good one. It seems, then,
that we have to conclude that experience exists.
. 
In the ﬁrst section of this chapter, section ., we considered what experiences
actually are. We discussed the term ‘experience’, what kinds of experiences
there are and in which ontological category experiences can be said to fall.
Even though we did not decide upon this matter, this discussion did clarify
the notion of experience so that we know what we are talking about when we
ask whether there are such things.
As we have seen in this chapter, the apparent way out of the problem that
the naturalist faces, to deny that there is such a thing as experience, is, in fact,
not a way out. We started out by considering reasons against the existence
of experience in section .. We discussed ‘the argument from awkwardness’
and Byrne’s argument against the existence of experience. Despite the fact
that there are problems with these arguments, it did seem that if we could do
without the notion of experience, we should.
However, even though there are good arguments to jettison the notion of
experience, we found that there is an even better reason why we can’t in fact
do so.is reason is provided byQuine’s criterion of ontological commitment
which implies that anything that we quantify over exists. Using Van Inwagen’s
model, we concluded that this means that we have to say that experiences
exist, since we and scientists with us quantify over experiences in our usage of
the term in ordinary and scientiﬁc sentences which we genuinely endorse. We
discussed this powerful argument for the existence of experience in section ..
It turned out that the only escape from theQuinean argument would be to
either eliminate or paraphrase away this kind of language. Since behaviorism
and eliminativism can be seen as attempts exactly to this eﬀect, we devoted
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sections . and . to a discussion of these theories. However, we soon found
that behaviorism and eliminativism face so many problems of their own that
these theories are untenable. And it is not just other kinds of problems that
surround them: their actual attempts at paraphrase and elimination are only
very limitedly successful. is means that we are committed to the claim
that experience exists. e subjectivity of experience is thus a genuine phe-
nomenon.
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Metaphysical Naturalism
In order to be able to establish whether or not the subjectivity of experience
is a problem for naturalism, the preliminary question of what naturalism is,
needs answering. Contrary to what might be expected – given the fact that
naturalism is the mainstream ontological position most analytic philosophers
embrace these days – just what the thesis of naturalism exactly amounts to is
far from clear. is is why this chapter and the next one are solely dedicated
to shedding light on this issue.
I will not just be discussing naturalism here, but also materialism and
physicalism. Since there is a lot of confusion about the terms ‘physicalism’,
‘materialism’, and ‘naturalism’ and the views these terms refer to, the ﬁrst
section of this chapter, ., is solely dedicated to inventorying the deﬁnitions
of these terms that can be found in the literature. In section ., I will oﬀer a
way of organizing these deﬁnitions into two diﬀerent versions of naturalism,
which I will call ‘metaphysical naturalism’ on the one hand and ‘methodolog-
ical naturalism’ on the other. ere is a lot that needs to be said about this
distinction and about these versions of naturalism. Here, I will also discuss
if we also need to distinguish between ‘epistemological naturalism’ and ‘on-
tological naturalism’, and if so, how this distinction relates to the distinction
between methodological and metaphysical naturalism. In section ., I will
then discuss if we need to distinguish a number of varieties of naturalism,
namely reductive and non-reductive naturalism, weak and strong naturalism
and soft and hard naturalism.
From here on this chapter will then be devoted tometaphysical naturalism,
whereas Chapter  will concern itself with methodological naturalism. In
section ., I will discuss the question whether or not the terms ‘materialism’,
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‘physicalism’ and ‘naturalism’ pick out diﬀerent views within metaphysical
naturalism or whether they are merely diﬀerent names for the same view.
e remainder of the chapter does not concern the diﬀerent terms that are
used to indicate metaphysical naturalism but the diﬀerent views this term
refers to. In section ., I will discuss four groups that the deﬁnitions of
metaphysical naturalism can be divided into. ese groups correspond to
four diﬀerent kinds of metaphysical naturalism. e ﬁrst sub-section, ..,
is about the ﬁrst kind of metaphysical naturalism that we can distinguish:
‘classical materialism’. Section .. is about the second kind of metaphysical
naturalism, a view that we have called ‘spatio-temporal materialism’. Section
.. concerns the third kind of metaphysical naturalism that we have found:
‘causal materialism’. Section .. will be about the ﬁnal kind of metaphysical
naturalism, which is better called ‘anti-supernaturalism’.
In section . I will summarize the ﬁndings of this chapter and draw some
conclusions.
.   ,   
Since there is a lot of confusion about the terms ‘physicalism’, ‘materialism’
and ‘naturalism’, in this section I will present the results of inventorying the
deﬁnitions of the terms ‘materialism’, ‘physicalism’ and ‘naturalism’ that can
be found in the literature. After listing them, I will proﬀer a way of organizing
the deﬁnitions into two diﬀerent groups, viz. metaphysical deﬁnitions and
methodological deﬁnitions. Metaphysical deﬁnitions are deﬁnitions of meta-
physical naturalism andmethodological deﬁnitions are deﬁnitions of method-
ological naturalism. I will discuss these two categories of naturalism more in
depth in the next section, section .. Let’s start out with the deﬁnitions of
materialism.
Materialism is:
(M) e view that token physicalism is true and that every event
falls under the law of some science or other.
 Some disclaimers regarding these deﬁnitions: () ese deﬁnitions are not necessarily en-
dorsed by the authors of the papers. () ese deﬁnitions are put in chronological order,
at least roughly, i.e. by year. () I do not claim that this list is exhaustive, although I do
think it accurately represents the variety of views that can be found in the literature.
 Fodor : .
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(M) e view that the world contains nothing but the entities rec-
ognized by physics.
(M) e view that everything is matter.
(M) e view that everything that actually exists is material or phys-
ical.
(M) e view that every thing and event in the universe is physical
in every respect; that ‘physical phenomenon’ is coextensive with
‘real phenomenon’.
(M) e view that whenever we talk about an object, state of aﬀairs
or event in psychological terms, we can talk about the very same
object, state of aﬀairs or event in physical terms.
(M) e view that all facts, in particular all mental facts, obtain
in virtue of the spatiotemporal distribution, and properties, of
matter.
(M) e view that nothing exists except for space-time, material
objects and events in space-time, and the properties exempliﬁed
by space-time and the objects and events therein.
(M) e view that ﬁrst, all reality is essentially a material reality and
that therefore, second, no supernatural or immaterial reality can
exist, and third, that all organic life arises from and returns to
inorganic matter.
ere are many diﬀerences between these deﬁnitions of materialism. In the
following discussion I will make several distinctions, starting with what I
take to be the most important one. Ignoring smaller diﬀerences, the main
 Armstrong : . Armstrong follows J.J.C. Smart in this deﬁnition.
 Crane & Mellor : .
 Moser & Trout (eds.) : .
 Strawson : .
 Rosenthal : .
 Loewer : .
 Rea : .
 Vitzthum.
   
distinction that should be made is between metaphysical deﬁnitions on the
one hand and methodological deﬁnitions on the other hand.
e ﬁrst category of deﬁnitions that we can distinguish is the category
of ‘methodological deﬁnitions’. ese deﬁnitions specify that materialism is
a view that provides a certain methodology for deciding which (kinds of )
things exist. at is: the view does not specify directly which kinds of things
exist but does so indirectly only by specifying which method we should use
to determine which (kinds of ) things exist. is method is science. I take it
as a suﬃcient condition for a view to be called a ‘methodological view’ if its
deﬁnition makes reference to the term ‘science’ or related terms such as ‘the
scientiﬁc method’ or particular sciences such as ‘physics’. ‘Method’ should
here thus be interpreted in a wide sense.
e methodological deﬁnitions that we have encountered present materi-
alism as the view that physics tells us what there is (M), or that for entities
to exist, they have to fall under the laws of ‘some science’ (M). In these
cases ‘physics’ and ‘some science’ are used as methods to determine which
things exist. Needless to say, there are vast diﬀerences between deﬁnitions
(M) and (M). For now, I want to merely point out that they share the
methodological characterization ofmaterialism as the view according to which
science – somehow – tells us what (kinds of ) things exists.
e second category of deﬁnitions that we can distinguish is that of ‘meta-
physical deﬁnitions’, that is: deﬁnitions of (a) metaphysical view(s). I take a
metaphysical view to be a view about which (kinds of ) things exist without a
reference to science, the scientiﬁc method, or particular sciences. Deﬁnitions
that fall into this group claim that materialism is a view about which (kinds
of ) things exist, without using the term ‘science’ and related terms. e cat-
egories ‘metaphysical materialism’ and ‘methodological materialism’ are thus
mutually exclusive.
e deﬁnitions of metaphysical materialism express the idea that the only
things that exist or that are ‘real’ are things made out of ‘matter’, or ‘physical
things’.e deﬁnitions that fall into the group of metaphysical deﬁnitions are:
(M), (M), (M), (M), (M), (M) and (M). Of these, (M) and (M)
are the only deﬁnitions in which the term ‘space-time’ occurs, which gives
us some clue as to how one might understand what it means for something
to be material or physical (according to these deﬁnitions). is is of course
a crucial issue for metaphysical deﬁnitions and will be further discussed in
section ..
e distinction between metaphysical and methodological materialism is
the main distinction between these deﬁnitions. However, there is another
distinction that functions within this ﬁrst distinction that is important to
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discuss, namely the secondary distinction between epistemological deﬁnitions
on the one hand and ontological deﬁnitions on the other. Both metaphysi-
cal and methodological materialism can be expressed in two diﬀerent ways:
in an epistemological way and in an ontological way. Or in other words,
the deﬁnitions of both metaphysical and methodological materialism can
be further divided into two groups: epistemological deﬁnitions and onto-
logical deﬁnitions. What is the diﬀerence between epistemological and on-
tological deﬁnitions? For lack of a better term, ‘epistemological’ deﬁnitions
are deﬁnitions formulated in terms of truth(s), facts, statements and so on,
whereas ‘ontological’ deﬁnitions are phrased in terms of existence and similar
terms. So, according to methodological-epistemological deﬁnitions, science
tells us what is true, whereas according to metaphysical-ontological deﬁni-
tions, science tells us what exists. Similarly, an example of a metaphysical-
epistemological deﬁnition is: ‘All facts are physical facts’; whereas an exam-
ple of a metaphysical-ontological deﬁnition is: ‘Everything that exists is in
space’.
To make the distinction between epistemological and ontological deﬁni-
tions more clear, I will show how the methodological andmetaphysical deﬁni-
tions ofmaterialism can be divided up into these two categories.ere are only
twomethodological deﬁnitions, i.e. deﬁnitions that make reference to science,
among the deﬁnitions of materialism: (M) and (M). Both these deﬁnitions
are ontological: they specify which kinds of entities (M) or events (M) exist.
By far most deﬁnitions of materialism are metaphysical, which means they do
not contain a reference to science. Of these metaphysical deﬁnitions only one
is metaphysical-epistemological: (M). Deﬁnition (M) is put in terms of
‘terms’, which makes it epistemological.
Two general things should be noted with respect to the distinction between
epistemological and ontological deﬁnitions. First, the distinction between
epistemological and ontological naturalism does not occur at the same level as
the distinction between metaphysical and methodological naturalism but cuts
across this more basic, primary distinction. Second, it should be clear that the
epistemological deﬁnitions entail their ontological counterparts. Or in other
words: if one of the epistemological formulations of materialism is true, then
it follows that its ontological counterpart is true as well. However, the reverse
does not hold. at is, if an ontological version of materialism is true, it does
not necessarily follow that its epistemological counterpart is true.
Next, I would like to turn to deﬁnitions of ‘physicalism’ that can be found
in the literature.
 One might think it should be called a ‘semantic’ deﬁnition. More about this in section ..
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Physicalism is:
(P) e view that every meaningful sentence, whether true or false,
could be translated into physical language.
(P) e view that a person, with all his psychological attributes,
is nothing over and above his body, with all its physical at-
tributes.
(P) e view that all that exists in space-time is physical.
(P) e view that everything is physical. All entities, properties,
relations, and facts are those which are studied by physics or
other physical sciences.
(P) e view that the empirical world contains just what a true
complete physics would say it contains.
(P) e view that the only individual things that exist are physical
things.
(P) e view that would be true IFF every world that is a mini-
mal physical duplicate of the actual world is a duplicate sim-
pliciter.
(P) e view that all factual knowledge can be formulated as a
statement about physical objects and activities.
(P) e view that everything that interacts causally with the phys-
ical world is physical.
 Deﬁnition from Neurath & Carnap (/) in Gillet : .
 Nagel : .
 Kim : .
 Crane & Mellor : .
 Ibid.
 Van Inwagen : . Van Inwagen also describes a weaker form of physicalism: the
thesis that human persons are physical things.
 Deﬁnition from Jackson () in Loewer : .
 Zachar.
 Papineau : .
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(P) e view that all facts obtain in virtue of the distribution of the
fundamental entities and properties – whatever they turn out
to be – of completed fundamental physics.
(P) e view that all God had to do to create our world was to create
its physical facts and laws; the rest followed from these.
Just as is the case with the deﬁnitions of materialism, the deﬁnitions of phys-
icalism fall into two diﬀerent categories. In fact, we can distinguish the same
categories in the deﬁnitions of physicalism as we distinguished within the
deﬁnitions of materialism.
First, there is the category of deﬁnitions that characterize physicalism as
a metaphysical view. ese deﬁnitions say that physicalism is the view that
only ‘material’ or ‘physical’ things exist. As I mentioned before, we need
to know what these terms mean exactly for these metaphysical deﬁnitions
to be meaningful. e deﬁnitions of physicalism that fall into the group of
metaphysical deﬁnitions are: (P), (P), (P), (P), (P) (P), (P) and (P).
Although (P) is about persons, it’s still a deﬁnition of physicalism in terms of
which things exist (namely, on this view, there are no psychological attributes
which aren’t reducible to physical attributes).
Second, we can distinguish a category of deﬁnitions of physicalism that
are methodological.ese deﬁnitions characterize physicalism as the view that
speciﬁes science as themethod for determining which things exist. Science can
be regarded as a ‘method’ here, since these deﬁnitions do not tell us directly
which things exist, but they introduce a method according to which we can
determine which (kinds of ) things exist. is is the case for the following
deﬁnitions: (P), (P) and (P).
Also, in the deﬁnitions of physicalism, we can distinguish between epis-
temological and ontological deﬁnitions. Let’s look at the metaphysical def-
initions ﬁrst and see which ones are epistemological and which ones are
ontological. Of the metaphysical deﬁnitions, epistemological deﬁnitions are:
(P), (P) and (P). ese deﬁnitions do not refer to science, which makes
them metaphysical, and they are formulated in terms of ‘factual knowledge’
(P), ‘facts and laws’ (P) and ‘sentences and language’ (P). Metaphysical-
ontological deﬁnitions are: (P), (P), (P), (P) and (P). ese deﬁnitions
 Loewer : .
 Ibid.: .
 Of (P) it might again be thought that ‘semantic’ is a better way to describe this deﬁnition,
which I will discuss in section ..
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do not make reference to science, which makes them metaphysical deﬁni-
tions, and they are formulated in terms of ‘existence’ (P, P, P), ‘causal
interaction’ (P) and ‘worlds’ (P).
Of the methodological deﬁnitions, epistemological deﬁnitions include:
possibly (P) and (P). Both of these are unclear cases. (P) is epistemological
and ontological since the deﬁnition speaks of ‘entities, properties, relations
and facts’ and (P) speaks of ‘what the world contains’ which could be inter-
preted both in an epistemological and an ontological way. Of the method-
ological deﬁnitions, there are no ontological deﬁnitions.
Finally, let’s turn to the deﬁnitions of naturalism.
Naturalism is:
(N) e recognition of the impressive implications of the physical
and the biological sciences.
(N) e view that the world is a single system of things or events
every one of which is bound to every other in a network of
relations and laws, and (…) outside this ‘natural order’ there is
nothing.
(N) e view that science is the measure of all things, of what is that
it is and of what is not that it is not.
(N) e view that whatever exists or happens is natural in the sense
of being susceptible to explanation through methods which,
although paradigmatically exempliﬁed in the natural sciences,
are continuous from domain to domain of objects and events.
(N) e view that philosophy is not an a proiri propaedeutic or
groundwork for science, but is continuous with science.
(N) e view that reality consists of nothing but an all-embracing
spatio-temporal system.
 Deﬁnition of Sellars () in Brandl : .
 Stace : .
 Sellars : .
 Danto : .
 Deﬁnition from Quine () in Hacker : .
 Armstrong : .
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(N) e view that it is within science itself, and not in some prior
philosophy, that reality is to be identiﬁed and described.
(N) e view that imposes a constraint on what there can be, stipu-
lating that there are no nonnatural or unnatural, praeternatural
or supernatural entities. (…) Nature comprises those entities
and constructs made of those entities that the ideal physics,
realistically interpreted, posits.
(N) e view that the world contains nothing supernatural.
(N) e view that attempts to construct intelligible explanatory the-
ories and to move toward eventual integration with the core
natural sciences.
(N) e view that philosophy is continuous with the natural sci-
ences.
(N) e view that only natural objects are real, where natural is
understood as to refer to whatever is recognized by science.
(N) e view that there is only one way of knowing: the empirical
way that is the basis of science (whatever that way may be).
(N) e view that everything that exists is part of nature, or part of
the natural order.
(N) e view that reality is exhausted by nature, containing nothing
‘supernatural’, and that the scientiﬁc method should be used to
investigate all areas of reality, including the ‘human spirit’.
 Quine : .
 Pettit : , .
 Tye : .
 Chomsky : .
 Moser & Trout (eds.) : .
 Schmitt : .
 Devitt : .
 Keil : .
 Papineau .
   
(N) e view that can be characterized brieﬂy by the thesis: ev-
erywhere in the world everything can be explained rationally
(überall in der Welt geht es mit rechten Dingen zu).
(N) e view that the sciences determine their own path without
being constrained by a priori philosophical reasoning.
(N) e view that takes as its starting point the assertion that only
certain (naturalist) metaphysical claims are acceptable and that
other (supernatural) claims are to be rejected. Most often the
underlying metaphysical distinction is made on the basis of the
ontology used by science by claiming that only entities recog-
nized by science should be called upon by naturalist philoso-
phy.
(N) e view that has as its starting point the assertion that only
certain kinds of epistemic methods can be rational. (…) It is
typically – though not necessarily – science that provides the
measure for what methods are acceptable.
(N) A shared research program – a subset of a maximal set of
methodological dispositions – that treats themethods of science
and those methods alone as basic sources of evidence.
(N) A more ambitious deﬁnition qualiﬁes naturalism in ontological
respects as materialistic; in methodological respects as making
the heaviest possible use of natural sciences and in epistemolog-
ical respects as proposing a hypothetical realism.
From this list it is clear that the deﬁnitions of naturalism are even more diverse
than the deﬁnitions of materialism and physicalism. However, as might be
expected, we can distinguish the same categories of deﬁnitions here as we
have distinguished within the deﬁnitions of materialism and physicalism.
First, there is the category of metaphysical deﬁnitions of naturalism that
 Gasser : . Translation Gasser’s.
 Brandl : .
 Ibid.: .
 Ibid.
 Rea : .
 Frey : .
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tell us that all that exists is material, physical, and/or spatio-temporal and that
there does not exist anything that is supernatural in any way. e deﬁnitions
of naturalism that fall into this group of metaphysical deﬁnitions are: (N),
(N), (N), (N) and (N).
Second, there is the category of methodological deﬁnitions of naturalism
in which science is singled out as – somehow – providing us with the method
for discerning which (kinds of ) things exist. By far the most deﬁnitions of
naturalism that we have seen fall into this group ofmethodological deﬁnitions,
namely: (N), (N), (N), (N), (N), (N), (N), (N), (N), (N),
(N), (even though this last deﬁnition of naturalism strikes me as a rather
odd deﬁnition), and (N).
ere are some deﬁnitions, according to which, naturalism is not either
just a metaphysical view or just a methodological view, but according to which
it is a combination of these. Deﬁnition (N) is a good example, which
is why I have mentioned (N) in both lists. e position that naturalism
is in some way a combination of certain metaphysical claims and a certain
methodological (or epistemological) program has been expressed more often.
For example, Vollmer thinks that naturalism is a certain program, but that
within this program there are certain theses that naturalism aﬃrms, not just
of methodology but also of content. Sukkop holds a similar position. He
writes: ‘Naturalism is not only, but also, a research program and can be iden-
tiﬁed by various theses.’ I will not discuss these deﬁnitions separately, but I
will trust that these will be discussed by addressing both the metaphysical and
the methodological deﬁnitions of naturalism. I am not of the opinion that the
idea that naturalism is a combination of these kinds of views does any good for
them, or somehow makes them invulnerable to problems that rise for either
metaphysical or methodological deﬁnitions. In my mind, ‘combination natu-
ralism’ (like N) is, on the contrary, twice as vulnerable, namely to problems
that rise for both of these kinds of views. Moreover, there is a certain tension
between metaphysical naturalism and methodological naturalism, which is
problematic for anyone trying to defend a combination view. I will discuss
this tension further in Chapter , section ..
Within deﬁnitions of naturalism we can distinguish a third category of
deﬁnitions, at the same level as the categories metaphysical and method-
ological, which we did not encounter for the deﬁnitions of materialism and
physicalism. is third category of deﬁnitions can be called ‘philosophical
naturalism’. Deﬁnitions that fall into this category are deﬁnitions that make
 Cf. Vollmer .
 Sukkop : .
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a claim about philosophy – more speciﬁcally, they all make claims about
philosophy’s position with respect to the sciences. Deﬁnitions that fall into
this category are: (N), (N) and (N). Despite the fact that these deﬁni-
tions are interesting in their own right, for this project I am not interested in
philosophical naturalism.
Of the methodological deﬁnitions of naturalism, which ones are episte-
mological? Methodological-epistemological deﬁnitions include: (N), (N),
(N), (N), (N), (N), (N), (N) and (N). Methodological-
ontological deﬁnitions are: (N), (N), (N), (N), (N) and (N). e
classiﬁcation of some of these deﬁnitions is controversial and (N) is placed
on both the epistemological as the ontological list because it speaks of ‘reality’,
which could equally well be interpreted in an ontological as in an epistemo-
logical way, in terms of, respectively, entities and states of aﬀairs or facts.
Of the metaphysical deﬁnitions of naturalism, which ones are episte-
mological? None of the deﬁnitions are metaphysical-epistemological, which
means that they are all metaphysical-ontological deﬁnitions.
.    
Our main ﬁnding in the previous section was that we can divide all of the def-
initions of materialism, physicalism and naturalism into two main categories:
metaphysical deﬁnitions on the one hand and methodological deﬁnitions on
the other hand. What is interesting is that it seems to be the case that the
metaphysical deﬁnitions of materialism, as well as of physicalism, as well as
of naturalism, are actually very similar. Also, the methodological deﬁnitions
of materialism, physicalism, and naturalism are very similar. e metaphys-
ical deﬁnitions all specify which things, or which kinds of things, exist: e.g.
physical things, matter, anything in space-time, etc. ese deﬁnitions are in-
tensional deﬁnitions: they tell us which kinds of things exist. Methodological
deﬁnitions, on the other hand, are extensional: these deﬁnitions do not tell us
which things or which kinds of things exist, but they specify a method or a cri-
terion that will enable us to ﬁnd out which (kinds of ) things exist.ismethod
is science or the scientiﬁc method (or a particular science, such as physics). I
have assumed that a reference to the scientiﬁc method, or ‘science’, is a nec-
essary and suﬃcient condition for a deﬁnition to count as a methodological
deﬁnition. From here on I will call the main distinction that we introduced
in the previous section the distinction between ‘metaphysical naturalism’ (in
the literature also sometimes called ‘ontological naturalism’, ‘materialism’ or
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‘physicalism’) and ‘methodological naturalism’ (in the literature sometimes
just called ‘naturalism’).
Although metaphysical naturalism and methodological naturalism are the
two main versions of naturalism that are often distinguished, in the previous
section we drew another important distinction, viz. the distinction between
epistemological and ontological deﬁnitions. We have seen that the metaphys-
ical as well as the methodological deﬁnitions of materialism can be further
divided into these two groups. ‘Epistemological’ deﬁnitions, for lack of a
better term, are phrased in terms of ‘facts’, ‘states of aﬀairs’, ‘truth’, ‘lan-
guage’ and so on, whereas ‘ontological’ deﬁnitions are formulated in terms of
‘existence’, ‘entities’, ‘events’, etc. We have seen that the distinction between
epistemological and ontological distinctions is a secondary distinction that
functions within the earlier, primary, distinction between metaphysical and
methodological naturalism.
In the literature, similar attempts have been made to categorize and or-
ganize the diﬀerent deﬁnitions of materialism, physicalism and naturalism.
Some are similar to the distinctions that I have drawn, others are diﬀerent.
In this section, I will discuss some of the distinctions that have been made
in the literature and I will show how my distinctions map onto these. In
the literature the terms ‘metaphysical’ and ‘methodological’ naturalism are
often used to distinguish diﬀerent kinds of naturalism, but my distinction
in those terms does not necessarily map onto the distinctions found in the
literature. Since this can cause confusion, I will discuss a few distinctions
between ‘metaphysical’ naturalism and ‘methodological’ naturalism that can
be found in the literature and their respective meanings.
Papineau has formulated a similar distinction betweenmetaphysical (in his
terms: ‘ontological’) and methodological naturalism, which is not identical
to mine, but also not far removed from it. Papineau describes these not as
diﬀerent versions of naturalism, but as diﬀerent components of a general
naturalism. Here is what he writes:
Naturalism can intuitively be separated into an ontological and a methodological
component. e ontological component is concerned with the contents of reality,
asserting that reality has no place for ‘supernatural’ or other ‘spooky’ kinds of entity. By
contrast, the methodological component is concerned with the ways of investigating
reality, and claims some kind of general authority for the scientiﬁc method.
It is clear from this passage that the distinction that Papineau draws between
methodological and ontological naturalism is very similar to the distinction
 Papineau .
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that we have drawn between methodological and metaphysical naturalism.
e ontological component that he describes is a version of metaphysical
naturalism that we will come to discuss later on in this chapter (i.e. anti-
supernaturalism) and of which we have encountered a number of deﬁnitions
in the ﬁrst section. We have called this ‘metaphysical’ naturalism and have
reserved the term ‘ontological’ to indicate something else. According to Pap-
ineau, the methodological component claims that the scientiﬁc method is the
right method for investigating reality, which is exactly how we have described
methodological naturalism. Papineau thinks that naturalism is a combination
of methodological and, in our terms, metaphysical naturalism. Papineau’s
distinction is thus the same, although the terms he uses are diﬀerent.
In the introduction to Naturalism in Question, a distinction is also made
between ontological and methodological naturalism. Whereas Papineau calls
them ‘components’, De Caro and MacArthur ﬁrst distinguish two ‘themes’ of
naturalism:
An Ontological eme: a commitment to an exclusively scientiﬁc conception of na-
ture;
A Methodological eme: a reconception of the traditional relation between philoso-
phy and science according to which philosophical inquiry is conceived as continuous
with science.
e interesting thing is that these descriptions would be very diﬀerently cate-
gorized according to the categorization we introduced in the previous section.
De Caro andMacArthur’s ‘ontological theme’ refers to science and speaks of a
‘conception’ of nature, which would make it a description of methodological-
epistemological naturalism according to our categorization. eir ‘method-
ological theme’ would be called ‘philosophical naturalism’ on our account,
since it makes a claim about the position of philosophy with respect to science.
De Caro and MacArthur then go on to distinguish between the ‘ontologi-
cal scientiﬁc naturalist’ and the ‘methodological scientiﬁc naturalist’ based on
the two themes they distinguished earlier. ey do so as follows:
i) e ontological scientiﬁc naturalist holds that the entities posited by acceptable
scientiﬁc explanations are the only genuine entities that there are. A weaker version
holds that scientiﬁc posits are the only unproblematic (or nonqueer) entities that
there are.
ii) e methodological (or epistemological) scientiﬁc naturalist holds that it is only by
following the methods of the natural sciences – or, at a minimum, the empirical
methods of a posteriori inquiry – that one arrives at genuine knowledge. A weaker
 De Caro and MacArthur : .
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version holds that the methods of the natural sciences are the only unproblematic
(or unmysterious) kind of knowledge that there is, thus provisionally allowing for
nonscientiﬁc knowledge in some loose or practical senses.
is is where it gets even more interesting. When the ‘ontological theme’ is
spelled out, it changes: the ﬁrst passage was a methodological-epistemological
description; the second passage is a methodological-ontological description.
After all, there is a reference to science, making the description methodolog-
ical, and the description is formulated in terms of ‘entities’, making it an
ontological description. e ‘methodological theme’ also changes when it
is spelled out. e ﬁrst description is one of philosophical naturalism, but,
in this second passage, the description of naturalism is a methodological-
epistemological one: there is a reference to science and it is phrased in terms
of ‘methods’ and ‘knowledge’. In the second set of passages, the distinction
made is the one between methodological-epistemological naturalism on the
one hand and methodological-ontological naturalism on the other hand.
As should be clear from these passages, the categories into which diﬀerent
forms of naturalism are divided bear diﬀerent names, but the same kinds of
naturalism are distinguished, i.e. the diﬀerences in content of the diﬀerent
deﬁnitions (or descriptions) of naturalism are pointed out; they are just called
by a diﬀerent name. One of the main diﬀerences between my distinction and
De Caro and MacArthur’s is that there is a reference to science in their de-
scription of ontological naturalism, which is not the case in either Papineau’s
or my description of ontological (i.e. metaphysical, in our terms) naturalism.
However, the description of methodological naturalism is very similar to Pa-
pineau’s and to mine.
e third and ﬁnal distinction between ontological and methodological
naturalism that I want to discuss is due to Moser & Yandell. Here is the
distinction they make:
Core ontological naturalism: every real entity either consists of or is somehow on-
tologically grounded in the objects countenanced by the hypothetically completed
empirical sciences (that is, in the objects of a natural ontology).
Core Methodological Naturalism: every legitimate method of acquiring knowledge
consists of or is grounded in the hypothetically completed methods of the empirical
sciences (that is natural methods).
Now, Moser and Yandell’s distinction is pretty much identical to the, second,
distinction that De Caro and MacArthur draw: it’s a distinction between
 Moser & Yandell : .
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methodological-ontological naturalism on the one hand and methodological-
epistemological naturalism on the other hand.
ese distinctions made in the literature are all slightly diﬀerent from one
another and from the distinction that I have drawn. However, the diﬀerences
are not too big to overcome and there is some degree of arbitrariness in any
kind of distinction like this. As long as we employ the distinction consistently,
there should not be much of a problem. However, not everyone shares this
opinion. For example, Rea thinks diﬀerently and maintains that these alleged
versions of naturalism are nonexistent. He thinks that there must be some-
thing these versions of naturalism have in common, since they are all called
‘versions of naturalism’, but, if this is the case, then that which the versions
have in common should be called ‘naturalism’. In Rea’s own words:
ere must be some reason why the relevant doctrines are rightly identiﬁed as versions
of naturalism rather than as disparate theses that bear no substantive relation to one
another. Perhaps they presuppose a common view about nature, or a common view
about how philosophical inquiry should be conducted. But if so, then it seems that
naturalism itself ought to be characterized as whatever it is that the diﬀerent ‘versions’
of naturalism have in common. As it is, however, we are often left largely in the dark as
to what the connection between the various putative versions of naturalism is supposed
to be. 
It should be noted that this is not the only reason for Rea to think that there are
no diﬀerent versions of naturalism. As a matter of fact, Rea thinks that neither
naturalism in general nor any version of naturalism (such as metaphysical,
methodological, etc.) can express a coherent and substantive philosophical
thesis. I will discuss this further in Chapter , section ..
Before we can look at the various deﬁnitions of metaphysical and method-
ological naturalism more in depth, we ﬁrst need to consider how our distinc-
tions map onto other general distinctions made in the literature: I am thinking
of ‘epistemological’ naturalism and ‘semantic’ naturalism.
According to some, there is not just metaphysical naturalism and method-
ological naturalism, but there is also an epistemological version of natural-
ism. Now, this is not the epistemological version of either metaphysical or
methodological naturalism that I have introduced and we have discussed.
is kind of epistemological naturalism is distinguished at the same level
as methodological and metaphysical naturalism. What, if anything, would
this ‘epistemological’ naturalism be? Just as we saw for the cases of onto-
logical naturalism and methodological naturalism, there is no consensus on
 Rea : .
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what epistemological naturalism would be. In what follows, I will contrast
the epistemological versions of naturalism that I have distinguished from the
epistemological naturalism in the literature.
According to my interpretation of the term, deﬁnitions of metaphysical
and methodological naturalism can be classiﬁed as ‘epistemological’ iﬀ some
of the terms that are used are ‘epistemological’ terms in a very broad sense.
at is to say, deﬁnitions are epistemological if some of the terms used in it
are either related to the terms that occur in the classical analysis of knowledge
as ‘justiﬁed true belief ’ or are any of the following: ‘facts’, ‘explanation’, ‘states
of aﬀairs’. Of the deﬁnitions of naturalism, we have seen that the following
deﬁnitions can be called ‘epistemological deﬁnitions’: (N), (N), (N),
(N), (N), (N), (N), (N), (N). For example, deﬁnition (N) is
put in terms of knowledge: ‘there is only one way of knowing’. In (N)
the terms ‘intelligible explanatory theories’ occur and in (N) the terms ‘ex-
plained rationally’ occur. Deﬁnition (N) explicitly speaks of ‘certain kinds
of epistemic methods’. Certain deﬁnitions of methodological naturalism thus
contain essentially epistemological terms, which can be taken as a suﬃcient
condition for these deﬁnitions to be deﬁnitions of ‘epistemological natural-
ism’.
But should we in fact take the usage of classical epistemological terms
as suﬃcient for making these deﬁnitions epistemological deﬁnitions? And are
the deﬁnitions of naturalism that are ‘epistemological’ in this way thereby not
methodological deﬁnitions? I think what we should say here is the following.
First of all, the usage of epistemological terms can be taken as suﬃcient for the
deﬁnitions in which those terms occur to be called ‘epistemological’, thereby
making the view they refer to an ‘epistemological naturalism’. Second, even
though we can label a certain group of deﬁnitions as ‘epistemological’ based
on the occurrence of epistemological terms in these deﬁnitions, this does not
mean that these deﬁnitions are therefore not methodological deﬁnitions (any-
more). After all, we posited that a central reference to the scientiﬁc method is
suﬃcient for a deﬁnition to be classiﬁed as a methodological deﬁnition. Even
though we could distinguish a group of epistemological deﬁnitions, these
– assuming they contain a reference to science of the scientiﬁc method – are
still a sub-group of methodological deﬁnitions. Even though epistemological
terms are used, the main thrust of these deﬁnitions is that science or the
scientiﬁc method is the central criterion for us in investigating reality and
discovering which kinds of things really exist.
As I mentioned before, epistemological naturalism is not always distin-
guished in the literature, and, if it is, it is not always described in the same
way as I do here. Rea, who thinks that these versions of naturalism actually
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do not exist, has nevertheless also talked about epistemological naturalism. As
we know, he concludes that this is not a version of naturalism, since there are
no versions of naturalism at all, according to Rea. However, he does have an
additional reason not to distinguish an epistemological version of naturalism.
His reason is that this epistemological version of naturalism can hardly be
construed as a version of naturalism at all. is is true for the deﬁnitions that
he discusses because he understands epistemological naturalism very diﬀer-
ently than we have done. Whereas we interpreted deﬁnitions of naturalism
as epistemological iﬀ they contained epistemological terms, Rea understands
epistemological naturalism as follows:
ere are two sorts of theses that can be and often are referred to by the label ‘episte-
mological naturalism’: theses about the discipline of epistemology, and theses about
knowledge or justiﬁed belief.
Rea goes on to mention a number of examples of such theses, of which I will
just quote one:
Epistemology is a branch of science.e statements of epistemology are a subset of the
statements of science, and the proper method of doing epistemology is the empirical
method of science.
It is obvious now that Rea thinks deﬁnitions of ‘epistemological naturalism’
such as the one above, which is numbered by him as (.), can hardly be
construed as versions of naturalism. is is a thesis about epistemology and it
might be a naturalistic form of epistemology, but it is thereby not an episte-
mological version of naturalism. As Rea puts it:
eses like . about the discipline of epistemology are not at all plausibly construed
as versions of naturalism. Certainly they might be endorsed by naturalists, they might
be among the consequences of naturalism, and they might serve well as statements of
what is involved in taking a naturalistic approach to epistemology. But I see no reason
to think that one could count as a naturalist simply by endorsing some such thesis.
It thus depends on one’s interpretation of ‘epistemological naturalism’
whether such a version of naturalism should be distinguished. Even if it can
be distinguished, as it can be according to the interpretation we proﬀered,
 Rea : .
 Goldman : .
 Rea : -.
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it does not mean that it should be or that it cannot be subsumed under a
methodological version of naturalism.
Not only ‘epistemological naturalism’ is sometimes distinguished, but
sometimes also ‘semantic naturalism’ is distinguished from metaphysical and
methodological naturalism. For example, De Caro and McArthur distinguish
semantic naturalism from both metaphysical and methodological naturalism.
What is ‘semantic naturalism’? Here is how De Caro and McArthur describe
semantic naturalism:
e semantic scientiﬁc naturalist holds that the concepts employed by the natural
sciences are the only genuine concepts we have and that other concepts can only be
retained if we can ﬁnd an interpretation of them in terms of scientiﬁcally respectable
concepts. A weaker version holds that such concepts are the only unproblematic con-
cepts we have.
According to this description, one would expect semantic deﬁnitions of natu-
ralism to contain a reference to ‘concepts’ or ‘language’ or a similar term. Are
there any such deﬁnitions in our list? ere are three of them:
(M) e view that whenever we talk about an object, state of aﬀairs
or event in psychological terms, we can talk about the very same
object, state of aﬀairs or event in physical terms.
(P) e view that every meaningful sentence, whether true or false,
could be translated into physical language.
(N) e view that takes as its starting point the assertion that only
certain (naturalist) metaphysical claims are acceptable and that
other (supernatural) claims are to be rejected. Most often the
underlying metaphysical distinction is made on the basis of the
ontology used by science by claiming that only entities recog-
nized by science should be called upon by naturalist philoso-
phy.
Now, should we distinguish a form of semantic naturalism? We can answer
this question along similar lines as we answered the question whether or not
 De Caro and MacArthur : .
 Rosenthal : .
 Deﬁnition from Neurath & Carnap in Gillet : .
 Ibid.: .
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epistemological naturalism should be distinguished. at is, we can distin-
guish ‘semantic naturalism’ and deﬁnitions that refer to this view by positing
that a suﬃcient condition for a deﬁnition to be a semantic deﬁnition is that in
the deﬁnition semantic terms (such as ‘concepts’, ‘language’, ‘talk’, ‘claims’)
are used. However, I think that semantic naturalism will still be a sub-group
of (our version of ) epistemological naturalism. After all, epistemological def-
initions are deﬁnitions that are phrased in terms of ‘facts’, ‘truth’, ‘states of
aﬀairs’, but also ‘language’, ‘terms’, ‘concepts’. Some (but presumable not all)
of these deﬁnitions could also be called ‘semantic’ distinctions. If this is the
case, then why don’t I use the term ‘semantic naturalism’? I don’t use this term
because I think that we have distinguished plenty of versions of naturalism
and I don’t see a reason to introduce a distinction between epistemological
and semantic naturalism. at being said, it is ﬁne with me if one wants to
call some of the epistemological deﬁnitions semantic deﬁnitions instead.
e main part of this chapter, starting with section ., will be devoted to
metaphysical naturalism and in the next chapter I will discuss methodological
naturalism.
.   
In the ﬁrst section of this chapter we have seen a long list of deﬁnitions of
materialism, physicalism and naturalism and in the second section we have
divided these into two versions of naturalism with the names: ‘metaphysical
naturalism’ and ‘methodological naturalism’. As the vast number and diver-
sity of the deﬁnitions of naturalism show, it is very unclear what naturalism
exactly is. One only needs to open any book on naturalism to ﬁnd this claim
made explicit. Let’s look at some passages that describe the confusion and
ambiguities concerning the term ‘naturalism’:
For better or worse, “naturalism” is widely viewed as a positive term in philosophical
circles—few active philosophers nowadays are happy to announce themselves as “non-
naturalists”. is inevitably leads to a divergence in understanding the requirements
of “naturalism”.
Naturalism is identiﬁed sometimes with materialism, sometimes with empiricism, and
sometimes with scienticism; but all of these positions are equally diﬃcult to charac-
terize and, in any case, the identiﬁcations are controversial.
 Papineau .
 Rea : .
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Although there is no familiar deﬁnition of naturalism at hand, the commitment to an
explanatory closure of the spatio-temporal world can be taken plausibly as a deﬁning
feature of naturalism.
e appearance of a pro-naturalistic consensus in contemporary analytic philosophy
is quite misleading.
Since Dewey’s espousal of naturalism, a richly branching family of various positions
that go by that name has evolved. Indeed, when one considers all these positions it
is hard to identify anything that they have in common beyond a generally favourable
attitude to science.
e closest thing to a common core of meaning [of naturalism] is probably the view
that the methods of natural science provide the only avenue to truth.
A term is only as useful as the class of things it identiﬁes and, in the case of ‘naturalism’,
the breadth of the common meaning is such as to have made it diﬃcult to have
a focused discussion as anything like a core of the position has been obscured by
vagueness.
‘Naturalism’ seems to me in this and other respects rather like ‘World Peace’. Almost
everyone swears allegiance to it, and is willing to march under its banner. But disputes
still break out about what it is appropriate or acceptable to do in the name of that
slogan. And like world peace, once you start specifying concretely exactly what it
involves and how to achieve it, it becomes increasingly diﬃcult to reach and to sustain
a consistent and exclusive ‘naturalism’.
ese are only a few of the many statements about the elusive meaning of
the term ‘naturalism’. What does this mean for our goal, namely that of
shedding light onwhat naturalism is? I thinkwhat we should say is this. Even if
‘naturalism’ is an ambiguous term, that does not make our task of clariﬁcation
impossible. If it is the case that the term ‘naturalism’ has diﬀerent senses, that
does not mean that we cannot disambiguate them and distinguish and discuss
the diﬀerent meanings of it that we have found – as we have been doing. In the
remainder of this chapter and in the next chapter we will continue to organize
and discuss these diﬀerent deﬁnitions and so, in this way, at least attempt to
understand what ‘naturalism’ really is.
 Gasser (ed.) : .
 Ibid.: .
 Talmont-Kaminski : .
 ompson : .
 Talmont-Kaminski : .
 Stroud : .
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After distinguishing diﬀerent versions of naturalism, I want to draw atten-
tion to another factor that adds to the complexity of the issue, which is the fact
that diﬀerent philosophers have distinguished diﬀerent varieties of (versions
of ) naturalism.Not only is ‘naturalism’ an ambiguous notion, and not only are
there diﬀerent versions of naturalism, but, on top of that, philosophers oﬀer
diﬀerent distinctions between diﬀerent varieties of naturalism, in particular
these three:
(i) Reductive and non-reductive naturalism;
(ii) Weak and strong naturalism and
(iii) Soft and hard naturalism.
One might think that such distinctions complicate the matter so much that
it is beyond hope to straighten it out. However, there is reason to think that
these distinctions do not complicate the matter any further. Why not? Well,
close examination reveals that in each of the cases just mentioned, (i), (ii) and
(iii), it turns out that one of the forms of naturalism actually does not seem
to be a form of naturalism at all. In the remainder of this section I will discuss
these three distinctions and show how one of the kinds of naturalism in each
distinction is not a form of naturalism.
First, there is the distinction between reductive naturalism and non-
reductive naturalism. As Gasser puts it:
e position of reductive naturalism claims that a complete physics would provide all
the ontological and explanatory means for understanding reality.
Non-reductive naturalists want to preserve higher level phenomena instead, such as the
mental, as a reality sui generis, which cannot be reduced to lower levels, for instance,
the biological or physical one.
According to reductive naturalism, ‘a complete physics would provide all the
ontological and explanatory means for understanding reality’. ere are many
deﬁnitions in our list that are very similar to this characterization of reductive
naturalism. e clearest cases of this form of naturalism are: (M), (P),
(P) and (N). Now let’s look at non-reductive naturalism which ‘want[s]
to preserve higher level phenomena instead, such as the mental, as a reality
 e philosophers quoted in this section do not necessarily defend these positions and have
not necessarily coined these terms.
 Gasser : .
 Ibid.
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sui generis, which cannot be reduced to lower levels, for instance, the bio-
logical or physical one’. ere are no deﬁnitions in our list that are close to
this formulation of naturalism. In fact, there are even a few deﬁnitions that
contradict this supposed form of naturalism, for example: (M), (M), (M),
(P), (P), (P) and (N). Now, of course it is possible that in fact there are
examples of non-reductive naturalism even though they are not on our list.
But it is of some signiﬁcance that we haven’t found any examples of it, and it
is presumably of more signiﬁcance that we have found many deﬁnitions that
contradict this supposed form of naturalism explicitly. is makes one think
that, actually, non-reductive naturalism is not a form of naturalism at all – or,
otherwise, (M), (M), (M), (P), (P), (P) and (N) are not, unless, of
course, there are explicitly contradictory views that the term ‘naturalism’ refers
to, but despite the ambiguous nature of the term that seems rather unlikely.
Papineau also thinks that non-reductive physicalism is not substantial
and that ‘there is room to query whether non-reductive physicalism amounts
to a substantial form of naturalism’. Why does Papineau think that non-
reductive physicalism is not substantial? He points out that ‘the requirement
that some category of properties metaphysically supervenes on physical prop-
erties is not a strong one’. After all, we can even say of aesthetic and moral
properties (as well as of mental properties) that they supervene on the phys-
ical, and these are the kinds of properties that most naturalists would love
to exclude from existence altogether. As Papineau says: ‘Supervenience on
the physical realm is thus a far weaker requirement than that some property
should enter into natural laws, say, or be analyzable by the methods of the
natural sciences.’ As we have found, this kind of physicalism is not only
weaker, but we should feel inclined to say that it is not a form of physicalism at
all. We will therefore not adopt a deﬁnition of non-reductive naturalism. e
only generic deﬁnition that we can extract, then, is a paraphrase of ‘reductive
naturalism’:
(N) e view that ‘a complete physics would provide all the onto-
logical and explanatory means for understanding reality’.
 Naturally, there are many inconsistencies between all the diﬀerent versions of naturalism.
What I am aiming at here, however, are explicit contradictions between deﬁnitions where
one deﬁnition aﬃrms a particular thesis and the other deﬁnition denies just this thesis.
 Papineau . Papineau speaks here about physicalism. More speciﬁcally, he speaks here
about ontological physicalism. is is, in our terminology, a form of ontological natural-
ism.is is why Papineau’s position is relevant here, even though the use of diﬀerent terms
here appears confusing.
 Ibid.
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Second, there is the distinction between hard naturalism and soft naturalism.
Strawson has describes their respective meanings as follows:
Soft naturalism expands the notion of existence in such a way that it comprises notions
of folk psychology and common sense.
Hard naturalism attempts to view the world in an objective and detached light from
the third person perspective.
Hard naturalism seems to assign full cognitive value, or objectivity, to science alone.
As Strawson puts it, hard naturalism ‘seems to assign full cognitive value, or
objectivity, to science alone.’ Well, this is deﬁnitely a form of naturalism of
which we have encountered instances in the list of deﬁnitions we found. Some
of the deﬁnitions of naturalism that most clearly resemble this formulation of
naturalism are: (N), (N), (N), and (N). However, it seems as though
the category of deﬁnitions that Strawson calls ‘soft naturalism’, which ‘ex-
pands the notion of existence in such a way that it comprises notions of folk
psychology and common sense’, is an empty category – at least no deﬁnition
that we have found falls into it. Now, it goes without saying that there are
probably more deﬁnitions of naturalism than we have found and it is possible
that one of those is an example of ‘soft naturalism’. However, this would be
more likely if there weren’t a couple of deﬁnitions in our list that more or
less contradict this supposed form of naturalism, viz. (M) and (P). In fact,
‘soft naturalism’ does not seem to be a form of naturalism at all. From this
distinction between diﬀerent forms of naturalism we can only formulate one
generic deﬁnition of naturalism, namely this formulation of hard naturalism:
(N) e view that seems to assign full cognitive value, or objectivity,
to science alone.
ird, there is the distinction between strong and weak naturalism. Here are
two passages where Sukkop describes these two supposed varieties of natural-
ism:
Strong naturalism asserts that the distinction between nature and a realm over or
beyond nature is preposterous.
 Gasser : .
 Ibid.
 Ibid.
 Sukkop : .
   
Weak ontological naturalism is compatible with supernaturalism. It does not explicitly
eliminate any possibility of a “higher” realm, or fundamental other nature and habit,
beyond our – by (natural) laws accessible – world.
Strong naturalism ‘asserts that the distinction between nature and a realm over
or beyond nature is preposterous’. Again, we can ﬁnd many deﬁnitions that
are instances of this form of naturalism: (M), (P), (P), (N), (N), (N),
(N), (N) and (N). But how about ‘weak naturalism’? Can we ﬁnd any
deﬁnitions that fall into this category? To recall, weak naturalism ‘is compat-
ible with supernaturalism. It does not explicitly eliminate any possibility of a
“higher” realm, or fundamental other nature and habit, beyond our – by (nat-
ural) laws accessible – world.’ Now, not only have we not found any examples
of this kind of naturalism, we have, in fact, found several deﬁnitions explicitly
denying that which according to this deﬁnition is not explicitly denied (i.e.,
the supernatural), viz. (N), (N), (N), (N), and (N). It seems, again,
that either the term ‘naturalism’ can refer to views that actually state explicit
contradictions or that not all of these are forms of naturalism. It seems clear
to me that we should go with the latter and say that weak naturalism is not
really a form of naturalism at all. e only generic deﬁnition we can extract
based on this distinction is then:
(N) e view that asserts that the distinction between nature and a
realm over or beyond nature is preposterous.
Fortunately, the diﬀerent kinds of naturalism that some philosophers dis-
tinguish do not complicate the matter any further since, as we have seen,
the distinctions aren’t distinctions within naturalism at all. is concludes
our discussion of the broad application the term ‘naturalism’ enjoys and of
the term’s elusive nature. We can now start our discussion of metaphysical
naturalism.
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We have seen that the distinction between metaphysical materialism and
methodological materialism is very important. In the remainder of this chap-
ter I will discuss metaphysical naturalism and in the next chapter I will discuss
methodological naturalism. In the deﬁnitions of materialism, physicalism and
 Ibid.
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naturalism alike, we found several metaphysical deﬁnitions, or, as we said,
deﬁnitions of views that we can characterize as metaphysical. Let’s call these
groups of deﬁnitions metaphysical-materialism for metaphysical deﬁnitions
given of materialism, metaphysical-physicalism for metaphysical deﬁnitions
given of physicalism and metaphysical-naturalism for deﬁnitions given of
naturalism, respectively.
e next question that should be asked is whether, within the metaphysi-
cal deﬁnitions, the termsmetaphysical-materialism,metaphysical-physicalism
and metaphysical-naturalism pick out the same view or diﬀerent views. In
other words, is there some important distinction to be made between meta-
physical-materialism, metaphysical-physicalism and metaphysical-natural-
ism, or are these terms merely interchangeable? On closer inspection, it seems
apparent that there is no principled distinction between these terms. For ex-
ample, according to (M), (P) and (P) all that exists is ‘matter’. According
to (M), (P) and (N), space-time and objects that exist in space-time are all
that is real. (M) and (N) both exclude the supernatural from the real. us
it seems that the key distinction to be made here is between metaphysical
and methodological deﬁnitions and no further principled distinction needs
to be made between deﬁnitions of metaphysical-materialism, metaphysical-
physicalism and metaphysical-naturalism.
is conclusion, that there is no principled diﬀerence between meta-
physical-materialism, metaphysical-physicalism and metaphysical-natural-
ism, ﬁnds some support in the literature. For example, Moser and Trout write:
‘We shall use “materialism” and “physicalism” interchangeably.’ And Van
Inwagen writes: ‘e word “materialism” is often used as a name for the thesis
I am calling “physicalism” ’. Armstrong places ‘physicalism’ in parenthesis
after using the word ‘materialism’. ere are also many philosophers who
write on either materialism or physicalism and don’t mention the other term at
all. It seems that in doing so they aren’t consciously ignoring an issue lurking
in the background, but they simply assume or presuppose that these terms
unproblematically refer to the same doctrine.
Horgan shares the opinion that ‘physicalism’ and ‘materialism’ are used
interchangeably, which is how he uses the terms as well. He does point out,
however, that there is a tendency to use the terms slightly diﬀerently; namely,
to employ the term ‘materialism’ more generically and in a more inclusive
way than the term ‘physicalism’, which is mostly used for psychophysical
 Moser & Trout (eds.) : .
 Van Inwagen : .
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identity theories. It should be noted, however, that Horgan’s remarks are
of a descriptive rather than a normative character. Papineau’s position comes
close to this; he holds that the reasons for speaking of physicalism nowadays
are (i) so there is less association with the historical concept of matter that has
been left behind, and (ii) to stress the connection with physics and physical
sciences.
However, some philosophers do distinguish between what they call ‘ma-
terialism’ and ‘physicalism’. Do they have the same distinction in mind that
we just made, namely between metaphysical and methodological views, or
do they think that there is a diﬀerence between metaphysical-materialism
and metaphysical-physicalism? Crane and Mellor are some of the philoso-
phers who think that the terms ‘physicalism’ and ‘materialism’ should be
distinguished. As they see it, physicalism has descended from materialism,
and they recognize that many physicalists regard their doctrine as a modern
form of materialism, but according to Crane and Mellor, ‘physicalism’ and
‘materialism’ diﬀer signiﬁcantly. Materialism (in e.g. the seventeenth century)
was a metaphysical doctrine that limited the natural sciences by its claim that
matter had to be ‘solid, inert, impenetrable and conserved, and to act deter-
ministically and only on contact’. However, the subsequent development
of physics has shown that this conception of ‘matter’ is entirely inaccurate,
matter has qualities very diﬀerent from the ones the materialist claimed it to
have. Modern ‘materialists’, i.e. physicalists, have likewise abandoned their
former metaphysical view and now hold that the empirical world is made up
of the matter a complete and true physics tells us it is made up of. us,
according to Crane and Mellor, materialism and physicalism diﬀer in the
following respects: (i) Materialism is a metaphysical view, physicalism is not;
(ii) Materialism limits science a priori, physicalism does not, (iii) Materialism
is tied to a certain conception of matter, while physicalism is tied to the
conception of matter that is based on the results of physical science.
e upshot of these three points is that materialism can be characterized
by its concept of matter having a certain substantial content and that physi-
calism can be characterized by leaving it up to the physical sciences to provide
this content. Now, while Crane and Mellor do identify a diﬀerence between
two views, it is not between two metaphysical views, but rather between a
metaphysical and a methodological view. at physicalism in their sense is
not a metaphysical view is clear from (i), and that it is tied to a certain
 Horgan .
 Papineau .
 Crane & Mellor : .
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methodology is clear from (iii). In short, Crane and Mellor do not give us
a reason to make a principled distinction between two metaphysical views,
i.e. within ‘metaphysical naturalism’, but merely reinforce the distinction we
have already advocated, namely the one between metaphysical naturalism and
methodological naturalism.
e distinction Crane and Mellor make can also be found in Bernstein,
albeit in diﬀerent terms. Bernstein makes a distinction between ‘classical ma-
terialism’ and ‘scientiﬁc materialism’. He describes classical materialism as
typically having a picture or a model of what matter is, namely that ‘it consists
of ultimate particles or atoms in motion. ere are regularities of atoms in
motion and it is the laws of motion that state what these regularities are.’
Scientiﬁc materialism is more ‘sophisticated’ and leaves the claims about the
deﬁnition of the basic entities to science, since this is a scientiﬁc matter. e
concept of matter that is characteristically used by the scientiﬁc materialist
is described as ‘general and open: one which can be given speciﬁcation only
as science develops’. Except for the terminology, Bernstein’s distinction is
signiﬁcantly similar to the one Crane andMellor employ. And, just like them,
rather than making a distinction between two metaphysical views, Bern-
stein is making a distinction between a metaphysical and a methodological
view.
us, there seems to be no good reason to distinguish between meta-
physical-materialism, metaphysical-physicalism and metaphysical-natural-
ism. Although there are obviously diﬀerences between the deﬁnitions given,
these diﬀerences do not correspond to the terms ‘materialism’ and ‘physical-
ism’. e main diﬀerence that we have found, which is also reinforced by the
literature, is the diﬀerence between metaphysical and methodological deﬁni-
tions. Secondary diﬀerences can be found between the diﬀerent metaphysical
deﬁnitions. After all, even though all themetaphysical deﬁnitions tell us which
kinds of things exist, they do not all agree on which those things or kinds of
things are.
Now that we have seen that there are no principled diﬀerences between
metaphysical-materialism, metaphysical-physicalism and metaphysical-nat-
uralism, the question might rise why I have picked the term ‘metaphysical
naturalism’ to cover all these terms. I have picked ‘metaphysical naturalism’
because I think that naturalism is a term that is often used in a wider sense than
materialism and physicalism – note that I do not think that there is a diﬀer-
 Bernstein : .
 Ibid.
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ence in meaning, merely in use. Naturalism is often used to refer to or include
metaphysical-materialism and/or metaphysical-physicalism. e same does
not hold for metaphysical-materialism or metaphysical-physicalism. Since I
want to talk about all these views, I think ‘metaphysical naturalism’ is the
most appropriate term.
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Even though there might not be any principled diﬀerences between
metaphysical-materialism, metaphysical-physicalism and metaphysical-na-
turalism, that does not mean that there are not diﬀerent versions of this
theory. As is clear from the vast number of diﬀerent deﬁnitions that we have
found in the ﬁrst section of this chapter, there are many diﬀerent interpreta-
tions of metaphysical naturalism.
e metaphysical deﬁnitions of materialism, physicalism and naturalism
that we have found can be organized into four diﬀerent groups of very similar
(or identical) deﬁnitions. Each of these groups means to provide an answer to
the question which kinds of things exist, or, in other words, which kinds of
things ultimate reality is made up of. Here are the four answers that metaphys-
ical naturalism has to oﬀer, i.e. here are four diﬀerent kinds of metaphysical
naturalism.
According to the ﬁrst group, the ‘material’, or ‘physical’ (or ‘matter’) is all
that exists. Deﬁnitions that fall into this category are the most by far: (M),
(M), (M), (M), (M), (P), (P), (P), (P), (P) and (P). I will call
deﬁnitions of this type ‘classical materialism’.
According to the second group, space-time and things in space-time are
all that exist. Deﬁnitions that fall into this category are: (M), (P) and (N).
I will call this group of deﬁnitions ‘spatiotemporal materialism’.
According to the third group, things that are causally eﬃcacious are all that
exists. A deﬁnition that falls into this category is: (P). I will call this group
‘causal materialism’.
According to the fourth group, the natural order is all that exists and
nothing supernatural exists. Deﬁnitions that fall into this category are: (N),
(M), (N) and (N ).
Even though these four kinds of metaphysical naturalism do not have
the same amount of ‘members’, they should still all be considered. After all,
they all are, or have been, famous candidates for metaphysical naturalism and
they have at diﬀerent points in time all been the main kind of metaphysical
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naturalism. In the remainder of this section, I will discuss each of these kinds
of metaphysical naturalism and see what the arguments for and against these
views are and if they are any good. e ﬁrst kind of metaphysical naturalism
I will discuss is ‘classical materialism’.
.. Classical Materialism
e most common kind of metaphysical naturalism is that the only thing
that exists is the ‘physical’, the ‘material’, or ‘matter’. is deﬁnition is not
only the most common; it is also the most general. In fact, it is so general that
without any further speciﬁcation of the concepts ‘the physical’, ‘the material’
or ‘matter’, it is not much of a deﬁnition at all. After all, there is not much we
can say about this kind of naturalism if we are not clear on what we mean by
these concepts, or rather, if we are not clear on what it means for something to
be material or physical. To press the point, maybe it would be fair to say that
without any such conception we cannot understand or know what classical
materialism is and thus it seems that no one could be in the epistemic position
to legitimately adhere to it.
In the history of materialism, physicalism and naturalism, there have been
several interpretations of the concept of ‘the physical’, or ‘the material’. What
does it mean for something to be ‘physical’ or ‘material’? One interpretation
is that for something to be physical it has to exist in space-time. is view
is, as we labeled it, spatiotemporal materialism. Another interpretation of the
concept of the physical is that the term ‘the physical’ only applies to things
that are causally eﬃcacious. We called this view ‘causal materialism’. What
other interpretations are there? One other interpretation is that ‘the physical’
has the same meaning as the classic term ‘matter’ has: solid, inert, homoge-
neous stuﬀ that ordinary objects are made up of. I will call this view ‘classical
materialism’. Since I will discuss the other interpretations of the concept of
the physical below, in the next two sub-sections, I will conﬁne the discussion
here to the last interpretation of the concept of the physical introduced: the
view of classical materialism.
According to classical materialism, matter is solid and homogeneous, just
as it appears to us to be in our pre-scientiﬁc common sense experience of
 It might be confusing that the names of these forms of metaphysical naturalism have the
term ‘materialism’ in them. However, I am using the names for the views that were used
at the time the view was the dominant form of, the view we now like to call ‘metaphysical
naturalism’.
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the world and the material objects around us. However, science has proven
classical materialism long false and this interpretation of the physical is not
available to us today. Here is a summary of the argument against classical
materialism. Classical materialism is the view that everything is composed
solely of atoms, or elementary particles. However, starting with Newton, this
thesis has been challenged and has in fact been refuted. Newton introduced
‘forces’, but forces are not composed of particles. Later, Huyghens introduced
‘waves’ as an alternative for Newton’s particle theory of light. Waves are not
composed of particles either. Recent research in quantum mechanics suggests
that the number of particles there are is relativistic and also that the existence
of particles is somehow dependent on observation. In short, the thesis that
everything is composed of particles is untenable if one is to take contemporary
science seriously at all. Classical materialism should therefore be rejected as a
tenable form of metaphysical naturalism.
is argument is not an argument against forms of physicalism according
to which ‘everything that exists is physical’.is is just an argument against the
classical model of matter as particles. Ever since the refutation of this classical
conception of matter, various other interpretations of it have arisen. I will
now ﬁrst turn to the interpretation that the physical is that which exists in
space-time or: ‘spatio-temporal materialism’.
.. Spatio-Temporal Materialism
e most famous kind of metaphysical naturalism is deﬁnitely spatio-
temporal materialism. Spatio-temporal materialism is a form of metaphys-
ical naturalism with a speciﬁc interpretation of the crucial concept of the
physical/material. In the Meditations, Descartes proposes a deﬁnition which
contends that something is material if and only if it is spatial, i.e. extended in
space. e property of spatial extension is the characterizing property of ma-
terial substances, as opposed to mental substances which are characterized by
the property of ‘thinking’. Descartes’ characterization of material substances
as ‘res extensa’ has been of great inﬂuence, often said to be bad inﬂuence.ere
 Van Fraassen .
 Ibid.
 Even though it seems right to say that this characterization of the physical goes back to
Descartes, it can be questioned if there isn’t a diﬀerence here, which is that Descartes
is characterizing material substances as opposed to mental substances, and not ‘matter’ or
physical properties.
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are a number of arguments against spatiotemporal materialism and against the
deﬁnition of the material as that which is extended in space (and time). Let’s
look at some of these arguments.
First, as Moser and Trout point out, the characterization of ‘material’ as
that which is extended in space is not very helpful. Why do they think this
not helpful? Here is what they say: ‘e problem is that the relevant notion
of spatial extension may depend on the very notion of material in need of
elucidation.’ Now, if this is the case, circularity threatens: ‘e main worry
here is that the notion of spatial extension is actually the notion of something’s
being extended in physical space.’ Even if there is no strict conceptual cir-
cularity here, still the notions ‘space’ and ‘spatial’ are so closely related to the
notion ‘material’ that it renders this interpretation at best uninformative.
Van Fraassen also argues against the interpretation of the physical as that
which exists in space-time. One argument he gives is that the elementary par-
ticles that the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics recognizes
are supposed to be physical, but they are not at all times fully located in space.
Electrons are in fact ‘going in and out of space’ continuously. Are electrons
therefore non-physical? ey should be according to this interpretation of the
physical. But, as Van Fraassen asks: do materialist want these kinds of non-
physical ‘substances’ in their ontology? It seems not. erefore, it seems best
to reject the interpretation of the physical in terms of the spatio-temporal. Or,
in Van Fraassen’s terms: ‘It seems better to conclude that the spatio-temporal
location criterion does not match materialists’ own understanding of their
own thesis either.’
Even though we often only believe things when we see them and extension
and visibility are a necessary condition to see that something exists, extension
is not a good interpretation of the concept of the physical.
.. Causal Materialism
e third kind of metaphysical materialism is ‘causal materialism’. Even
though we only have encountered one deﬁnition which makes this explicit,
this is a version of naturalism that has been defended equally. ere are two
diﬀerent versions of causal materialism.e ﬁrst is more of a deﬁnition of the
term ‘physical’ and contends that ‘the physical’ or ‘the material’ is that which
is causally eﬃcacious, or, an entity is physical iﬀ it is able to exert causal inﬂu-
 Moser & Trout (eds.) : .
 Ibid.
 Van Fraassen : .
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ence.e second version of causal materialism is more an ontology, according
to it, an entity exists iﬀ it is able to exert causal inﬂuence. It seems that a true
naturalist would endorse both these theses: that the only things that exist are
physical things and that only physical things are able to exert causal inﬂuence.
Papineau writes the following about this kind of naturalism:
e driving motivation for ontological naturalism is the need to explain how diﬀer-
ent kinds of things can make a causal diﬀerence to the spatiotemporal world. us
many contemporary thinkers adopt a naturalist view of the mental realm because they
think that otherwise we will be unable to explain how mental processes can causally
inﬂuence non-mental processes. Similar considerations motivate naturalist views of
the biological realm, the social realm, and so on.
Another example of a philosopher who is a causal materialist in the second
sense (i.e. only things with causal powers exist) is Armstrong. Here is what
Armstrong says about causally inert objects:
If they are powerless in the space-time world, then whether they exist or whether they
do not will make no diﬀerence to what happens in the space-time world. Are they not
then useless postulations?
He also writes elsewhere about these entities that ‘we have no good reason to
postulate such entities’.
ere is a very good objection against this sort of view fromOliver, which I
will discuss next. Oliver has pointed out correctly that what we are looking for
is a reason to think that causally inert objects do not exist. To say that it ‘makes
no diﬀerence to what happens in the space-time world’ whether or not they
exist and to say that they are ‘useless postulations’ are not good reasons. After
all, these reasons would only be good if it is assumed that if something does
not do any explanatory work, then it should be said not to exist. However,
there are two problems with this assumption. One is that it is based on bias to
equivocate ‘existence’ and ‘exerting causal powers’. Why would one think that
only causally eﬃcacious things exist? As Oliver puts it, this is ‘nothing more
than a prejudice’. In fact, it is very problematic to think that only causally
 Naturally, insofar as an interpretation of the concept of the physical is employed in a deﬁ-
nition of naturalism these propositions would be equivalent. Taken out of such a context
the latter claim is stronger than the former.
 Papineau .
 Armstrong : .
 Armstrong a: .
 Oliver : .
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eﬃcacious things exist when you consider the causally ineﬃcacious things
many people believe in such as sets, relations, numbers, etc. Second, we are
interested in whether certain things (causally inert things) exist or not. Now,
whether these things are unnecessary postulations in a metaphysical theory is
quite beside the point. After all, we do not decide which things can, should,
or in fact do exist. We might have a personal preference to exclude all causally
inert objects, but we are not the ones calling the shots.
.. Anti-Supernaturalism
e fourth kind of metaphysical naturalism is slightly diﬀerent in kind than
spatio-temporal and causal materialism. Unlike those, this kind of metaphys-
ical naturalism does not provide us with a particular interpretation of the
concept of the physical or the material. Rather, anti-supernaturalism is an al-
ternative to classical materialism and oﬀers an alternative conception of which
things exist. Instead of claiming that the only things that exist are physical
things, like classical materialism, anti-supernaturalism claims that everything
that exists is part of the natural order. As classical materialism introduced the
problem of what it means for something to be physical, anti-supernaturalism
hereby introduces the problem of what it means for something to be ‘natural’.
What does it mean for something to be ‘natural’?
Here are a few options: (i) ‘the natural’ and the ‘physical’ have the same
extension, (ii) ‘the natural’ is that which can be investigated using the ‘natural
sciences’, (iii) ‘the natural’ is that which falls under ‘natural laws’, i.e. the laws
of nature, or (iv) a combination of the above. Now, we have considered (i)
when we considered the previous forms of metaphysical naturalism. We will
consider (ii) when we consider methodological naturalism in the next chapter.
If ‘the natural’ would have the meaning speciﬁed by (i) or (ii), then we have or
will have discussed this view under the alternative headings just mentioned.
However, what about (iii): what if ‘natural’ refers to ‘that which falls under
natural laws’?
If ‘natural’ refers to ‘that which falls under natural laws’, then the question
emerges what natural laws are and which things are subject to them. Natural
laws can either be interpreted as propositions or as something in nature that
these propositions are about, but we cannot go into this issue too much, since
this is a whole ﬁeld of its own. But what we can say is that if (iii) is the right
interpretation of the natural and the natural is ‘that which falls under natural
laws’, then this interpretation of ‘natural’ can itself be reduced to either (i) or
(ii). How?
Interpretation (iii) can be reduced to interpretation (ii) if we hold that laws
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of nature are in a very crucial way related to and dependent on science, either
in the sense that science discovers them, or in the sense that science formulates
or postulates them. If this is the interpretation that should be used, then (iii)
can be reduced to (ii). After all, science would play a crucial role when it comes
to laws of nature and if only things that are subject to laws of nature exist, then
science is again the standard for which things exist.
Interpretation (iii) can be reduced to interpretation (i) in an even more
straightforward manner. After all: laws of nature are physical laws.is means
that only physical things can fall under those laws. at which falls under
natural laws, ‘the natural’, thus has the same extension as the physical, just
like (i) says. is would mean that (iii) gets reduced to (i).
So, we have now reduced (iii) to (i) or (ii). What does this mean for
anti-supernaturalism? First of all, since the concept ‘that which falls under
natural laws’ reduces (iii) to either (ii) or (i), I think we are safe to say that
anti-supernaturalism can be reduced to either one of two other kinds of
metaphysical naturalism: classical materialism or methodological naturalism.
Our discussion of these versions of naturalism thus also covers this version
of naturalism. I will brieﬂy sketch what that means. In the ﬁrst case, ‘the
natural’ would refer to that which falls under natural laws. As we have just
seen, only physical things can fall under natural laws, since natural laws are
physical laws. is means that this version of naturalism excludes not just
possibly consciousness, but also math, logic and the normative domain. is
result makes this version of naturalism very implausible. In the second case, if
‘the natural’ would be reduced to methodological naturalism, then it faces the
same problems that methodological naturalism faces, which we will discuss
in the next chapter. In this case, anti-supernaturalism would not be a form of
metaphysical naturalism though. As we have just established, themetaphysical
interpretation of anti-supernaturalism does not fare well.
ere is another point worth making here, which is the following. Even
though it is very hard to answer the question which things are subject to
natural laws, it is easy to answer the question which things deﬁnitely do
not fall under such laws and would be excluded from a view such as anti-
supernaturalism. Such exclusion might, in fact, be what a view like anti-
supernaturalism is hinting at. Now, which things would be excluded? One
thing that would clearly be excluded is the supernatural order. After all, the
supernatural, if it exists, is not subject to natural laws. As we can tell from the
list of deﬁnitions that fall into this category of metaphysical naturalism (i.e.
anti-supernaturalism), such exclusion is indeed the intention of this kind of
naturalism. Some of the deﬁnitions are formulated in a positive way (i.e. the
only thing that exists is the natural order) and some of them are formulated in
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a negative way (i.e. there is no supernatural order), but in either formulation
and in any case, one and the same view is expressed.
Rea has also discussed anti-supernaturalism, which, according to him, is
the main kind of metaphysical naturalism. Even though this is the main kind
of metaphysical naturalism, according to Rea, he is not so positive about this
view. Rea calls anti-supernaturalism ‘terribly uninformative’:
Perhaps the only clearly formulated explicitly ontological thesis that all naturalists
agree on is the terribly uninformative thesis that there are no supernatural entities.
e reason this thesis is uninformative is that naturalists disagree about what it is for
something to count as natural or supernatural. ere are common paradigms: men,
beasts, plants, atoms, and electrons are natural; God, angels, ghosts, and immaterial
souls are supernatural. But even these paradigms are controversial; and, in any case,
it is not clear what the items on each list have in common with their other list-mates
that makes them examples of natural or supernatural entities. 
is leads him to conclude that anti-supernaturalism is not a tenable kind of
metaphysical naturalism. Here is how he puts it:
e claim that there are no supernatural entities, therefore, will not do as a character-
ization of naturalism or any version thereof.
Rea thus rejects anti-supernaturalism as a credible kind of metaphysical natu-
ralism. It must be noted though, that Rea has an additional reason for rejecting
anti-supernaturalism as a tenable kind of ontological naturalism, for Rea holds
that:
More must be said if a clear position is to be articulated. At the very least, the claim
must be supplemented by some account of what nature and supernature are like.
is seems to open the door for a tenable version of anti-supernaturalism.
However, Rea goes on to argue that this claim cannot be supplemented as
such. Just why it cannot be supplemented as such requires a general discussion
of the relation between metaphysical and methodological naturalism which
will occur in section .. ere I will mention Rea’s argument for the claim
that no supplement can be given to make anti-supernaturalism a better can-
didate for metaphysical naturalism.
 Rea : .
 Ibid.
 Ibid.
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. 
In the ﬁrst part of this chapter, we started out discussing the term ‘naturalism’
and the closely related terms ‘materialism’ and ‘physicalism’. In section .
we composed a long list of deﬁnitions of materialism, physicalism and natu-
ralism. In section . we drew an important distinction between deﬁnitions
that are metaphysical in nature and deﬁnitions that are methodological in
nature. We called these groups ‘metaphysical naturalism’ and ‘methodologi-
cal naturalism’ respectively. Here we also discussed whether ‘epistemological
naturalism’ and ‘ontological naturalism’ should be distinguished as two addi-
tional versions of naturalism. We decided that one can draw this distinction,
but that both epistemological and ontological naturalism remain sub-groups
of metaphysical and methodological naturalism. In section . we discussed
whether we should make even more distinctions, namely by recognizing vari-
eties of naturalism such as reductive and non-reductive, weak and strong and
hard and soft naturalism. After considering these distinctions, we concluded
that they do not all concern genuine varieties of naturalism and, as such, do
not have to be distinguished.
e second part of this chapter concerned metaphysical naturalism. We
ﬁrst considered whether metaphysical-materialism, metaphysical-physicalism
and metaphysical-naturalism pick out principled diﬀerent views within meta-
physical naturalism, in section ..We concluded that they do not and insofar
as philosophers sometimes distinguish the terms ‘materialism’ and ‘physical-
ism’, they usually refer to the distinction we made, namely the one between
metaphysical naturalism and methodological naturalism and not to a distinc-
tion between metaphysical views.
Next we moved on from discussing the term ‘metaphysical naturalism’
to the diﬀerent views that this term refers to in section .. We considered
four forms of metaphysical naturalism in sub-sections: classical materialism,
spatiotemporal materialism, causal materialism and anti-supernaturalism.We
found that classical materialism has long been refuted by new developments in
science, just like spatio-temporal materialism. We learned that causal materi-
alism has recently been challenged by the physics of quantum mechanics and
less recently by convinced interactionist dualists who make a case for mental
causation. Finally, we saw that anti-supernaturalism is a form of naturalism in
which the notion ‘laws of nature’ plays a crucial role, and, given the problems
that rise with this notion, this form of naturalism is not very plausible.
We have to conclude, therefore, that metaphysical naturalism is not a
tenable position. After all, all the candidates for this view have been refuted
or declared irrelevant. We have to conclude, then, that the question whether
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metaphysical naturalism is compatible with the subjectivity of experience does
not rise here. After all, there is no consistent and relevant form of metaphysical
naturalism for which we can consider this question.
If naturalism is a coherent position at all, it should be methodological
naturalism and not metaphysical naturalism. In the next chapter, I will discuss
methodological naturalism and see if that fares any better than its metaphys-
ical counterpart. en, in Chapter , I will turn to the question whether the
subjectivity of experience is compatible with a form of naturalism that we
have found to be tenable.
 
Methodological Naturalism
is chapter is devoted to methodological naturalism and will provide an
in depth discussion of the various interpretations of this view in search of
a version of naturalism that is tenable. Since we established in the previous
chapter that there is no form of metaphysical naturalism that is tenable, the
burden now lies on methodological naturalism to be a tenable, i.e. coherent
and not outdated, view. As we will see, despite a few problems of its own, there
is a version of methodological naturalism that is coherent and acceptable.
is will be the view that we will proceed with in Chapter  where we will
consider whether the subjectivity of experience is compatible with that form
of naturalism.
e ﬁrst part of this chapter concerns itself with formulating a version
of methodological naturalism. In section . I introduce the term ‘method-
ological naturalism’ and I discuss the various deﬁnitions of methodological
naturalism that we found in the previous chapter. en, in section ., I
will consider whether an important distinction needs to be made between
the idea that methodological naturalism is a view and the idea that it is not a
view but that it should be interpreted in an alternative way. I will discuss two
such alternative interpretations, one according to which naturalism is a stance
and one according to which naturalism is a research program, and consider
if we should adopt one of these alternative interpretations of methodological
naturalism.
e second part of this chapter concerns itself with the question whether
the version of methodological naturalism that we formulated in the beginning
of the chapter is tenable. Here I will discuss some of the main problems that
face methodological naturalism. I will ﬁrst focus on its most serious threat,
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Hempel’s dilemma, in section .. I will then move on to two lesser issues
that need to be addressed if naturalism is to be taken seriously, in section ..
As I will show, I think we can sidestep these problems and conclude that there
is a tenable version ofmethodological naturalism that we can use in Chapter .
e third part of this chapter concerns itself with the ontological im-
plications of methodological naturalism. If we want to be able to answer
the question whether the subjectivity of experience is compatible with the
tenable version of methodological naturalism that we found, then we need
to know what the ontological implications of this view are: which kinds of
things exist according to this view? In section ., I will discuss the ontological
implications of methodological naturalism in general and lay down the two
main positions one can take on this matter and their most recent supporting
arguments. In section ., I will then turn to a discussion of science and the
scientiﬁc method, since methodological naturalism is crucially committed to
science and the scientiﬁc method. is discussion will lead to a discussion of
the most important aspect of science and the scientiﬁc method, namely its
objectivity, and to the ontological implications that this aspect of science and
the scientiﬁc method has. At the end of this section we should have a pretty
good grasp of the ontological implications of methodological naturalism such
that we have a good basis to answer the question whether methodological
naturalism is compatible with the subjectivity of experience.
In section ., I will draw conclusions and summarize this chapter.
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Not all deﬁnitions of methodological naturalism that we found are the same,
which means that there are diﬀerent kinds of methodological naturalism. In
this section I will organize and discuss the diﬀerent deﬁnitions of method-
ological naturalism.
We have found several methodological deﬁnitions of materialism, phys-
icalism and most of all of naturalism. Just as in the previous chapter, where
we considered deﬁnitions of metaphysical naturalism, for the deﬁnitions of
methodological naturalism it also seems to be the case that, even though there
are diﬀerences between the deﬁnitions, these diﬀerences are not bound to one
of the particular terms ‘materialism’, ‘physicalism’ or naturalism’. In this case,
even though there are diﬀerent methodological deﬁnitions, the diﬀerences be-
tween them are not primarily between deﬁnitions of materialism, physicalism
and naturalism. On the contrary, there are very similar or identical deﬁnitions
of methodological materialism, methodological physicalism andmethodolog-
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ical naturalism. For example, (M), (P), (P) and (N) all claim that what
exists is what the ideal physics will tell us that exists. In light of this, and given
our ﬁnding in the previous section, it appears that the only major diﬀerence
between deﬁnitions of materialism, physicalism, and naturalism is between
metaphysical and methodological deﬁnitions. Just as we decided to call all of
the views referred to by metaphysical deﬁnitions instances of ‘metaphysical
naturalism’, we will identify the views referred to by methodological deﬁni-
tions as varieties of ‘methodological naturalism’. It is suﬃcient for a deﬁnition
of naturalism to count as a methodological deﬁnition if it contains a reference
to science or the scientiﬁc method.
e methodological deﬁnitions of materialism, physicalism and natural-
ism that we have found can be organized into two diﬀerent groups of very
similar (or identical) deﬁnitions. Each of these groups means to provide an
answer to the question: which method should we follow to establish what
exists? Or, in other words, which method should we follow to establish what
ultimate reality is like? Here are the two answers that methodological natural-
ism has to oﬀer.
According to the ﬁrst kind, an ideal, completed physics will tell us what
exists. Deﬁnitions that fall into this category are: (M), (P), (P) and (N).
I will call this kind of methodological naturalism ‘ideal-physics naturalism’.
According to the second group, the scientiﬁc method, or the sciences, will
tell us what exists. Deﬁnitions that fall into this category are: (M), (N),
(N), (N), (N), (N), (N). I will call this kind of methodological
naturalism ‘scientiﬁc naturalism’.
Ideal-physics naturalism speciﬁes physics as the science that will tell us
what exists, so, according to it, there is one science in particular, physics, that
can provide an answer to the question what exists. According to ‘scientiﬁc
naturalism’, not one science but sciences in general and in particular the
scientiﬁc method will tell us what exists. Despite the fact that physics, as a
science, falls under ‘the sciences’, I am here making a (temporary) distinction
between ideal-physics naturalism and scientiﬁc naturalism to point out the
diﬀerence between the idea of a particular science telling us what exists on
the one hand, and the idea of ‘the scientiﬁc method’ telling us what exists on
the other. However, as will be made clear right below, for practical purposes,
 is ‘scientiﬁc naturalism’ should not be confused with De Caro’s scientiﬁc naturalism. De
Caro describes scientiﬁc naturalism as follows: ‘Scientiﬁc naturalismmaintains the absolute
ontological and epistemological primacy of the natural sciences as a whole, whether the
other natural sciences are reducible to physics or not.’ (De Caro : ). As he says:
‘Scientiﬁc naturalism is a metaphilosophical view’ (ibid.). De Caro’s ‘scientiﬁc naturalism’
is, what I call, ‘philosophical naturalism’.
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ideal-physics naturalism can and will be subsumed under (MN). What is
common to the deﬁnitions of methodological naturalism (some of which are
quite vague) or, in other words, what methodological naturalism amounts to,
is that science tells us all and only what exists.
ere are four important points to be made regarding these deﬁnitions
of methodological naturalism. First, even though we have organized these
deﬁnitions into two diﬀerent groups, there are still noteworthy diﬀerences
between the deﬁnitions within each group. For example within ideal-physics
naturalism some deﬁnitions refer to ‘contemporary physics’, while others refer
to a ‘completed physics’.is makes for two very diﬀerent deﬁnitions and two
very diﬀerent kinds of methodological naturalism. However, I think that what
these deﬁnitions have in common, namely their reference to ‘physics’, is even
more important. is is why, for now, I think it is best to have these diﬀerent
deﬁnitions in one group. Within the deﬁnitions of scientiﬁc naturalism, the
deﬁnitions seem to show even more diﬀerences. Each deﬁnition refers to
science, but they all do so in a diﬀerent way. To bemore speciﬁc, these are their
references: ‘law of some science’ (M), ‘the basis of science’ (N), ‘science’
(N), (N), (N), (N), ‘natural sciences’ (N), ‘integration with the core
natural sciences’ (N), ‘scientiﬁc method’ (N), ‘physical and biological
sciences’ (N), ‘methods of science’ (N). Even though the vast diﬀerences
between these deﬁnitions should be acknowledged, it needs to be pointed out
that, despite these diﬀerences, they have more in common than they diﬀer.
After all, the scientiﬁc method could be regarded as the basis of science and
as the core of science, so also of the natural sciences like physics and biology;
the laws of science are closely related to its method, etc. I think we can put
these deﬁnitions together into a single group in which references to ‘science’
or ‘the scientiﬁc method’ are central and the binding factor.
e second point that should be made about these two groups of deﬁni-
tions is that, as we anticipated before, they can be taken together to form one
group; ideal-physics naturalism can be subsumed under scientiﬁc naturalism.
I realize that I have just divided them up into two groups and there is a
diﬀerence in focus between the two groups (as I have spelled out above).
However, since physics is one of the sciences, ideal-physics naturalism can
be regarded as a speciﬁc version of scientiﬁc naturalism. From here on I am
assuming that ideal-physics naturalism falls under scientiﬁc naturalism and
that everything that holds for scientiﬁc naturalism also holds for, or applies
to, ideal-physics naturalism. at means that I will simply be speaking about
methodological naturalism for sake of simplicity.
e third point that should be made is that there is an ambiguity in the
literature when it comes to methodological naturalism. It is not clear whether
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methodological naturalism provides us with a method to interpret the concept
of the physical, or if it provides us with a method to determine which things
exist. Now, often, in these contexts, ‘the physical’ and ‘that which exists’ are
taken as synonyms, but of course they are not – at least, not in any way
that does not express a certain bias in these contexts. e question is, then,
whether we should interpret methodological naturalism as a view oﬀering an
interpretation of the concept of the physical or as a view specifying which
things exist? I think that we should say that methodological naturalism oﬀers
a view about which kinds of things exist. One reason for thinking this is that
it is an open possibility for future natural science to include things we now
call ‘mental’. Since this is a possibility, we would be wise to deﬁne method-
ological naturalism as a view about which method should be used to ﬁnd out
which kinds of things exist so as not to end up in hopeless contradictions
later which are solely the result of ill-chosen terminology. A second reason to
think that it is better to think of methodological naturalism as a view about
which kinds of things exist than as a view about the concept of the physical,
is that there seems to be no reason for methodological naturalism to cling to
the concept of the ‘physical’. In its intensional sense, this concept has been
written oﬀ (as we have seen in the last chapter) and there is no non-biased
reason to identify the physical with that which really exists.
e fourth point that should be made is this. When we look at the version
of methodological naturalism that we have found, there is one thing that is
important to bear in mind. at is that it is not the scientist according to
whom science or the scientiﬁc method are the ultimate criteria for which
(kinds of ) things exist. Scientists are more concerned with providing expla-
nations for certain events and states of aﬀairs that obtain in the empirical
world, and with providing proof for the accuracy of these explanations. It
falls beyond the scope of science to inform us about the ultimate nature of
reality, namely those things reality is ultimately made up of. is is the task
of philosophy, more in particular, of metaphysics. Mainstream contemporary
analytic metaphysics has rejected several theories about which kinds of things
exist: idealism (very few adherents at this time), neutral monism (always had
very few adherents), dualism (better represented than previously mentioned
views, but by far not as popular anymore as it once was) and metaphysical
naturalism (classical materialism, spatiotemporal materialism, causal materi-
alism). e only view that is seen as being in accordance with science, a view
that is popular and enjoys many adherents, is methodological naturalism.
 I will discuss this in more detail in section ..
 Naturally, there are also neutral monists, idealists and dualists. However, most analytic
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It is important to realize that philosophers are the ones who hold that the
scientiﬁc method is the best method to be followed to determine which kinds
of things exist. is is why methodological naturalism has also been called
‘philosophical naturalism’, for example by Papineau (), and why it has
been regarded as a view about the practice of philosophy.
Before concluding this section, I brieﬂy want to compare my account of
methodological naturalism to Rea’s account. As we established in the previous
chapter, Rea does not think that diﬀerent versions of naturalism should be
distinguished, including methodological naturalism. Since we have already
discussed his reasons for thinking this, I will not go into them again here. Rea
does discuss what is usually considered to be methodological naturalism. Here
are three deﬁnitions of methodological naturalism that he quotes:
Naturalism in philosophy is always ﬁrst a methodological view to the eﬀect that philo-
sophical theorizing should be continuous with empirical inquiry in the sciences.
Methodological naturalism holds that the best methods of inquiry in the social sciences
or philosophy are, or are to be modeled on, those of the natural sciences.
Methodological naturalism is the view that philosophy – and indeed any other intel-
lectual discipline – must pursue knowledge via empirical methods exempliﬁed by the
sciences, and not by a priori or nonempirical methods.
Since these deﬁnitions of methodological naturalism are very diﬀerent from
one another, Rea raises the question why they are all called methodological
naturalism. is is his answer to that question:
I suspect that the reason for the overlap in labels is just that methodological assump-
tions generally are taken to be either background presuppositions about what the world
philosophers these days want to be naturalists. Of course, just the fact that a view is popular
at a given time and many people want to believe in it does not have any bearing whatsoever
on its truth. I am at this point not arguing for its truth. I am merely illustrating how
methodological naturalism, with all its references and connotations of science, is in fact a
purely philosophical position. is is important to keep in mind.
 Papineau . Even thoughmethodological naturalism is sometimes called ‘philosophical
naturalism’, I think that ‘philosophical naturalism’ is an alternative to both metaphysical
and methodological naturalism and is not identical to either one.
 Deﬁnition from Leiter () in Rea : .
 Deﬁnition from Schmitt () in Rea : .
 Deﬁnition from Hampton () in Rea : . I have not adopted these deﬁnitions
in our list of deﬁnitions of naturalism since these are all deﬁnitions of ‘methodological
naturalism’, not of ‘naturalism’ simpliciter.
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is like that guide and constrain the process of inquiry, views about how inquiry should
be conducted, or views about what sorts of inquiry are likely to be fruitful. In other
words, methodological assumptions generally are either metaphysical theses, theses
about how inquiry in a particular discipline ought to be conducted, or theses about
knowledge or justiﬁed belief.
So, Rea seems to think that the term ‘methodological naturalism’ is kind of an
umbrella term for ‘metaphysical theses’, ‘theses about how inquiry ought to be
conducted’ and ‘theses about knowledge or justiﬁed belief ’. Now, I agree with
the second part of this claim, namely that methodological deﬁnitions usually
specify a method for inquiry. However, according to the distinction between
metaphysical and methodological naturalism that we used, methodological
naturalism usually is not a ‘metaphysical thesis’, unless all that is meant by
the term ‘metaphysical thesis’ is that a particular ontology is expressed. For
‘theses about knowledge or justiﬁed belief ’ we reserved the term ‘epistemic
naturalism’.
.  : ,   

So far we have assumed that, and talked as if, methodological naturalism is
a view, or a thesis. However, it has been debated whether methodological
naturalism should be understood as a view. Two philosophers in particular
have argued that naturalism is not a view or a thesis but that we should employ
an alternative interpretation. One of them is Rea, who argues that naturalism
is not a view or a thesis but instead a research program. e second is Van
Fraassen, who also thinks that naturalism is not a view or a thesis, but who
does not think it is a research program either. According to Van Fraassen
naturalism is a ‘cluster of attitudes’ or a ‘stance’. Now, are there good reasons
to distinguish between methodological naturalism as a view or thesis on the
one hand and methodological naturalism as a research program or a stance
on the other? And if so, should we interpret methodological naturalism as a
view, as a research program, or a stance? In the remainder of this section I will
address these questions.
As we have seen before, Rea thinks that naturalism is not a metaphysical
thesis, or a methodological or epistemological view. Rea thinks naturalism is
not a metaphysical thesis since, if a naturalist wants to follow science wher-
 Rea : -.
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ever it leads, then he cannot be committed to any metaphysical theses. Rea
thinks naturalism is not an epistemological view because the epistemological
views that he considered are not characterizations of naturalism at all, just
of a naturalized epistemology. Rea thinks naturalism is not a methodological
view because all the characterizations of methodological naturalism that he
considers can be reduced to either metaphysical naturalism or epistemological
naturalism. Now, if naturalism is none of these, then what is it? According to
Rea, naturalism is a ‘research program’. What is a ‘research program’? Here is
Rea’s deﬁnition:
A research program is a set of methodological dispositions – a way of conducting in-
quiry. One counts as a naturalist to the extent that one shares the relevant dispositions
and conducts inquiry in the relevant way.
Rea emphasizes that he is not the only one to proﬀer an alternative interpre-
tation of naturalism as a research program, but according to him, also Sellars,
Forrest and Giere hold a view like this. Now, Rea thinks that naturalism is
not just a research program, but he thinks that it is a shared research program.
What is a (shared) research program? Rea uses this deﬁnition of an individual
research program:
Individual research programs are maximal sets of methodological dispositions, where
a set of dispositions is maximal just in case it is possible to have all of the dispositions
in the set but it is not possible to have all of them and to have other methodological
dispositions as well.
And he gives the following deﬁnition of a shared research program:
Shared research programs are relevantly distinctive subsets of individual research pro-
grams.
Why does Rea think that naturalism is not a view or a thesis but a shared
research program? As he writes:
What uniﬁes those that call themselves naturalists is not a particular philosophical
thesis but rather a set of methodological dispositions, a commonly shared approach to
philosophical inquiry.
 Ibid.: .
 See Rea : .
 Rea : .
 Ibid.
 Ibid.: .
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And:
It seems most appropriate to characterize naturalism so that one counts as a naturalist
only if one shares all of the methodological dispositions that are distinctive of it.
Now, which methodological dispositions are distinctive of it, according to
Rea?ose shared by Quine and Dewey, the two twentieth-century fathers of
naturalism. Rea sums them up as follows:
High regard for science and scientiﬁc method, a disposition to employ scientiﬁc
methods and results in all domains of inquiry as much as possible to the exclusion of
a priori speculative methods, opposition to theories, particularly religious ones, that
are untestable and do not play any signiﬁcant role in ﬁlling out interstices of scientiﬁc
theory.
Given this description, one might wonder how this is diﬀerent from the
idea that naturalism is a methodological thesis. e diﬀerence is that what
is described above is not a thesis or a view but rather a set of dispositions. is
seems right. However, on Rea’s view, it is a set of dispositions to employ a
certain method ‘as much as possible’, namely the scientiﬁc method. Although
I acknowledge that there is a diﬀerence between Rea’s view in which the natu-
ralist has a disposition to employ a certain method and the other methodolog-
ical deﬁnitions of naturalism that we have seen, this diﬀerence doesn’t seem
to warrant not classifying Rea’s account of naturalism as a methodological
deﬁnition of naturalism. Let me explain.
It might be the case that this kind of deﬁnition does not present method-
ological naturalism as a view or a thesis, and it might even be true that natural-
ism is not a view or a thesis. But there is one important thing that naturalism as
amethodological view and naturalism as a set of dispositions have in common,
which is that both are methodological. at is: it is central to both that there
is a reference to the scientiﬁc method as the method that will tell us which
things exist. e diﬀerence between naturalism as a methodological view and
naturalism as a methodological research program is how they relate to the
scientiﬁc method. While naturalism as a view is committed to it, naturalism
as a research program only has the disposition to accept it. Now, there is
deﬁnitely a diﬀerence between being committed to a certain method and
having the disposition to accept it: the latter is weaker. However, both do
allow at least for a tentative crucial role to be played by the scientiﬁc method
 Ibid.: .
 Ibid.
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as their only criterion for leading us to ontological truth. For our purposes,
we can therefore leave it unresolved whether methodological naturalism is,
or should be seen as, a methodological view or as a methodological research
program.We will build on their common ground, which is the fact that natu-
ralism as a view and naturalism as a research program both are methodological
and that either a weaker disposition to accept, or a stronger commitment to
accept, the scientiﬁc method, is the central assumption of both accounts of
naturalism.
I will now turn to Van Fraassen’s position on this matter. Van Fraassen also
thinks that materialism (our methodological naturalism) is not a thesis, or
a view, but he does not think that it is a research program either. Instead he
thinks that it is a stance. His main motivation for this is Hempel’s dilemma,
which we will discuss in the next section. Here is what Van Fraassen writes:
If the “physicalist” or “naturalist” part of this philosophical position is mainly the
desire or commitment to have metaphysics guided by physics, then it is something
that cannot be captured in any thesis or factual belief. If the position does not mainly
consist in such a desire or commitment, then what is it?is knowing how to retrench
cannot derive from the substantative belief which is (at that time) identiﬁed with the
view that all is physical. So what does it derive from? Whatever the answer is, that,
and not the explicit thesis, is the real answer to what materialism is.’
In the next section, we will discuss Hempel’s dilemma in depth. For now, it
is suﬃcient to notice that, according to Van Fraassen, materialism should not
be identiﬁed with a thesis about what there is, but it should instead be taken
as an ‘attitude’ or ‘a cluster of attitudes’, or ‘a stance’. Instead of trying to get
a grip on these notions in an abstract way, let’s look at the characteristics this
‘cluster of attitudes’ or this ‘stance’ has according to Van Fraassen. e cluster
of attitudes in question has the following characteristics:
(i) A strong deference to the current content of science in matters of
opinion about what there is,
(ii) An inclination (and perhaps a commitment, at least an intention)
to accept (approximative) completeness claims for science as actu-
ally constituted at any given time.
 e terms can be confusing, but ‘materialism’, as Van Fraassen uses it, is ourmethodological
naturalism.
 Van Fraassen : .
 Ibid.
 Ibid.
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It should be clear that (i) is very similar to methodological naturalism as
we formulated it at the beginning of this chapter. Sentence (i) as well as
the thesis of methodological naturalism is an ontological thesis according to
which science tells us which things exist. e obvious diﬀerence is that, while
methodological naturalism expresses a view or a thesis, sentence (i) does not
since it does not express a commitment to science, but ‘a strong deference to’
science.
Just as is the case where methodological naturalism is considered to be a
view, and just as in the case where methodological naturalism is taken to be a
research program, also in sentence (i) the sciences and the scientiﬁc method
play a crucial role. Again, the relation to the scientiﬁc method is diﬀerent
for each of these ‘kinds’ of naturalism; whereas the ‘view-naturalist’ is ﬂat-
out committed to the scientiﬁc method, the ‘research program-naturalist’ has
the disposition to accept this method and the ‘stance-naturalist’ is inclined to
accept the scientiﬁc method. Despite these diﬀerences in epistemic attitudes,
the scientiﬁc method is of crucial importance to all of them. is means
that we can leave the question whether or not naturalism is a thesis or a
research program or a stance behind, and we can focus on naturalism being
methodological and characterized by, minimally, an inclination to accept the
scientiﬁc method.
In this section, we have considered whether we need tomake an additional,
possibly major, distinction, namely the distinction between the position that
naturalism is a view and the position that methodological naturalism is not a
view. In this case, we have found that the considered distinction did not need
to be made, or rather, that the distinction can be made withinmethodological
naturalism. Naturalism as a research program and as a stance can be distin-
guished, but they remain sub-groups of methodological naturalism. After all,
a reference to the scientiﬁc method is suﬃcient for these deﬁnitions to quality
as deﬁnitions of methodological naturalism.
. ’ 
Methodological naturalism, like any other view, faces all kinds of issues. I will
not address all of these issues and not all of them are relevant here, but there
is at least one problem which is unavoidable and needs to be addressed, as it
seems to arise as soon as one tries formulating the view. is ﬁrst and biggest
problem that methodological naturalism faces is ‘Hempel’s dilemma’, which is
a dilemma noticed byHempel as well as by others. As Stoljar writes: ‘Hempel’s
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dilemma has become, as Poland puts it (: ) “the stock objection”.’
In this section I will discuss Hempel’s dilemma and I will consider whether
methodological naturalism can still be seen as a coherent and tenable view
given this issue.
Hempel’s dilemma is based on the fact that the natural sciences are in-
complete. Among others, Moser and Trout have discussed this issue. is is
what it means for the natural sciences to tell us which things exist, according
to them:
A predicate (such as “is an electron,” or “has spin”) signiﬁes a physical item, on this
view, if and only if the natural sciences, individually or collectively, rely on that pred-
icate in the formulation of their explanatory theories.
Now, what does it mean to say that the natural sciences are incomplete? In
Moser and Trout’s terms again, this means that there are predicates that pick
out something physical, which have not (yet) been adopted in the language
of the natural sciences. e application of the predicate ‘physical’ to x is a
suﬃcient condition for x to be physical, but it is not a necessary condition
for anything to be physical since the predicate has not picked out everything
that actually is physical (yet). e fact that the natural sciences are incomplete
presents us with the following dilemma:
(i) Either methodological naturalism should be restricted to the con-
temporary language of natural science, or:
(ii) It should not be so restricted and instead tie its fate to the ulti-
mate language of natural science. at is: the best, ideal, complete,
ﬁnished language of natural science.
is dilemma has also become known as Hempel’s dilemma. I will give a short
account of this dilemma ﬁrst, after which I will present other philosopher’s
accounts of it.
e ﬁrst horn of Hempel’s dilemma is the option of a restricted method-
ological naturalism, which is conﬁned to present-day natural sciences. Re-
stricted methodological naturalism suﬀers from the same problem as classical
materialism, namely the risk (and in the case of classical materialism the actu-
ality) of becoming out-dated. Since there is a continuous development in the
language of natural science, a form of naturalism this restricted is bound to be
 Stoljar : .
 Moser & Trout (eds.) .
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empirically refuted by the natural sciences themselves in only a short amount
of time. To formulate methodological naturalism as such would make the
position extremely vulnerable to refutation by new results of natural science.
ere is no way a restricted methodological naturalism could avoid this fate.
e alternative horn of the dilemma (ii) seems to be a better option,
which is why many methodological naturalists wish to make their notion of
‘the physical’ dependent upon the results of the complete natural sciences.
But this alternative faces serious problems too. e main problem is that the
results the physicalist ties its fate to are, so far, a future dream, or maybe even
worse, an unattainable ideal. For now, and maybe in principle, this kind of
methodological naturalism ﬁnds itself without a deﬁnite, and possibly with-
out a substantial, answer to the question what it means for something to be
physical and also to the question which (kinds of ) things exist. From here it
only takes a small inference to the conclusion that methodological naturalism
is a vacuous doctrine. Hempel’s dilemma is a serious threat to naturalism.
is dilemma has not only been recognized by Hempel; others have made
the same point in diﬀerent contexts. I will now discuss a few other formula-
tions of the same problem by McGinn, Van Fraassen, Chomsky and Crane,
so that the scope of this issue will become apparent.
First I will discuss McGinn’s take on the dilemma that rises for method-
ological naturalism. Based on this dilemma, McGinn argues that physicalism
(our methodological naturalism) is a vacuous doctrine. McGinn draws a dis-
tinction between ‘narrow’ and ‘wide physicalism’. Narrow physicalism asserts
that ‘consciousness is reducible to the properties now described in books of
neurophysiology and physics.’ is position proves hard to defend, since it
does not take into account that the natural sciences are not ‘ﬁnished’ and new
laws and properties will be discovered or described. Like ‘classical material-
ism’, narrow physicalism will be refuted by the progress made in the natural
sciences and will turn out to be empirically false. McGinn’s ‘narrow physical-
ism’ clearly corresponds to the ﬁrst horn of Hempel’s dilemma, namely that
of restricted methodological naturalism.
e alternative to ‘narrow physicalism’ is ‘wide physicalism’. Wide phys-
icalism is the doctrine that ‘the mental is reducible to what would feature in
an ideal theory of the world (don’t say physical world).’ Wide physicalism
corresponds to the second horn of Hempel’s dilemma, namely that of future
methodological naturalism. Now, McGinn argues that wide physicalism is
vacuous. McGinn holds it is vacuous because he thinks that the mental can
 McGinn : .
 Ibid.: .
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obviously be reduced to ‘what would feature in an ideal theory of the world’.
Naturally, in this kind of theory, there would be a place for the mental, and
naturally ‘mental terms’ would have a part in that ultimate theory. We have
no idea just what such an ideal theory of the world would look like, and how
diﬀerent the results of the natural sciences would be from their results now.
But we do know that every new property or construct will be called ‘physical’
and this may include properties we now call ‘mental’ as well.e problemwith
‘wide physicalism’, according to McGinn, is that it is so liberal that there is
nothing informative to say about its actual content. e only thing we can
say about it is that if it is the true theory of mind and world, then, trivially,
that’s what it is. ere does not seem to be a third alternative to both narrow
and wide physicalism, which means that the physicalist either has to commit
himself to a restricted view of what is physical or what exists, which will almost
certainly be overturned by future science, or the physicalist has to admit that
we don’t know (yet) what the concepts of ‘physical’ or ‘material’ mean and so
that it is unclear what his doctrine of physicalism really is.
e second person who has argued that materialism (our methodological
naturalism) is a vacuous view is Chomsky. Chomsky’s argument is very
similar to McGinn’s, but Chomsky spends more time sketching the histor-
ical context of the development of the concept of the physical. Now, which
development is this? Here is Chomsky’s sketch. Chomsky parallels the devel-
opment from spatial dualism, which reﬂects a common-sense understanding
of the world, to the (post-) Newtonian situation with the shift that has taken
place from a substantial version of the concept of the physical to a vacuous
version of this concept. Spatial dualism was based on a mechanical account
of the physical world, in which there was no room for properties or aspects
that we would call ‘mental properties’, e.g. the property of language use, or
‘thinking’. To account for these properties, a diﬀerent kind of substance, i.e.
a mental substance, was introduced. But with Newton’s demonstration that
the Cartesian account of the material world was wholly misguided and that
material substances have ‘ghostly’ properties just like mental substances do,
the concept of the physical changed dramatically. Not only has the concept
changed, with this change it has lost all its meaning. is is why, according to
Chomsky, materialism in which this concept plays a crucial role has turned
into a vacuous view. In Chomsky’s words:
 Ibid. Paraphrased.
 See Chomsky .
 E.g. bodies can act at a distance.
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ese moves also deprive us of any determinate notion of body or matter. e world
is what it is, with whatever strange properties may be discovered, including those
previously called ‘mental’. Such notions as ‘physicalism’ or ‘eliminative materialism’
lose any clear sense.
As is clear, Chomsky’s argument is very similar to McGinn’s. Both McGinn
and Chomsky think that ‘the physical’ will be an unhelpful notion in the
future, since we do not know yet which properties natural science will dis-
cover. Even properties we now consider ‘mental’ may then be called ‘physical’.
Because the concept of the physical depends on future science for its spelling
out, it is an empty concept, and the view based on it is therefore a vacuous
view.
A third to discuss the same issue is Van Fraassen. Van Fraassen recognizes
the dilemma that faces the materialist and oﬀers the following neat summary
of the issue:
When their [the physicalist’s] most important terms are tied to current scientiﬁc theo-
ries, they [physicalists] must die with those theories; but if not, they [‘those theories’]
seem to lack content all together.
According to Van Fraassen, there are two moves available for the materialist.
Which moves? e ﬁrst move that is open to the materialist, according to van
Fraassen, is described in the following way:
Some have attempted to formulate very speciﬁc theses relating to the putative subject
matter of psychology, argued that these are empirical, and oﬀered the results as a
speciﬁc version of materialism.
By this cryptic description, Van Fraassen intends to say that what a materialist
could do is to posit that type-type physicalism (according to which certain
mental events are identical to certain brain states) is true and argue that this is
a scientiﬁc, empirical thesis. It is not immediately obvious how this could be
a move out of Hempel’s dilemma for the materialist. I assume Van Fraassen
means that a materialist could bite the bullet and present a form of reduction-
ist psychology and argue that that is scientiﬁc or empirical. However, it seems
that this option still falls prey to the ﬁrst horn of the dilemma, which means
that it could be overturned by future developments in psychology. It is thus
not exactly clear how this would be a way out.
 McGinn : .
 Van Fraassen : .
 Ibid.
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Van Fraassen also thinks that this move does not work, for two reasons.
First, Van Fraassen thinks that ‘mental’ or ‘psychological’ events are not the
only problems for a materialist: they have many other things to worry about,
such as ‘that a person has a purpose’, ‘that her sins are forgiven’, etc. Second,
he thinks that this move will not help the materialist because the empirical
claim(s) of type-type physicalism might turn out to be false, and then the
question that rises is, of course, whether the materialist will then accept his
position to be proven false or whether there will be, as Van Fraassen calls it, a
fallback position which is ‘the real materialism after all’.
What is the second way out for the materialist, according to Van Fraassen?
e second move that is open to the materialist is to follow science wherever
it leads. According to Van Fraassen, this is mostly done in the way in which,
for example, Smart does this. Here is Smart’s deﬁnition of materialism:
By materialism I mean the theory that there is nothing in the world over and above
those entities which will be postulated by physics (or, of course, those entities which
will be postulated by future and more adequate physical theories).
Now, the obvious problem with this ‘move’, as Van Fraassen points out, is
that no one knows what a future physics might postulate. Moreover, it seems
that Smart, like others who defend a similar thesis, wants to introduce some
amendments that rule out the existence of emergent properties form the start
– which is obviously incompatible with the deﬁnition we have just considered.
For these reasons, Van Fraassen concludes that this move is not open to the
materialist either.
It seems to me that these two ‘moves’ that Van Fraassen discusses that
could help the materialist, when he ﬁnds himself confronted with Hempel’s
dilemma, in fact are a reformulation of exactly Hempel’s dilemma. at is, to
me these ‘moves’ do not seem solutions but a formulation of the problem.
After criticizing both moves, Van Fraassen goes on to ask the question
what is really involved in materialism, given the fact that materialists can
change the content of their doctrine and supposedly know ahead of time that
the development of science will be in line with that which is ‘materialistic’
(whatever that means). Hempel’s dilemma is one of the main reasons why
Van Fraassen thinks that materialism is not a substantial thesis or view, and, in
fact, not a view or thesis at all, as we have discussed in the previous section. So,
although Van Fraassen sees the same problem for the materialist as McGinn,
 Ibid.: .
 Ibid.: .
 Van Fraassen : .
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he does not declare materialism a vacuous doctrine. Instead, he argues that
materialism is not a doctrine at all.
Hempel’s dilemma, which, as we have seen, has not only been noticed
by Hempel, is one of the most serious threats for methodological naturalism.
e ﬁrst horn of the dilemma does not seem an option at all. Can one accept
the second horn of the dilemma, without needing to believe methodological
naturalism is a vacuous doctrine or no doctrine at all? Well, basically, the
naturalist is going to have to choose one of the horns or the dilemma and
even though they are both not perfect, they are both tenable. If the naturalist
accepts the ﬁrst horn of the dilemma and interprets ‘natural sciences’ as the
current natural sciences, then he does hold a tenable position. Granted, it is
a position that can and most likely will be overruled in the future. In that
case he might either stick with his out-dated view or update his view to be in
line with the then-current natural science again. In any case, his position at
any given moment is tenable. If the naturalist accepts the second horn of the
dilemma and interprets ‘natural sciences’ as complete natural sciences, then,
for now, he will base his view on contemporary natural science but is willing
to substitute this for the results of complete natural science when they are
available. is position is also a tenable position, though maybe not a very
desirable one.
Another point that should be made is the following. is dilemma is
foremost a problem for the naturalist, who will have to decide which horn of
it to embrace. Yet, it is not so much a problem for us, for two reasons. One,
either one of these interpretations of naturalism is tenable (albeit problematic,
possibly) and all we need is a tenable position of naturalism for which we
can investigate whether it is compatible with the subjectivity of experience.
Second, whichever horn of the dilemma the naturalist embraces, both forms
contain the crucial element which is the commitment to science. For our
purposes, it can be sidestepped whether science should here be interpreted as
current science or as future science. Most important is to note that method-
ological naturalism is committed to science and the scientiﬁc method. Know-
ing that methodological naturalism is a tenable position, which is committed
to science and the scientiﬁc method, gives us enough in hands to consider
whether it is compatible with the subjectivity of experience.
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Hempel’s dilemma is not the only problem that arises with the formulation
of methodological naturalism. ere are at least two more problems, which I
will discuss in this section.
e second problem that pops right up with the formulation of method-
ological naturalism has been expressed by Crane and Mellor. Crane and
Mellor’s point is that there is a problem with the term ‘natural sciences’.
eir question is: what counts as a natural science? Physics surely does, and
chemistry; molecular biology and neurophysiology do too but social sciences
among which psychology fall beyond their scope. Crane andMellor’s problem
is that there is no justiﬁable reason why psychology should not be considered
to be a natural science. ey argue for this claim in the following way.
e reason why psychology is excluded from the natural sciences is not
because it aﬃrms the existence of mental substances. According to Crane and
Mellor, the distinction between amental and a physical substance is irrelevant,
since what the diﬀerence comes down to is their diﬀerent essential proper-
ties, respectively thinking and being extended. e reason why psychology
is excluded from the natural sciences is, then, that thinking is not a physical
property. Crane and Mellor’s question then becomes why thinking is not a
physical property. And even if it is not, then it still seems that the exclusion of
psychology from the natural sciences is solely a matter of bias. As Crane and
Mellor put it:
What, if not the metaphysics of materialism, prevents the empirical psychology of
thought, and of other mental phenomena, adding in its own terms, as physics does,
to our inventory of what there is?
To repeat their point: why do physics and chemistry and biology have the
authority to determine which ontological claims are true, and why doesn’t
psychology have that same authority? Why is it not acceptable if psychology
describes in its own terms (i.e. not only or not at all using the term ‘physical’)
which things exist? Crane and Mellor think that psychology is taken to be
epistemically suspicious exactly because its subject matter is not physical. But
such a prima facie exclusion of psychology is sheer prejudice.
I will not discuss the scientiﬁc status of psychology in depth, since this is
not only a complicated but also a major issue requiring more analysis than we
 Crane & Mellor : . Crane & Mellor’s materialism is ‘classical materialism’ or old
versions of materialism.
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have space for here. I think the best reply to Crane’s argument, though, is to
say that the reason why psychology is not always, or not usually, considered
a natural science is not because ‘thinking’ is not considered a physical prop-
erty. I think the reasons for its exclusion are more often based on a (at least
perceived) diﬀerence in methodology between certain areas in psychology on
the one hand and the natural sciences on the other. As I will argue later on
in this chapter, scientiﬁc statements are such that they should be capable of
test and they should be such that scientists could reach agreement over them.
Naturally, a lot of research that is done in psychology meets these standards
for objectivity, which I will spell out in section ., but I suspect that the
reason that psychology is not always considered a natural science might be
that not all areas of psychology are thought of as meeting these standards.
Elsewhere, Crane has brought up yet another issue with the formulation
of methodological naturalism. is third issue is closely related to Hempel’s
dilemma, yet raises a slightly diﬀerent point. Crane’s problem here concerns
the development of future physics. is is how he describes the problem:
If current physics develops in certain unforeseeable ways, then how can physicalism
be deﬁned now in such a way as to rule out the mental? Perhaps physical science
can be deﬁned as the ﬁnal theory of everything. But if it turns out that irreducible
psychological properties are appealed to in the ﬁnal theory of everything, then the
mental will once again count as physical by mere deﬁnition.
ere are two things that should be said in reply to the future possibility
that natural sciences will include ‘mental’ things, as discussed by Crane, and
earlier by McGinn and Chomsky. First of all, this is a good argument against
calling the view that might have such a future ‘materialism’ or ‘physicalism’.
After all, if we stick to this terminology and the view will include ‘mental’
things, it will become a contradictio in terminis and nobody will want to
adhere to it.is is the reason why we have chosen to talk about ‘metaphysical
naturalism’ instead. Second, this is a good argument in favor of formulating
methodological naturalism as the view that holds that the scientiﬁc method
will tell us which things exist, instead of saying that methodological natural-
ism is the view that holds that the scientiﬁc method will tell us what it means
for something to be physical. We have made this distinction in Chapter 
and it is important here. If one thinks that methodological naturalism will
someday tell us what it means for something to be physical, and it will include
 Crane : . Pettit has taken up Crane’s challenge to come up with a deﬁnition of
physicalism that is neither too restricted nor too liberal (Pettit ), but Crane has argued
that this deﬁnition fails (Crane b).
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things we call ‘mental’, then the same contradiction occurs. However, if we
think methodological naturalism will simply tell us which things exist, there
would be no contradiction whether these things would be mental, physical or
neutral in nature (or any combination of the above).
Now, given these two points, there is no problem anymore for method-
ological naturalism to include mental things in the future. It would be great
if it were to turn out that the ‘mental’ is a natural phenomenon that can have
its place in a theory of everything, even if we cannot envisage such a theory
now. Even stronger, it seems that we actually want that which we now call ‘the
mental’ to be part of the phenomena covered by our ultimate theory. After
all, don’t we aspire to an ideal theory of everything?
.     

We have now found a tenable and credible version of naturalism: the kind
of methodological naturalism that we have formulated above. If we want
to be able to answer the question whether the subjectivity of experience is
compatible with this tenable version of methodological naturalism that we
found, then we need to know what the ontological implications of this view
are: which kinds of things exist according to this view? ere are diﬀerent
things to say about the ontological implications of methodological naturalism.
An important question is what the ontological implications of science and
the scientiﬁc method are, which I will discuss in the next section. In this
section, I want to focus on the question whether methodological naturalism
entails metaphysical naturalism, or, in other words: whether ‘naturalism’ en-
tails ‘physicalism’ or ‘materialism’?
If one is a methodological naturalist, and thinks, for example, that science
will tell us which kinds of things exist, then does this imply that one is a
metaphysical naturalist who thinks, for example, that everything that exists is
in space-time?We have already concluded that the four forms of metaphysical
naturalism that we distinguished should be rejected. However, it might be the
case that our discussion of methodological naturalism leads us right back to
metaphysical naturalism. Maybe one cannot be a methodological naturalist
without being a metaphysical naturalist?
ere are at least two views that are represented in the literature concerning
the relation betweenmethodological naturalism andmetaphysical naturalism.
It should be noted that the relation is often described as the relation between
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‘naturalism’ on the one hand and ‘materialism’ on the other, or as the rela-
tion between ‘methodological’ and ‘ontological’ naturalism, but in each of
these cases it is clear that this distinction amounts to our distinction between
methodological and metaphysical naturalism. Here are the two possible posi-
tions to take regarding this relationship:
A. Methodological naturalism is ontologically neutral regardingmeta-
physical naturalism.
B. Methodological naturalism is not ontologically neutral regarding
metaphysical naturalism.
Both these views are and have been defended in the literature. Among others,
defenders of view A are: Papineau, Brandl, Rea and Ritchie. In Rea’s terms,
naturalism as a research program is not committed to the doctrine of materi-
alism – just the contrary:
My goal is to show that commitment to naturalism forces one to reject both realism
about material objects, and materialism.
Ritchie makes a similar point in his recent book Understanding Naturalism.
As he writes:
ere is no general metaphysical picture that our best science supports. Add to that
the fact that it is not clear what physicalists mean by physics in the ﬁrst place, then the
best attitude a naturalist can take may be one of metaphysical agnosticism.
Another recent example of someone who defends view A is Brandl ().
I will not consider his argument in depth here, but I do want to discuss it
brieﬂy, mainly as an illustration to, and enhancement of, our understanding
of position A. In his paper, Brandl claims that naturalists are only committed
to physicalism as understood by the logical positivists, who think, according to
Brandl, that ‘physicalism is just a methodological rule about how to formulate
the evidential base on which scientiﬁc theories rest’. Brandl thinks that the
idea of the logical positivists and Quine about naturalism is that naturalism
should not go beyond science in stating any metaphysical claims. However,
Brandl thinks that physicalism as we understand it now (which is the view that
 Moser & Trout (eds.) : .
 Rea : .
 Ritchie : .
 Brandl : .
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we have called ‘metaphysical naturalism’) is such a metaphysical claim. Brandl
argues that naturalists should remain neutral when it comes to ontological
positions and themind-body problem, just as the logical positivists andQuine
intended it to be. I will comment on this argument below, after looking at the
argument from defenders of position B.
Among the recent defenders of position B are Armstrong, and Gasser and
Stefan. Armstrong’s view is that materialism (what we have called metaphysi-
cal naturalism) is part of the doctrine of (what we have called methodological)
naturalism. According to Armstrong, naturalism is the doctrine that ‘reality
consists of nothing but a single all-embracing spatio-temporal system’. Ma-
terialism, naturalism and also realism rest on a common basis, according to
him, which is that the natural sciences provide the best guide to the nature of
reality.
A recent argument for position B is given by Gasser and Stefan ().
I will not consider their argument in detail, but I will nevertheless mention
it as an illustration of position B. Gasser and Stefan take the view that being
a methodological naturalist commits one to metaphysical naturalism. ey
make this claim because they think that, ontologically, neutral naturalism is
‘unsatisfying from a philosophical point of view’. Gasser and Stefan ﬁnd this
position unsatisfying because at some point, if one accepts scientiﬁc realism
(and the idea that scientiﬁc explanations bring ontological commitments), a
tension will rise between the diﬀerent causal claims and the diﬀerent scientiﬁc
explanations. Now, because of the tension that arises, one can only temporarily
take up a neutral position, but if one is to take science seriously, at some point
one has to take a position. As they put it:
Because it has proven to be diﬃcult to provide a convincing way to evade the tensions
between diﬀerent causal stories at the various levels of reality, we assume that an onto-
logical neutral position can only be provisional for naturalism. (…) [I]f it is believed
that scientiﬁc concepts and hypotheses refer to something real, then methodological
and epistemological issues are closely intertwined with ontological assumptions.
is is why Gasser and Stefan draw the conclusion that if one takes science
seriously (and is a scientiﬁc realist), ontology is a central issue for naturalists.
Since science makes claims about the causal eﬃcacy of objects, scientiﬁc theo-
ries implicitly raise ontological questions. Ontology is thereby ‘a central issue
for naturalism’.
 Armstrong : .
 Gasser and Stefan : .
 Ibid.
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Now, who is right, Brandl or Gasser and Stefan? I think we should say
that they are both right. How can they both be right? Well, I think they do
not disagree with each other in the ﬁrst place. Let’s look at Brandl’s argument
again: the only thing Brandl claims here is that naturalism cannot go ‘beyond
science’. erefore, before we have seen the results of science, we cannot com-
mit to a particular ontology. In other words: naturalism is not and should not
be committed to a particular ontology a priori. However, when the results of
science are in, then naturalism can and will catch up with science and present
an ontology based on the ﬁndings of science. So, in short, even though there is
and should be no a priori commitment to a particular ontology (e.g. dualism
or naturalism), naturalism will in fact proﬀer an ontology, following science.
It is not the case that naturalism will remain completely neutral concerning
ontology, in the sense that naturalists won’t care about ontology. Naturalism,
according to Brandl, should only stay neutral to begin with and it should not,
without consulting science, take sides with for example, dualists, physicalists,
neutral monists or idealists.
Does this contradict Gasser and Stefan’s position? It does not. Gasser and
Stefan do not claim that naturalism should commit to a particular ontology,
like dualism or physicalism or neutral monism, without being led to this
decision by science. ey do not think naturalists should commit themselves
to a particular ontology a priori, and they do not think naturalists should go
‘beyond science’. e only point that Gasser and Stefan make, is that natural-
ism is not completely ontologically neutral in the sense thatwhen the results of
science are in, the naturalist is committed to the ontology that science proﬀers
(if they want to take their commitment to the scientiﬁc method seriously). So,
naturalists should take science seriously enough not to commit to a particular
ontology a priori and seriously enough not to ignore the results of science and
not care about ontology at all. Is this position diﬀerent from Brandl’s? Not so
much: Brandl and Gasser and Stefan seem to agree at this point.
Does this mean that there is no diﬀerence between positions A and B? No,
there very well can be a diﬀerence. For example, some philosophers think that
methodological naturalism is a priori committed to metaphysical naturalism;
for example Armstrong thinks this. is means that for Armstrong and like-
minded philosophers, position A and B are very diﬀerent and, in fact, opposed
to one another. Armstrong would thus not agree with Brandl but maintain
that methodological naturalism is committed to metaphysical naturalism.
And Armstrong is not alone in thinking this.Whenwe discussed deﬁnitions of
metaphysical and methodological naturalism, we noticed that there are some
deﬁnitions according to which naturalism is not either a metaphysical or a
methodological thesis but a combination of both. Often the metaphysical and
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the methodological are regarded as components or elements of a combination
view which is called naturalism. Now, since the terms materialism, physical-
ism and naturalism are so closely related and often refer to the same view, it is
not surprising that methodological naturalism and metaphysical naturalism
are often seen as part of the same package.
is is even more interesting when one realizes that there are also philoso-
phers who hold a position centrally opposed to Armstrong’s. For example,
Rea argues that methodological naturalism andmetaphysical naturalism aren’t
even compatible. Since this is so interesting, I will brieﬂy consider how Rea
thinks that methodological and metaphysical naturalism are incompatible.
Well, methodological naturalism entails a commitment to science and to fol-
lowing science wherever it will lead. Since we don’t know now where science
will lead in the future (e.g. maybe someday science will posit mental objects),
this means that this commitment in incompatible with a commitment to any
particular metaphysical theses, such as ‘there are no emergent properties’ or
‘there are no mental objects’. ese theses are just examples, but Rea’s point is:
methodological naturalism is not compatible with any metaphysical theses at
all, since it is a contradiction to follow science wherever it will lead and before-
hand already draw limits by posing theses where science cannot lead. If one
is a true methodological naturalist, so argues Rea, one therefore cannot be a
metaphysical naturalist.emethodological naturalist needs to follow science
wherever it will lead him, even if someday it will lead him to accept emergent
properties or mental objects (or whatever else). He cannot decide already that
in fact science is limited by all these metaphysical theses he would like to hold
on to. And if the methodological naturalist would choose to do the latter, and
formulate ontological theses that he absolutely does not want to part from,
then this makes him a metaphysical naturalist rather than a methodological
naturalist. Rea’s point is that one cannot be seriously committed to both at
the same time and be a methodological and metaphysical naturalist. Here is
the issue in Rea’s words:
But to say this [naturalists at present are committed to certain ontological theses] is not
at all to say that any of those theses are adequate as deﬁnitive statements or characteriza-
tions of naturalism. ey are not because, like any substantive thesis about what there
is, they are not the sorts of theses that one could unconditionally endorse while at the
same time following scientiﬁc investigation wherever it might lead. So no substantive
ontological thesis will do as a characterization of any version of naturalism.
is is also Rea’s reason for thinking that no supplement can be given to the
anti-supernaturalist thesis of the metaphysical naturalist. Because, however
 Rea : .
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the anti-supernaturalist would interpret the terms ‘natural’ and ‘supernatural’,
this would betray an ontological commitment that one cannot have if one is
also a methodological naturalist. Note how this is not an argument against
anti-supernaturalists who do not claim to be methodological naturalists as
well.
Armstrong and Rea thus defend positions that are diametrically opposed,
so there remains plenty of disagreement on this issue. e most important
aspect of this debate for our interests is the fact that, even if methodological
naturalism is not in principle committed to one particular ontological posi-
tion, it is nevertheless committed to an ontology. Since methodological nat-
uralism is committed to an ontology, the question arises: to which ontology?
Because methodological naturalism is committed to science and the scientiﬁc
method, this seems the right place to start looking for the kind of ontology
that methodological naturalism is committed to. is will be the topic of the
next section.
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Since we want to be able to answer the question whether the subjectivity
of experience is compatible with methodological naturalism or not, we need
to know more speciﬁcally what methodological naturalism amounts to. We
started this chapter by considering a number of deﬁnitions of methodological
naturalism and found that, according to these deﬁnitions, science tells us
which things exist.us, in order to learnmore about whether the subjectivity
of experience is compatible with methodological naturalism, we’ll need to
know which things (can) exist according to science. And for that, we need to
ﬁgure out what science is.
What is science? Needless to say, this question is not easy to answer and
has been asked for thousands of years. However, attempts have been made to
say what science is. For example Quine describes science as follows:
Our word ‘science’ comes from a Latin word for knowledge. Much that we know
does not count as science, but this is often less due to its subject matter than to its
arrangement. For nearly any body of knowledge that is suﬃciently organized to exhibit
appropriate evidential relationships among its constituent claims has at least some call
to be seen as scientiﬁc. What makes for science is system, whatever the subject. And
what makes for system is the judicious application of logic. Science is thus a fruit of
rational investigation.
 Quine : .
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e details of this description will be discussed later on in this section, but
for now we should continue with the big picture. Often a distinction is
made between natural sciences, social sciences and humanities. Despite the
diﬀerences between natural and social sciences and humanities, they have a
common objective. Which objective is this?
e natural and social sciences and the humanities are all part of the same human
endeavor, namely systematic and critical investigations aimed at acquiring the best
possible understanding of the workings of nature, man, and human society.
Gorham has pointed out that ‘there is little agreement among philosophers
about what science is for or what it has achieved.’ But for a scientiﬁc re-
alist, whose point of view we’ll adapt here, the point of science is to un-
derstand and give an account of the world. According to scientiﬁc realism
‘modern scientiﬁc theories provide a true (or approximately true) account of
the world’.
So, science is a system that aims to provide a true account of the world.
However, not only science tries to provide a true account of the world, but
so do many religions, and also cults, astrologers and tea-leaf-readers. ese
alternative accounts of the world are possibly also systematic. In this light,
Quine’s description of science thus seems too broad, including possible sys-
tematic but non-scientiﬁc accounts of the world.e following question then
presents itself: What is distinctive about science? is question is central in
the debate about the demarcation between science and pseudo-science. Over
time, several criteria for such a demarcation have been proﬀered. e logical
positivists, for example, proﬀered that the criterion for a statement being
scientiﬁc is that the statement can be veriﬁed:
e basic idea was that a scientiﬁc statement could be distinguished from a metaphys-
ical statement by being at least in principle possible to verify.
Popper has proﬀered a demarcation criterion along the same lines:
 ere is debate about how exactly to distinguish the natural sciences from the social sciences
and the social sciences from the humanities, but I cannot go into this matter any further
here since it is a huge debate in its own right.
 Quine : .
 Gorham : .
 e argument for scientiﬁc realism is that science is so successful and the best explanation
for its empirical and technological success is that it is true.
 Gorham : .
 Hansson .
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Statements or systems of statements, in order to be ranked as scientiﬁc, must be capable
of conﬂicting with possible, or conceivable observations.
Both of these demarcation criteria have been criticized and others have been
proﬀered in their stead. In “Science and Pseudo-science” Hansson concludes
with the following description of the distinctiveness of science:
Science is a systematic search for knowledge whose validity does not de-
pend on the particular individual but is open for anyone to check or redis-
cover.
So, for any theory to be scientiﬁc, it needs to be systematic and it needs to
meet certain standards. How is the application of these standards in scientiﬁc
research guaranteed? e application of these standards in scientiﬁc research
is guaranteed by means of the universal method that sciences employ in their
research: the scientiﬁc method. Science is thus a systematic account of the
world, and the fact that it is systematic can be further spelled out in the sense
that its distinctive scientiﬁc character is guaranteed by the application and use
of the scientiﬁc method. In order to determine which things exist according
to science, we need to learn more about the scientiﬁc method. What is the
scientiﬁc method?
Just like the question ‘What is science?’ is not easy to answer, the question
what the scientiﬁc method exactly is, is not easy to answer either. Rea writes
the following about the methods of science:
Notoriously, it is hard to say exactly what methods are supposed to count as the
methods of science. But I think we will do well enough for present purposes if we say
that the methods of science are, at the present time anyway, those methods (including
canons of good argument, criteria for theory choice, and so on) regularly employed
and respected in contemporary biology, chemistry, and physics departments. Reliance
on memory and testimony is included in the methods of science, as well as reliance
on judgments about apparent mathematical, logical, and conceptual truths.
is gives us a ﬁrst idea what the methods of science are. Ritchie oﬀers the
following answer to the question what is distinctive about science and its
method:
Traditional philosophy of science has oﬀered us two very general answers to what is dis-
tinctive about science and its method – inductivism and hypothetico-deductivism.
 Popper : .
 Rea : .
 Ritchie : . is formulation of the scientiﬁc method leaves room for the possi-
bility of it changing over time. As Rea puts it: ‘is understanding of scientiﬁc method
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What are inductivism and hypothetico-deductivism? Inductivism and hypo-
thetico-deductivism are two alternative views on the working of science and
the scientiﬁc method. Ritchie’s oﬀers the following description of induc-
tivism:
Inductivists say that science begins by piecing together observations. From the data
we put forward a tentative generalization. We then look for analogous phenomena in
the world on the bases of which we can extend our generalizations. Once we have a
generalization, we use it to make predictions. If the prediction matches the new data,
the theory is conﬁrmed. e more tests our theory passes, the more our theory is to
be trusted and the more chance there is that it is true.
e key to understanding inductivism is that it starts from observations based
upon which generalizations are made. ese generalizations are then in turn
used to base predictions upon. en, if new observations match the predic-
tions, the theory – made up of generalizations – is conﬁrmed. Hypothetico-
deductivism diﬀers from this, especially where it concerns the development of
the tentative theory. Ritchie gives the following description of hypothetico-
deductivism:
Hypothetico-deductivists, on the other hand, claim that science does not begin with
raw data but by postulating a theory or hypothesis to explain some phenomena that we
are interested in. From that wemake predictions. If the tests agree with the predictions,
we hang on to our theory. If the prediction doesn’t match up with the data, then we
must discard our old hypothesis and replace it with a new one.
While inductivism develops from observations to generalizations to theory,
hypothetico-deductivism starts out by postulating a theory aimed at explain-
ing a particular phenomenon.en predictions are made based on the theory
and if new observations match the predictions the theory is conﬁrmed. e
is suﬃciently conservative to rule out the various methods most naturalists want to rule
out (e.g. the methods of astrology, phrenology, or iridology). But it is liberal enough to
allow that the range of scientiﬁc methods might change over time.’ Rea : . Despite
the possibility of change, the naturalist’s core commitment to a scientiﬁc method will not
change: ‘e heart of the shared research program – the disposition to treat as basic sources
of evidence whatever methods counts as scientiﬁc – will remain unchanged.’ Rea : .
Whether it’s a threat to the naturalist that the scientiﬁc method changes over time can be
debated, but I will not be able to address this issue any further here.
 ere are other alternatives too, such as Kuhn’s ‘paradigm’ view of the scientiﬁc method,
but I will not go into this here.
 Ritchie : .
 Ibid.
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second part of the method – experimentation or testing – is thus similar in
both accounts, but the position of theory is diﬀerent. Even though there
are diﬀerences between inductivism and hypothetico-deductivism, there is
general common ground:
Although inductivists and hypothetico-deductivists disagree over the fundamental
methods of science, the pictures have in common two elements: ﬁrst, scientists produce
theories of the world; and secondly, the scientiﬁc method involves (in some way) the
testing of those theories.
So, according to both models, scientists come up with theories and test them
using the scientiﬁc method. is means that there are (at least) two com-
ponents to the development of a scientiﬁc theory: (i) theorizing and (ii) ex-
perimentation. We have seen in the description above what these processes
involve: theorizing is what is done either right at the start and predictions are
formed based on this theory, or observations are taken together and gener-
alized so as to put forth a theory. Experimentation, or testing, is the second
phase of developing a scientiﬁc theory for hypothetico-deductivists, but the
ﬁrst phase for inductivists. In this phase the tentative theory is tested: it is
checked whether new observations match the existing predictions made based
on the tentative theory. If they do, the experimentation conﬁrms the theory;
if they don’t, then the theory needs to either be adjusted or rejected.
Before we can answer the question in the next chapter whether the subjec-
tivity of experience is compatible with methodological naturalism, we need
to know what the ontological consequences are of science and the scientiﬁc
method. Which things exist according to science?
According to methodological naturalism, those entities exist that our best
scientiﬁc theories quantify over. After all, according to methodological natu-
ralism science tells us which things exist. is means that our scientiﬁc theory
will tell us what exists in the sense that anything that appears in a scientiﬁc
theory, i.e. anything that is quantiﬁed over in a scientiﬁc theory, exists. And
nothing which does not appear, i.e. is not quantiﬁed over, does exist. at
is: anything that is not in a scientiﬁc theory does not exist. We can ﬁnd the
idea that those things exist which are quantiﬁed over in scientiﬁc theories in
Quine:
 Ibid.: .
 It should be noted that it is possible that two diﬀerent theories both ﬁt all the available
scientiﬁc evidence and as such are as good candidates to explain a certain phenomenon. In
this case the phenomenon is overdetermined. is is a problem for scientists, but not for
us.
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To show that some given object is required in a theory, what we have to show is no
more nor less than that that object is required, for the truth of the theory, to be among
the values over which the bound variables range.
It should be pointed out that the claim that ‘science tells us what exists’ is
diﬀerent from the claim that ‘science tells us what is true’. ere are two
problems with the statement that ‘science tells us what is true’. First, surely
science gives us only truths, but it is very likely that there are disciplines
other than science that give us some truths, such as e.g. world history. All
the foregoing says is that such truths, as the ones contained in the discipline
studying world history, don’t quantify over anything in addition to the kinds
of things that science quantiﬁes over. Second, the claim that ‘science tells us
what is true’ is self-refuting because, for this to be a coherent position, it is not
only necessary that science tells us what is true, but in addition this statement
itself (i.e. the statement that ‘science tells us which things exist or, in other
words, what is true’) should be true. However, this statement could never be
the result of science. e fact that this statement (i.e. ‘science tells us which
things exist or, in other words, what is true’) is itself not a claim that is or
can be the result of science is sometimes thought to indicate that naturalism
is self-refuting and incoherent.
Another way of saying that those entities exist that our best scientiﬁc
theories quantify over is to say that those entities exist that are indispensible
for science. e entities that are indispensible for science are quantiﬁed over
in scientiﬁc theories. Ritchie mentions that Quine holds this to be true:
Quine believes in the existence of mathematical objects such as numbers and sets. His
reason for so believing is that numbers and sets play an indispensible role in our best
scientiﬁc theories and we as good naturalists should be committed to whatever entities
our best science ﬁnds indispensible.
is approach for determining which things exist is standard in contemporary
analytic metaphysics. InUnderstanding Naturalism, Ritchie calls this approach
‘constructive methodological naturalism’, which is, of course, what we have
been calling ‘methodological naturalism’:
I shall call this approach to ontological questions ‘constructivemethodological natural-
ism’. It is the way most ontological questions are pursued in contemporary philosophy.
e naturalized ontologist must put forward arguments for the indispensability and
 Quine : .
 Ritchie : .
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the explanatory worth of the entities he takes to exist. His opponents must dispute the
indispensability or explanatory worth of those entities. at’s how we are supposed to
decide what there is.
As we have just seen, Quine believes we need mathematical entities to exist
because they are indispensible for science. Other philosophers have argued for
the existence of diﬀerent entities in a similar fashion. For example, Armstrong
thinks that universals are indispensible for science and therefore should be said
to exist for methodological naturalists:
In a similar vein, David Armstrong has claimed that we should be committed to the
existence of universals. According to Armstrong, we need universals to make sense of
certain aspects of our science.
And Lewis has argued that possible worlds are necessary for science and there-
fore should be said to exist:
David Lewis (…) claims that our ordinary and indeed our scientiﬁc talk commits us
to the existence of what he calls possible worlds.
Now, according to methodological naturalism, entities that possibly exist in-
clude: mathematical objects, universals and possible worlds, in addition to
quarks, electrons, waves and/or other fundamental particles (if, of course,
there are such things). Instead of trying to list anything that possibly exists
according to science, a more interesting question is if there are any principled
restrictions on what can be in our scientiﬁc theories, i.e. as to what our sci-
entiﬁc theories can be about. Given the nature of the scientiﬁc method, there
are indeed principled limitations to which entities scientiﬁc statements (used
in our scientiﬁc theories) can quantify over. What is it about the scientiﬁc
method that limits which entities scientiﬁc theories can quantify over? Let’s
explore this aspect of science and the scientiﬁc method.
Science and the scientiﬁc method have always been described as essentially
‘public’, ‘objective’ or ‘intersubjective’. In the following, I will refer to this
aspect of science and the scientiﬁc method as ‘objectivity’ or I will speak
of science and the scientiﬁc method being objective – but I consider this
the same aspect as its ‘publicity’ or ‘intersubjectivity’. As just said, this is
an essential aspect of science and the scientiﬁc method. In order to be able
 Ibid.: .
 Ibid.: .
 Ibid.: .
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to answer our question whether the subjectivity of experience is compatible
with methodological naturalism, we’ll need to know more about this aspect
of science and the scientiﬁc method. I will now turn to the literature in which
science and the scientiﬁc method are characterized as objective in order to
ﬁnd what this means exactly.
In his paper “Science, Publicity and Consciousness” Goldman writes ex-
tensively about this aspect of the scientiﬁc method:
An old but enduring idea is that science is a fundamentally ‘public’ or ‘intersubjective’
enterprise. According to this thesis, the core of the scientiﬁc methodology is interper-
sonal rather than private.
Goldman uses the term ‘agreement’ to spell out what it means for science to
be public or objective. He formulates the ‘publicity restraint’ as follows.
(O) Objectivity of science means that: Statement S qualiﬁes as a
piece of scientiﬁc evidence only if S is a statement on which
scientiﬁc observers could reach agreement.
Goldman makes clear that this aspect of science has been important since the
beginning of modern science:
Even at the advent of modern science, publicity received a prominent role. Boyle
insisted that the witnessing of experiments was to be a collective act.
It was also important in the time of logical positivism:
e publicity thesis was prominent in the positivist era, and although it is less fre-
quently discussed today, I suspect it would still receive a vote of approval, or a nod of
assent, from most philosophers of science.
In his discussion of the ‘publicity requirement’ as he calls it, Goldman dis-
cusses three important ﬁgures in the philosophy of science who have also
described this essential aspect of science and the scientiﬁc method. e ﬁrst
Goldman mentions is Popper. Popper writes the following about science:
 Goldman : .
 It should be noted that Goldman calls this ‘(P)’ but I will call it ‘(O)’, since I am
formulating these deﬁnitions in terms of objectivity rather than publicity.
 Goldman : .
 Ibid.: .
 Ibid.
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Popper held that ‘the objectivity of scientiﬁc statements lies in the fact that they can be
intersubjectively tested’. Epistemically, ‘basic’ statements in science, said Popper, are
statements ‘about whose acceptance or rejection the various investigators are likely to
reach agreement.’
Popper’s deﬁnition of the objectivity of science can be formulated in two
diﬀerent ways, which (most likely) come down to the same idea:
(O) Objectivity of science means that: Scientiﬁc statements can be
intersubjectively tested.
And:
(O) Objectivity of science means that: Investigators are likely to
reach agreement about acceptance or rejection of scientiﬁc
statements.
e second important philosopher who has written about this aspect of
science and the scientiﬁc method, who is also mentioned by Goldman, is
Hempel. is is what Goldman writes about Hempel:
Hempel followed Popper in requiring that all statements of empirical science be ca-
pable of test by reference to evidence which is public, i.e. which can be secured by
diﬀerent observers and does not depend essentially on the observer.
e deﬁnition that we can extract from this passage is the following:
(O) Objectivity of science means that: All statements of empirical
science should be capable of test by reference to evidence which
can be secured by diﬀerent observers and does not depend es-
sentially on the observer.
is deﬁnition is very similar to (O) but adds to it that the evidence cannot
essentially depend on the observer.
e third important ﬁgure that Goldman discusses is Feigl. Feigl describes
‘objectivity’ in science very extensively. Here is a passage in which he does so:
 Ibid.
 Ibid.
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e quest for scientiﬁc knowledge is (…) regulated by certain standards or criteria
(…). e most important of these regulative ideas are:
Intersubjective Testability. is is only a more adequate formulation of what is gen-
erally meant by the “objectivity” of science. What is here involved is (…) the re-
quirement that the knowledge claims of science be in principle capable of test (…)
on the part of any person properly equipped with intelligence and the technical de-
vices of observation or experimentation. e term intersubjective stresses the social
nature of the scientiﬁc enterprise. If there be any “truths” that are accessible only
to privileged individuals, such as mystics or visionaries – that is, knowledge-claims
which by their very nature cannot independently be checked by anyone else – then
such “truths” are not of the kind that we seek in the sciences. e criterion of inter-
subjective testability thus delimits the scientiﬁc from the non-scientiﬁc activities of
man.
e deﬁnition of objectivity that we can infer from this passage is the follow-
ing:
(O) Objectivity of science means that: Knowledge claims of science
should in principle be capable of test.
So far for the ﬁgures that Goldman mentions.ere are many others, though,
who stress how very crucial this aspect of science is. We can, for example, also
ﬁnd the idea that intersubjectivity is essential to science in Railton:
Objective inquiry uses procedures that are intersubjective and independent of par-
ticular individuals or circumstances – for example, (…) it makes no essential use of
introspective or subjectively privileged evidence in theory assessment.
e deﬁnition of the objectivity of science that can be inferred from this
passage is the following:
(O) Objectivity of science means that: e procedures used in
science are independent of particular individuals or circum-
stances.
Another description of the objectivity of science can be found in Gillies. Here
is the relevant passage:
 Ibid.
 Ibid.
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One point to notice here is the claim that statements about physical objects are inter-
subjective. is is really the crux of the matter. e line of thought is this. Let us ﬁrst
consider the protocol sentences of a science like physics or chemistry. Such sciences
are carried on by a community of scientiﬁc workers. Now a particular observation of
experiment may be carried out by scientist A. However if the result is to be accepted
by the community, it is important that A’s result should be capable of being checked
by another scientist, B. If A’s protocol is about physical objects, it can in principle be
checked by B, and so is inter-subjective, If, however, A’s protocol is about A’s private
sensations, then A’s protocol cannot be checked by B.
e deﬁnition of the objectivity of science that can be inferred from this
passage is the following:
(O) Objectivity of science means that: Scientiﬁc results should be
capable of being checked by other scientists.
We can also ﬁnd the idea that science is objective in Fetzer:
e objectivity to which science aspires is deﬁned by intersubjective standards of rea-
soning. In principle, diﬀerent scientists confronted by the same alternative hypotheses
and the same relevant evidence would tend to accept and reject all and only the same
tentative conclusions by virtue of relying upon the same principles of reasoning.
From this passage it can be inferred that part of the objectivity of science lies
in the scientists’ use of ‘intersubjective standards of reasoning’ or logic. Since
this description contains the word ‘intersubjective’ we should better use the
second part of the description:
(O) Objectivity of science means that: Diﬀerent scientists con-
fronted by the same alternative hypotheses and the same rel-
evant evidence would tend to accept and reject all and only the
same tentative conclusions by virtue of relying upon the same
principles of reasoning.
ese eight deﬁnitions of the objectivity of science can be regarded as vari-
ations of one and the same deﬁnition. Some deﬁnitions of the objectivity
of science are put in terms of scientists reaching agreement about scientiﬁc
statements, the other deﬁnitions of the objectivity of science are put in terms
 Gillies : -.
 Fetzer : .
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of scientiﬁc statements (or results or knowledge claims) being capable of test
by other scientists. It should be clear that both these deﬁnitions come down
to the same thing:
(a) Scientists can, could and/or in fact do reach agreement about sci-
entiﬁc statements.
(b) Scientiﬁc statements (or scientiﬁc results, knowledge claims) are
capable of test by other scientists.
It is easy to see that (a) and (b) are not two alternative deﬁnitions of the
objectivity of science, but are two diﬀerent ways of describing the same
phenomenon. esis (a) is formulated in terms of ‘scientists’ who can reach
agreement about which scientiﬁc statements to adopt and which to reject,
whereas thesis (b) is formulated in terms of ‘scientiﬁc statements’ that can be
tested by any scientist. As a result of these tests, scientiﬁc statements will either
be adopted or be rejected. As thesis (a) indicates, scientists will agree which
statements to adopt or reject – based on the fact that they get the same results
when they test the same statements. esis (a) and (b) are thus so closely
related that it would be foolish to distinguish two senses in which science is
objective.e deﬁnition of the objectivity of science that I will use is therefore
a combination of (a) and (b);
(O) e objectivity of science means that: Scientiﬁc statements can
be conﬁrmed by any scientist by experiment and/or the relevant
computations.
e deﬁnition of the objectivity of science that we have found, (O), is very
similar to the demarcation criterion that Popper uses to distinguish science
from pseudo-science. As we have seen, the objectivity of science, according
to Popper, consists in the following: ‘the objectivity of scientiﬁc statements
lies in the fact that they can be intersubjectively tested’. Gorham writes:
‘Popper’s demarcation criterion oﬀers a clear and simple condition of the sci-
entiﬁc status of a theory: there must exist empirical tests that could decisively
refute it.’ Now, Popper’s demarcation criterion has received a fair amount
of criticism. Because our deﬁnition of the objectivity of science is so similar to
Popper’s demarcation criterion for science, the points of critique that apply to
his demarcation criterion apply to our deﬁnition of the objectivity of science
 Popper : .
 Gorham : -.
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just as well. For this reason I will discuss the main objection against Popper’s
view. Which are the objections against his view?
e biggest objection seems to be that science possibly does not work the
way Popper describes. As Gorham writes:
Historians of science have been quick to point out that science simply does not work
the way Popper envisions. Most importantly, otherwise valuable theories are not re-
jected simply because they have some false content.
Gorham explains that even though anomalies have been observed, the big
bang theory has not simply been abandoned by scientists for this reason. e
reason why actual scientists do not follow Popper’s ‘strict falsiﬁcationism’
is twofold according to Gorham: (i) ‘alternative theories with comparable
explanatory power are not easy to come by’ and (ii) ‘sticking with an existing
theory despite its ﬂaws even when this requires ad hoc repairs in the short
run, can sometimes prove an excellent strategy over the long haul.’ Now, it
may be the case that science de facto does not function as Popper describes,
i.e. as it ought to function. However, that does not mean that his theory is
false, but rather that he is describing ideal science instead of actual science.
Moreover, it seems that the two reasons mentioned to prefer actual science
over ideal science are not very good either. It might be the case that Popper is
committed to abandon a theory before ﬁnding an alternative theory with the
same explanatory power and it might be the case that Popper is committed
to abandoning a theory as soon as it is ﬂawed. But we are not so committed
simply given our deﬁnition of the objectivity of science. How can we respond
to objections (i) and (ii)?
Regarding (i) it should be noted that, given our deﬁnition of the objectivity
of science, it merely should be possible to falsify a theory and replace it with
a better one if the latter theory matches the observations better than the old
one. I don’t claim that we should abandon a theory right away if there is not a
better one with which to replace it. Regarding (ii) a similar point can be made:
naturally, the theory that best matches the data should be preferred and an old
theory should be abandoned only if there is a better one with which to replace
it. If there is not a better theory with which to replace the old theory, then I
would agree to stick with the old theory. If there is a better theory with which
 Ibid.: .
 As Gorham calls it.
 Gorham : .
 Ibid.
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to replace the old theory, then it seems false that it would be better to stick
with the old theory (since the ‘better’ theory is per deﬁnition better).
e main gist of Popper’s demarcation criterion for science seems tenable
and our deﬁnition of the objectivity of science certainly seems to be. Gorham
also thinks that Popper’s main idea is right:
If a theory is absolutely immune to empirical challenge then it cannot be a serious
contender in the scientiﬁc enterprise. And this I take to be the core insight of Popper.
But although we will expect a science to involve empirically testable, mathematically
precise, logically coherent explanations of natural systems, diﬀerent sciences will ex-
emplify these virtues in varying degrees.
e fact that our deﬁnition of the objectivity of science is so similar to Popper’s
demarcation criterion for science is thus not a problem, despite the fact that
Popper’s demarcation criterion has been criticized.
We said before that what is involved in science is (i) theorizing and (ii)
experimentation. Now how are both these aspects of science objective, ac-
cording to deﬁnition (O)? eorizing is objective in the sense that sentences
used in a scientiﬁc theory need to be such that they can be checked by other
scientists. is requires that the sentences used in scientiﬁc theories do not
depend in any way on the scientist as a person, only on the results of his or
her research.
e second part of science, experimentation or scientiﬁc experiments, is
objective in the sense that any experiments can be done by more than one
person, i.e. there should be nothing unique about the scientists who do them,
and these scientists would presumably come to the same conclusions. is
means that anyone who has access to the data of scientiﬁc research, who has
the required skills and knowledge (e.g. of logic and math), and who has the
relevant textbooks, can do the science and arrive at the same conclusions.at
means that any scientist can, and would, formulate the same theory based on
the same research data and it also means that any scientist could verify the
truth of the sentences used in a theory of a diﬀerent scientist.
But can really anyone using reason, math and logic verify claims made in
scientiﬁc theories? It seems that this person, or this scientist, does need tomeet
a number of criteria, some of which were mentioned before, such as having
access to research data, possessing knowledge of math and logic, possessing
the required textbook knowledge and so on. Quine has said this also:
e scientiﬁc community is no private club. In principle, and in the best and broad-
est sense of the words, scientiﬁc inquiry can be undertaken by anyone on almost
 Ibid.: .
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any subject matter. Practically speaking, such inquiry often demands a vast fund
of background knowledge and a sizable team of cooperating inquirers, not to men-
tion sophisticated equipment; this is because human knowledge has already pro-
gressed so far. But at root what is needed for scientiﬁc inquiry is just receptivity
to data, skill in reasoning, and yearning for truth. Admittedly, ingenuity can help
too.
ere are a number of obvious objections against the idea that anyone could
arrive at the same scientiﬁc conclusions and verify scientiﬁc theories. First,
what about the past and future? It seems that there are truths about the past
and future that science cannot establish. Second, the magnitude of the task
would prevent any person from establishing truths about, e.g. the number
of blades of grass on the earth. ird, there is problem with particularity: a
scientist does not know how many books I have in my oﬃce, but there is
a fact to the matter and so there is a true proposition about the number of
books in my oﬃce. Fourth, location is an issue: location issues would prevent
any person from establishing truths about, e.g. the number of stars in the
universe.
ese objections can all be countered by adding the following clause. Any
person using the methods of science could tell us what is true, given that
there are no restrictions on: location, time, equipment, resources, number of
scientists, and assuming scientists are ‘proper functioning’. From now on, I
will call a scientist who meets all these criteria the, or an, ‘ideal scientist’.
With these qualiﬁcations in place, scientists could tell us all and only what
is true – but could they? Does the fact that the scientiﬁc method is objective
limit which entities scientiﬁc theories can be about?
As we have seen, entities that are unproblematic for the methodological
naturalist include mathematical objects, possibly universals and possibly pos-
sible worlds.ere may be other entities, possibly many more, over which sci-
entiﬁc theories can quantify without any problem. But what about the entities
we are most interested in: subjective experiences? Can they exist according to
the methodological naturalist?
Well if experience is subjective, then sentences which quantify over expe-
riences are not publicly veriﬁable. is point was made in one of the passages
we’ve seen above about scientist A and scientist B, to repeat:
If A’s protocol is about physical objects, it can in principle be checked by B, and so
is inter-subjective, If, however, A’s protocol is about A’s private sensations, then A’s
protocol cannot be checked by B.
 Quine : -.
 Gillies : .
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is means that there cannot be a scientiﬁc theory about experiences. After
all, statements (or ‘protocol’) about experiences cannot be veriﬁed by the
ideal scientist, because the experiences that these statements are about are not
intersubjectively available. As we have seen, statements that cannot be veriﬁed
by the ideal scientist cannot be part of a scientiﬁc theory. Since the only
things that exist are things that our scientiﬁc theories can quantify over (as we
have seen inQuine), experiences cannot exist according to themethodological
naturalist. Methodological naturalism is thus a limited view: it excludes the
existence of experiences because they are subjective in the senses we speciﬁed
in the ﬁrst chapter.
It might seem that the existence of universals, sets and numbers is a coun-
terexample against this deﬁnition of the objectivity of science. If there cannot
be scientiﬁc theories about experiences because experiences are subjective and
thus cannot be quantiﬁed over in scientiﬁc sentences which means that these
scientiﬁc sentences could then not be conﬁrmed by other scientists, then
what about these other immaterial entities? Even though this might initially
seem like a good counterexample, in fact, it is not. Experiences might be
immaterial, just as universals, sets and numbers, but the diﬀerence is that
universals, sets and numbers are entities that we are all acquainted with – if
we know the concepts that refer to them. Everyone who knows the relevant
concepts is acquainted with the number  and with ‘redness’. ese objects
might be immaterial, but they are not subjective in the sense that experiences
are. Universals, sets and numbers are intersubjectively available. Experiences,
though they are possibly also immaterial, are not intersubjectively available,
as we have seen in the ﬁrst chapter.
In the next chapter, I will discuss in much more detail whether the subjec-
tivity of experience is compatible with methodological naturalism or not. As
I just brieﬂy pointed out, there seems to be an incompatibility here: if science
tells us which things exist, according to methodological naturalism, and there
cannot be any scientiﬁc theories about experiences because they are subjective,
then subjective experiences cannot be said to exist for the methodological
naturalist. Methodological naturalism is thus limited in this way. Moreover,
if it is true that experiences do exist, as we argued in the second chapter,
and if it is true that they are subjective, as we argued in the ﬁrst chapter,
then methodological naturalism is false. is goes very fast, but in the next
chapter I will closely look at each deﬁnition of the subjectivity of experience
individually and determine whether that sense of the subjectivity of experience
is incompatible with methodological naturalism.
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In this chapter, we have discussed methodological naturalism. First, we dis-
cussed the deﬁnitions of methodological naturalism that we found in the
previous chapter. We decided that, even though they can be divided into
two groups, ideal-physics naturalism and scientiﬁc naturalism, ideal-physics
naturalism can easily be subsumed under scientiﬁc naturalism. Second, we
considered whether a distinction should be made between naturalism as
a thesis or a view on the one hand and naturalism as a stance or a re-
search program on the other hand. Similar to our conclusion for the case
of epistemological naturalism, we decided that the reference to the scien-
tiﬁc method is crucial and the speciﬁc epistemic attitude one takes toward
it, be it an inclination to accept, disposition to accept, or commitment to,
is (even though there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence there) of secondary impor-
tance.
We then moved on to the question whether the kind of methodological
naturalism that we formulated is in fact a tenable and credible position. In
the previous chapter, we established that there is no kind of metaphysical
naturalism that is tenable, so this is an important question to ask. In or-
der to answer this question, we discussed a number of problems that rise
as soon as one tries to formulate the position of methodological natural-
ism. We focused on methodological naturalism’s biggest threat: Hempel’s
dilemma. We concluded that, even though this is a serious issue, there is
a way to sidestep it so that we can still work with the formulation of nat-
uralism as we found it. We continued to discuss two lesser problems for
methodological naturalism that also arise as soon as one tries to formulate
this position but concluded that methodological naturalism is still a tenable
position.
Now that we established that methodological naturalism is a tenable po-
sition, we asked what its ontological consequences are. After all, in the next
chapter we want to consider whethermethodological naturalism is compatible
with subjectivity. is is why the next part of this chapter was devoted to the
relationship between metaphysical naturalism and methodological natural-
ism. First we asked the question whether methodological naturalism implies
metaphysical naturalism (physicalism or materialism). We then focused on
the speciﬁc ontological implications methodological naturalism has. is led
us to a discussion of science and the scientiﬁc method and of a crucial aspect
of science, namely publicity, objectivity or intersubjectivity. We discussed this
aspect of science and the ontological implications it has. We concluded that,
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according to methodological naturalism, the only (kinds of ) things that exist
are public or intersubjectively available.
e formulation of naturalism that we found in this chapter is the one
that we will work with in the next chapter, Chapter . ere, we will consider
whether the phenomenon of subjectivity, as we have found it in Chapter , is
compatible with methodological naturalism.
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Are Subjectivity and Naturalism
Compatible?
e aim of this chapter is to establish whether the subjectivity of experience
is compatible with naturalism, and, if it is incompatible, to explain just why
and how it is. We are in a good position to answer these questions. In the
ﬁrst chapter, we found several deﬁnitions of subjective-making properties that
experience has if there is such a thing as experience. In the second chapter, we
argued that in fact there is such a thing as experience or, to be more precise,
that there are token as well as type experiences. en, in the third chapter,
we argued that a distinction can be made between metaphysical naturalism
on the one hand and methodological naturalism on the other hand. We con-
tinued to argue that all versions of metaphysical naturalism can be refuted,
so if naturalism is to be a tenable position at all, it should be methodological
naturalism. In the fourth chapter, we then focused on methodological natu-
ralism and concluded that despite problems of its own, it is in fact a tenable
position. Finally, we addressed the question which ontological consequences
methodological naturalism has and found that it at least seems to be that case
that there is an initial incompatibility betweenmethodological naturalism and
the subjectivity of experience. In this chapter, I will discuss each of the ﬁve
senses in which we found experience to be subjective, which we discussed in
the ﬁrst chapter, and for each of these I will analyze whether it is compatible
with the theory of naturalism.
Since we found ﬁve deﬁnitions of subjectivity, I will be discussing ﬁve pos-
sible cases of (in)compatibility in ﬁve subsequent sections. In the ﬁrst section
of this chapter, section ., I will discuss the (in)compatibility of deﬁnition
(S) with methodological naturalism.
In section ., I will discuss the (in)compatibility of deﬁnition (S), which
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we found in Nagel’s work, and methodological naturalism, which will lead to
a discussion of the ‘argument from perspective’, section .., the knowledge
argument, section .., and Nagel’s own argument against physicalism, sec-
tion ... is section is not just about Nagel’s work, but also concerns the
idea that experiences are ‘perspectival’, which we have found in the work of
e.g. Farkas and Searle.
en, in section ., the (in)compatibility between (S) and methodolog-
ical naturalism will be discussed, focusing on what I call ‘the argument from
privacy’. Next, section . will be about the (in)compatibility of (S) with
methodological naturalism, which will lead to a brief discussion about the
kind of knowledge we have of our experiences. en, in section ., I will
discuss the last subjective-making property that we found, (S), which raises
the most straightforward and obvious (potential) dualist argument against
methodological naturalism, viz. that there are immaterial persons.
As I will show in this chapter, at least three deﬁnitions of subjectivity are
incompatible with naturalism. at means that, if the arguments are sound
and the accounts of subjectivity and of naturalism are correct, then the sub-
jectivity of experience is incompatible with naturalism.
Before concluding the chapter, I will consider a number of objections
against the arguments for the claim that naturalism and the subjectivity of
experience are incompatible. I will ﬁrst consider the objections from Lycan,
who has argued that even though subjectivity is a genuine phenomenon, there
is no noteworthy incompatibility between this phenomenon and naturalism
and subjectivity does not pose a threat to naturalism in any way. I will analyze
Lycan’s arguments and oﬀer replies to them. I will go on to consider a second
kind of objection, viz., that despite appearances, experiences are intersubjec-
tively available and therefore not problematic for methodological naturalism.
is objection stems from the identity theory of mind, which I will discuss in
section ...
Section . concerns a topic along the same lines as section .: here I
will discuss alternative approaches to the claims of incompatibility that are
made in the previous sections of this chapter.ese are not extreme alternative
approaches such as denying the existence of subjective experience or adopting
dualism but alternative approaches that the methodological naturalist could
possibly adopt. I will discuss Chrisley’s alternative interpretation of the con-
cept of ‘objectivity’ as ‘intersubjectivity’, Velmans’ similar endeavor, and the
theory of ‘subjective physicalism’ by Howell.
Finally, in section ., I will summarize this chapter and draw conclusions.
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In this section, I will look at the following deﬁnition of the subjectivity of
experience and discuss whether this deﬁnition is a problem formethodological
naturalism:
(S) E is subjective=df. For all subjects S, if S has E, then there is
something it is like for S to have E.
As we established before, to say that there is something it is like for someone
to have an experience is just to say that experience has phenomenal char-
acter. Is it compatible with methodological naturalism to hold that there is
something it is like to have experiences or, in other words, that experience has
phenomenal character? In the previous chapter we found that methodological
naturalism is the theory that science tells us which things exist. We also found
that scientiﬁc statements need to be objective, meaning that they should be
capable of tests performed by other scientists. Every scientiﬁc statement thus
needs to be such that anyone (any other scientist) could verify it. is, in
turn, means that scientiﬁc statements can only quantify over objects that
are intersubjectively available. For if they quantify over objects that are not
intersubjectively available, then these ‘scientiﬁc’ statements could not be ver-
iﬁed by any other scientist and would therefore cease to be scientiﬁc. If there
cannot be a scientiﬁc theory about something, then, since science provides
us with the truth and the whole truth, this ‘thing’ does not exist. erefore,
for anything to exist, according to methodological naturalism, it should be
intersubjectively available – meaning that it is observable and/or veriﬁable
by any person satisfying the criteria described in Chapter , i.e. by the ideal
scientist.
e question we want to answer in this section is whether or not the
fact that experience has phenomenal character, or qualia, is compatible with
methodological naturalism or not.is obviously depends on the fact whether
phenomenal character is intersubjectively available. Since (S) doesn’t make
any claims about whether or not phenomenal character is intersubjectively
available, (S), taken at face value, is not obviously incompatible with nat-
uralism; however, it could be. Under which conditions would (S) be in-
compatible with naturalism? (S) would be incompatible with naturalism if
phenomenal character would not be intersubjectively available. For example,
if phenomenal character is essentially connected to a single point of view,
(S), which can be interpreted such that only those people who have had an
experience with certain phenomenal character can know what it is like to have
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that experience (S0), then phenomenal character would not be intersubjec-
tively available. at means that if (S0) is true, then phenomenal character
would not be intersubjectively available and (S) would be incompatible with
methodological naturalism, in virtue of having the further subjective-making
property (S) or (S0). us, whether or not (S) is incompatible with natu-
ralism depends on whether (S0) is true and on whether (S) is incompatible
with naturalism (which it seems to be). I can see no other way in which (S)
would be incompatible with naturalism except for the reason that the further
property (S) would make it so incompatible. ere is thus no further need
to discuss (S), so I will move on by discussing (S) in the next section.
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In this section, I will discuss whether or not the following way in which
experience is subjective is compatible with methodological naturalism:
(S) E is subjective =df. E is essentially connected to a single point
of view.
As we will soon ﬁnd out, (S) is, in fact, incompatible with methodological
naturalism. is means that an argument against methodological naturalism
can be formulated based on this incompatibility. In section .., I will ex-
plain why (S) and methodological naturalism are incompatible and I will
formulate an argument against methodological naturalism based on this. In
the remainder of this section, two important questions need to be addressed.
First, is this argument the same argument as the knowledge argument or is it
diﬀerent? I will address this question in section ... Second, is this argument
the same as Nagel’s argument or not? I will address this question in ...
.. Argument from Perspective
e question we want to answer in this section is whether the subjectivity of
experience, as deﬁned by (S), is incompatible with methodological natural-
ism or not. We have a good grasp now of (S) and its implications. To recall,
methodological naturalism entails that for anything to exist it has to be inter-
subjectively available. Are subjectivity, as deﬁned by (S), and methodological
naturalism, as deﬁned in Chapter , compatible?
If one interprets ‘being essentially connected to a single point of view’
(S) in the sense of (PV), i.e. ‘one can only know what it is like to have
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an experience with phenomenal character if one has had an experience with
suﬃciently similar phenomenal character’, i.e. as (S0), then experience and
phenomenal character are not intersubjectively available. After all, in that
case one can only know what it is like to have an experience with particular
phenomenal character if one has had the experience. Someone who has not
had a particular experience with its particular phenomenal character cannot
know what it is like to have that experience. Knowledge of what it is like
to have experiences is thus only available to some, not to all. at means
that experiences and phenomenal character are not intersubjectively available
according to (S0). And this, in turn, means that (S0) is incompatible with
naturalism.
Since there is an incompatibility between (S0) and methodological nat-
uralism, we can formulate an argument against naturalism. Here is the argu-
ment, based on the incompatibility described in the previous paragraph, in a
more formal way:
Argument from Perspective
. If methodological naturalism is true, then every true statement is
veriﬁable by an ideal scientist. [Chapter ]
. Possibly, there is an ideal scientist who does not know what it is
like to have some PV-experience.
. If an ideal scientist cannot know what it is like to have some PV-
experience, then there is at least one true statement that an ideal
scientist cannot verify.
. erefore, methodological naturalism is false. [, , ]
Let’s go over this argument a little more slowly.We argued for the ﬁrst premise
in the previous chapter and established that indeed, if methodological natu-
ralism is true, then any statement should be veriﬁable by an ideal scientist. We
have not discussed the second premise yet, but it seems pretty straightforward
that it is true. After all, it seems possible that there is a person who satisﬁes all
the criteria speciﬁed in Chapter , i.e. an ideal scientist, but who does and/or
could not know what it is like to have a particular experience. Which things
does the ideal scientist not know? Are there any things that the ideal scientist
could not know?
As for the ﬁrst possibility, it seems that there is not anyone, including an
ideal scientist, who has had every single experience one could possibly have.
In fact, it seems impossible for there to be such a person in ordinary life. But
since our scientist is not restricted in time and location and since there is no
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limit either on the size of his team of other ideal scientists, it seems that it
is not impossible for him to have every single possible experience, though it
does seem very unlikely. Since there are so many possible experiences we can
still easily imagine a team of ideal scientists who have not had a particular
experience, such as, for example, the experience of ‘buttering toast in the
White House’. Of course, they could have that experience, but it is possible
(even likely) that de facto they have not had it and therefore do not knowwhat
it is like to have it. So, it is possible that the ideal scientist does not know what
it is like to have some PV-experience. But are there PV-experiences which the
ideal scientist could not have?
Obviously, there are not so many cases of experiences that the ideal sci-
entist could not have, compared to the experiences that the ideal scientist has
not had. But are there any cases of experiences at all that the ideal scientist
could not have? e examples are not so plenty here, but there are a few. In
what follows, I will describe three categories of PV-experiences that the ideal
scientist cannot have. e ﬁrst category of experiences contains experiences
of a diﬀerent species. For example, the ideal scientist could not know what it
is like for a bat to hang upside down in the attic, or what it is like for a bee to
make honey. So, the ideal scientist could not know what experiences of other
species are like and he could never have those experiences.
e second category of experiences of which the ideal scientist could not
know what they’re like are experiences of infants. Granted, the ideal scientist
was once an infant, but is not an infant anymore and – presumably – does
not remember much from being an infant a long time ago. is means that
the ideal scientist cannot know what it is like for an infant to be, for example,
separated from the mother.
e third category of experiences whichmight be problematic for the ideal
scientist is that of, let’s call it, ‘acquired taste’. A wine connoisseur has a much
more reﬁned palate than the average wine-drinker and we can expect the con-
noisseur and the average drinker to have a very diﬀerent experience of tasting
wine. We can assume that the average wine-drinker has, in turn, a diﬀerent
experience of tasting wine than the beginning wine-drinker who would, for
example, not recognize the kind of wine by its taste and who certainly does
not have the phenomenal concepts that the connoisseur applies to it. Where
the connoisseur might distinguish the smell of subtle spice aromas and a hint
of butter, the average wine-drinker may only recognize it is a Chardonnay
and the new wine-drinker might just think ‘so this is what wine tastes like’.
Now, the issue is that our ideal scientist, when tasting wine, needs to be
positioned somewhere on the scale between the connoisseur, the average wine-
drinker and the beginner. But this means that whatever position she takes, she
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necessarily does not take any of the other positions and could not possible take
them. After all, the wine connoisseur cannot remember or imagine anymore
what it was (or would be) like to have wine for the ﬁrst time: she cannot help
but picking up on the subtle spice aromas and the taste of butter. You cannot
turn acquired taste ‘oﬀ’. is is not just a problem for wine-tasting, but for all
our senses there is a degree to which we can be more or less of a ‘connoisseur’.
Some people have a much more developed olfactory capacity than others,
others have a gift for hearing and can play music after just having heard it
once, and it is often said that blind people hear much better than people who
can see. Everyone, for all senses, is positioned on a scale between connoisseur
and beginner, including the ideal scientist. is means many experiences are
excluded from the ideal scientist per deﬁnition and she can never know, for
example, what it is like to have a very good nose, or to be tone-deaf, or to hear
even the faintest sound.
e fourth category of experiences is the one of past contingencies. Let
me explain. Jill, who fell from the swing set as a child, might a while later (or
forever) have a diﬀerent experience of going on a swing set than Jack, who
has only ever had fun going on the swing set. Whereas this is fun for Jack,
for Jill there is something scary about it that never quite goes away. Or take
the following example. You have a curry dish containing a lot of cumin and
coincidentally that night you get a fever and fall very sick. In the future, the
smell of cumin might make you feel sick because of its association with the
fever you developed the night you had cumin before. For someone else, cumin
might smell wonderful, and for yet someone else it might remind them of a
place where they once traveled, or a restaurant they visited. e issue is that
our ideal scientist will have her own associations with experiences based on the
contingencies of her past. is also means that there are plenty of associations
and past experiences that she does not have and cannot have or know.
We can conclude that there are at least some experiences that even an
ideal scientist could not have and of which they could not know what these
experiences are like. is means that the second premise of the argument is
also true. e third premise simply states that if it is the case that an ideal
scientist cannot know what it is like to have some PV-experience, then there
is at least one true statement that an ideal scientist cannot verify. is premise
clearly seems true, after all, the ideal scientist could not verify statements
about experiences which she has not had and cannot have. is means that
the argument from perspective against methodological naturalism is sound.
ere are two questions I want to address in the remainder of this section:
Is this argument the same argument as the knowledge argument? And is this
argument the same as Nagel’s argument?
   
.. e Knowledge Argument
An important question that needs to be addressed is whether the argument
against naturalism based on (S), which we discussed in the previous section,
is the same argument as the knowledge argument. I will discuss this matter in
the present section.
e knowledge argument has been a topic of great dispute as the main
focus of the qualia debate. Jackson famously introduced it in the form of his
thought experiment aboutMary the brilliant neuroscientist. Mary has always
been conﬁned to living in a black-and-white roomwith a black-and-white TV
and (we’ll assume) without any windows. She has even always been painted
with black and white paint all over. As a neuroscientist, Mary knows all there
is to know about the physical nature of the world, including the workings
of human perception, the physics of light rays and colors, the working of
the human retina, the biological working of the eyes and so forth. One ﬁne
day Mary is released from her black-and-white room and sees a red ﬂower
for the ﬁrst time. Now, many people have the intuition that Mary learns
something new upon seeing a red ﬂower for the ﬁrst time, even though she
knew everything there is to know about the nature of the physical world. An
expression that might approximately capture what she just learned could be:
‘this is what it is like to see red’. In other words: Mary would learn what it
is like to have an experience of seeing red. Now, if it would be the case that
Mary would learn something new and if it also would be the case that she
already knew everything physical there was to know about the natural world,
then this would mean that all the physical information or, all the physical
knowledge, leaves something out. If this is true, it would seriously undermine
the theory of physicalism.
Now the question is whether the knowledge argument is the same argu-
ment as our argument from perspective? If (S) is interpreted in the sense
of (PV), i.e. if (S) is interpreted as (S0), I think that these arguments are
very similar. According to (S0), what it is like to have a particular experience
E can only be known if one has had experience E, which is also what the
knowledge argument contends. One can only know what it is like to see red
if one has seen red. Even if one would posses all knowledge of the physical
world, like Mary does, having an experience of actually seeing red will add
to this knowledge, which means that the knowledge was incomplete before
the experience of seeing red. e argument from (S0) is thus very similar to
the knowledge argument. is means that it is very likely that this argument
 Jackson .
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is susceptible to all the same objections as the knowledge argument. Which
objections have been raised against the knowledge argument?
In order to systematically discuss the objections against the knowledge ar-
gument, which also apply to the argument from (S0), it helps to formalize the
argument. Stoljar and Nagasawa present a version of the logical structure of
Jackson’s knowledge argument. Jackson himself has called this reconstruction
to be ‘convenient and accurate’. is is what it looks like:
Knowledge Argument
. Mary (before her release) knows everything physical there is to
know about other people.
. Mary (before her release) does not know everything there is to know
about other people (because she learns something new about them
on being released).
. erefore, there are truths about other people (and herself ) that
escape the physicalist story.
Over the years, many kinds of physicalist replies to the knowledge argument
have been proﬀered. ese are strategies that are supposed to deny or avoid
the conclusion of the knowledge argument and at the same time explain the
dualist intuition it triggers. Van Gulick has organized these physicalist and
naturalist responses around a number of questions in his paper “So many
ways of saying no toMary”. In what follows, I will stick to his categorization;
however, I will do so in terms of statements rather than in terms of questions
(as Van Gulick does). Here are the responses as organized by Van Gulick in
short:
. Mary does not learn anything new after release from her black-and-
white room.
. Mary only gains know-how.
. Even though Mary learns something new after her release, this is
not factual learning.is means that Mary does not learn new facts
and/or propositions but merely old facts or propositions in a new
way.
 In fact two formalizations are presented. I am here sticking to the ﬁrst one.
 In Stoljar and Nagasawa : . And: Jackson : .
 Stoljar and Nagasawa : -.
 Van Gulick .
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. Mary only learns a new proposition on a ﬁne-grained mode of
individuation, which means that physicalism is not refuted.
Since these objections all apply to the argument from (S0), I will brieﬂy
discuss each of these responses. I will describe them and explain which premise
of the argument they reject.
e ﬁrst physicalist response to the knowledge argument is that Mary does
not learn anything new after her release. Why does Mary not learn anything
new, according to this strategy? Because she already knew everything there was
to know about experience by way of her ‘physical knowledge’, and there was
nothing to learn from having the experience itself at all. is strategy denies
the second premise of the argument, which is that Mary did not yet know
everything there was to know before her release. For example, Churchland
thinks that Mary does not learn anything new at all upon release out of her
black-and-white room.
e second response to the knowledge argument, according to which
Mary only gains know-how, is called the ability hypothesis. Philosophers who
defend the ability hypothesis are, among others: Lewis, Nemirow and the new
Jackson. ese philosophers deny that Mary gains propositional knowledge,
or any substantial kind of knowledge, but think that her experience merely en-
ables her to recognize similar experiences (say, of seeing red objects) in the fu-
ture and to apply the right concepts (in this case ‘red’) to the appropriate expe-
riences. On this account, Mary does gain something but it is not the case that
physicalism leaves anything out. What Mary learns or gains is merely a tool
for color or experience recognition and concept application which helps her
to organize her experiences and to develop strategies for doing so in the future.
According to the third strategy, Mary just learns old propositions in a new
way. Philosophers who think that Mary just learns old propositions in a new
way are, among others: Tye, Horgan and Papineau. ere are at least three
ways in which this third strategy, that Mary learns an old fact in a new way,
can be spelled out. ese subjectivity-strategies do not occur on Van Gulick’s
list, but are helpful to consider anyway. Here they are:
a. Mary only gains knowledge by acquaintance.
b.Mary only gains a new phenomenal concept.
 After Van Gulick : , ﬁgure ..
 Churchland .
 e ‘new Jackson’ represents Jackson after his change of mind concerning the knowledge
argument, cf. Ludlow, Nagasawa, Stoljar (eds.). .
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c. Mary only acquires a feeling of what it is like to have a particular
experience.
Strategy a is a popular strategy. According to it, Mary does gain new knowl-
edge, but this is not propositional knowledge, but knowledge by acquaintance.
is would mean that the propositional physical information or knowledge
about the natural world is complete, after all: there is no propositional knowl-
edge that Mary lacks. All Mary lacks is knowledge by acquaintance and that
makes sense since she has never had the experience of seeing red before. It is
generally accepted that the only way to get knowledge of acquaintance of a
particular experience is by having (had) that experience.
Strategy b is also a very popular strategy, which is defended by, for ex-
ample, Papineau in his book inking about Consciousness. e idea of this
strategy is that Mary does not gain any physical propositional knowledge but
all she gains is a phenomenal concept. is means that Mary does gain new
knowledge, but only new knowledge of old facts. But what is this phenom-
enal concept? A phenomenal concept is a concept that one acquires from
experience which enables one to recognize the phenomenal character of an
experience. When Mary sees red for the ﬁrst time she gains a phenomenal
concept, which enables her to recognize what it is like to see red when she
sees red again in the future.
Strategy c is the strategy of philosophers who think that the existence of
qualia is in fact compatible with methodological naturalism, often holding
that ‘what it is like’ to have experiences does not contain any propositional
content. ‘What it is like’ is just some ‘feeling’ that comes with having expe-
riences. If it is the case that ‘this feeling’ exists and if it couldn’t be part of a
physicalist account, then still nothing substantial would be left out of such a
physicalist account.
e fourth strategy, that Mary learns something new that nevertheless
does not entail that physicalism is false, is among others defended by Lycan
() and Loar ().e idea here is that propositions can be individuated
in diﬀerent ways: ﬁne-grained or coarse-grained. Coarse-grained propositions
are functions from possible worlds to truth-values. Propositions expressed by
the sentences ‘+=’ and ‘+=’ are the same proposition under this inter-
pretation since both propositions are true in every possible world. However, if
one uses a ﬁne-grained mode of individuation, then two propositions are only
identical if their constituent structures match.e structure of propositions is
determined by the concepts that they are made up of. Now, ifMary only learns
 Papineau .
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a new proposition on the ﬁne-grained mode of individuation of propositions,
then this does not entail that physicalism is false. Mary can simply have ac-
quired a new concept, but, on a coarse-grained interpretation, the proposition
she learns would still be identical to a proposition that is (and was) part of her
physical knowledge.
We have seen a number of prominent kinds of objections against the
knowledge argument. Naturally, many kinds of replies have been oﬀered to
counter these objections. Since it would take too much time and space to
respond to all these objections and counter-objections, I think what we should
say here is this. Whether or not (S0) is compatible with methodological nat-
uralism, in the end, depends on the outcome of the qualia debate in which
the knowledge argument, these objections and the replies are all discussed.
Possibly, the knowledge argument is a problem for naturalism and, if it is,
(S0) is so as well. But because there is a huge debate and amount of literature
out there discussing exactly this, I proﬀer we move on and see if the other
senses in which experiences are subjective are a problem for naturalism or
not.
Before concluding this section, we need to address the question how the
qualia debate exactly relates to the debate about subjectivity.e qualia debate
is part of the debate about subjectivity. e debate about subjectivity is a frag-
mented debate, since the term ‘subjectivity’ is so vague and interpreted in so
many diﬀerent ways (as we have seen in Chapter ). One interpretation of the
subjectivity of experience is that the subjective-making property of experience
is identical to the experience’s phenomenal character. If the subjectivity of
experience should be understood as the phenomenal character of experience,
and not in any other way, then the debates would be the same. However,
it seems that the term ‘subjectivity’ of experience is broader and can also be
understood in all the other ways that we have discussed in Chapter . e
debate about subjectivity is thus broader and more encompassing: it includes
the qualia debate, but also includes many other debates, viz. the ones that will
be the topics of the next sections.
However, it should be pointed out that not everyone agrees with this
position and there has been discussion about the question whether the phe-
nomenal character of experience and the subjectivity of experience are in fact
the same properties of experience. Even though I think that they are not,
since ‘subjectivity of experience’ is also used to refer to diﬀerent properties
of experience, I want to mention a couple of the diﬀerent positions that are
taken with respect to this issue. Here are two opposed visions.
According to Georgalis () qualia and subjectivity are diﬀerent:
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I illustrate and oppose an almost universal tendency, even among widely divergent
theorists of mind, to conﬂate consciousness or subjectivity, on the one hand, with
phenomenal experience, on the other. Of course it is true that phenomenal experi-
ence is subjective and (if not always, often) conscious. My point is that subjectivity
and consciousness do not occur only in phenomenal experience; they are as strongly
implicated in intentionality.
Georgalis’ point is that phenomenal experience is subjective, but we should
not identify experience’s phenomenal character with its subjectivity, since
not only experience but also other phenomena, such as intentionality, are
subjective. is is a good reason to think that phenomenal character should
be distinguished from the subjective-making property of experience, since
intentionality might not have phenomenal character, but is subjective also.
However, according to for example Searle, qualia and the subjectivity of
experience are one and the same property of experience:
But of course, all conscious phenomena are qualitative, subjective experiences, and
hence are qualia. ere are not two types of phenomena, consciousness and qualia.
ere is just consciousness, which is a series of qualitative states.
As this passage makes clear, Searle does not only think that the subjectivity
of experience is identical to its phenomenal character but he thinks that con-
sciousness simpliciter, or experiences simpliciter, are identical to qualia. To
repeat, he thinks that experiences are identical to their phenomenal character.
Now, I have already made clear what I think of the matter, which is that
phenomenal character is one way to understand what it means for experience
to be subjective but not necessarily the only or the right way. ere are other
ways in which we understand and use the term ‘subjectivity of experience’,
which I will address in the next few sections. But before moving on to the next
deﬁnition of experience, we need to address one more important question,
viz. is the argument from (S0) the same argument as Nagel’s argument? I will
answer this question in the next section.
.. Nagel’s Argument
Another important question that needs to be addressed is whether the argu-
ment from perspective is the same argument as Nagel’s argument, or if these
arguments are diﬀerent. e present section concerns this matter.
 Georgalis : .
 Searle : .
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Nagel thinks that the fact that experience is subjective in the sense that
(S) spells out causes the subjectivity of experience to be incompatible with
physicalism. Nagel formulates an argument against physicalism based on
this incompatibility and in the following I’ll discuss Nagel’s argument and
then see if it is the same argument as the argument from perspective.
In short, Nagel’s argument is that the physicalist cannot fully grasp or
understand experiences, since the program of physicalism is committed to
achieving an objectivist view on reality, which necessarily leaves any particular
point of view behind. Since experiences can only be fully grasped from a
particular, subjective point of view, the physicalist will never be able to in-
clude subjective experience in its account of reality. Here is Nagel’s argument
reconstructed in a more formal form.
Nagel’s Argument
. e physicalist view of reality is an objective view of reality. [as-
sumption]
. An objective view of reality cannot include particular points of
view. [assumption]
. erefore, the physicalist view of reality cannot include particular
points of view. [, ]
. An account of experience can be given only from particular points
of view. [assumption]
. erefore, the physicalist view of reality cannot give an account of
experience. [, ]
In order to be able to answer the question whether this argument is the
same argument as the argument from perspective, which we discussed in
section .., we need to understand each premise of Nagel’s argument and
the terms that he uses in it.
e ﬁrst premise is that ‘the physicalist view of reality is an objective view
of reality’. What does Nagel mean by an ‘objective view’ of reality, which he
sometimes also calls ‘an objectivist view’? An objective view of reality, or an
objectivist view, is a view of reality that leaves behind any particular point of
view. According to Nagel, objectivity is a ‘method of understanding’:
 I will discuss whether Nagel’s physicalism is suﬃciently similar to methodological natural-
ism below.
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To acquire a more objective understanding of some aspect of life or the world, we step
back from our initial view of it and form a new conception which has that view and
its relation to the world as its object. 
And:
A view or form of thought is more objective than another if it relies less on the speciﬁcs
of the individual’s make-up and position in the world, or on the character of the
particular type of creature he is.
According to Nagel, physicalism is a view that aims to achieve an objective
understanding of the world. Since Nagel uses the term ‘physicalism’ and we
have been talking about methodological naturalism, we need to pause for a
moment to see what Nagel’s claim means in our terms. Is Nagel’s physicalism
suﬃciently similar to our methodological naturalism? According to Nagel,
physicalism is ‘committed to achieving an objectivist view on reality, which
necessarily leaves any particular point of view behind.’ Is this kind of phys-
icalism similar to our methodological naturalism? We can clearly see that it
is. After all, our methodological naturalism requires, in similar fashion, that
for anything to exist it has to be intersubjectively available. is can be put
diﬀerently, but meaning the same, as a view that is ‘committed to achieving
an objectivist view on reality.’ So, according to Nagel, methodological natu-
ralism is committed to leaving behind any particular point of view, whereas
experience is very much connected to, and dependent on, a particular point
of view. Experience and its phenomenal character can therefore not be under-
stood from a methodological naturalist’s perspective and cannot be part of a
methodological naturalist’s account of the world.
e second premise of the argument is: An objective view of reality cannot
include particular points of view. We have just seen what an ‘objective view of
reality’ is, but what is a point of view again? In the ﬁrst chapter, we established
that by a ‘point of view’ Nagel does not mean a token single point of view,
i.e. the point of view of one individual, but a type point of view, i.e. a point
of view that can be taken up by several individuals. e deﬁnition according
to which subjective experience is connected to a token point of view, which
would mean that experience is private, will be discussed in the next section. A
type point of view can be taken up by more than one individual. Just which
individuals are able to take up the same point of view is a question we have
 Nagel : .
 Ibid.: .
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considered in detail in our discussion of (PV)-(PV) in the ﬁrst chapter.
(PV) seemed the best description of which individuals are able to take up
a single point of view: they have to have had an experience with the same
phenomenal character. However, it seems that Nagel’s interpretation of ‘point
of view’ is richer than (PV). What is Nagel’s interpretation of a ‘point of
view’?
In order to understand better what Nagel means by a ‘point of view’, it
will be helpful to delve a little deeper into Nagel’s idea that experience and a
single point of view are essentially connected. As we have seen in Chapter ,
this means that there is a necessary relation between experience and a point
of view: i.e. a single point of view is a necessary condition for there to be any
experience (or in other words: there cannot be experience without there being
a point of view) and experience is necessarily (and thus always) experience
from a particular point of view. It is also implied that there cannot be a point
of view without there being something it is like for someone to take up this
point of view, i.e. as soon as there is a point of view, there is something it is
like to have experiences from this point of view.
But Nagel’s claim goes even further than this. e relation between expe-
rience and a single point of view is necessary and essential in the sense that
there is nothing left of experience if you take its particular point of view away.
is might seem puzzling at ﬁrst. What does this mean exactly? Nagel puts it
this way:
It is diﬃcult to understand what could be meant by the objective character of an
experience, apart from the particular point of view from which its subject apprehends
it. After all, what would be left of what it was like to be a bat if one removed the
viewpoint of the bat?
In this passage, Nagel makes it clear that if one were to remove the viewpoint
of an organism on a particular experience, there would not be anything left
that would make that particular experience thát particular experience. Nagel
does not intend to merely make the trivial claim that without a particular
subject (with a certain point of view) this subject’s experiences would not
(have) exist(ed). at is to say: Nagel does not only think that experiences
are ontologically dependent on the subjects who have them. Nagel means to
make a much stronger claim. Not only does the existence of an experience
depend on its subject, also, and moreover, what that experience is like (in
other words, its nature) depends on the subject. It is not the case that there is
 Nagel : .
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a fact to the matter of what an experience is like that can be accessed or known
by diﬀerent subjects who diﬀer dramatically (so as to not be able to take up
the same point of view). ere is no nature an experience has independent of
being experienced. So, experiences are not only ontologically dependent on
the subjects who have them but also qualitatively.
e third premise of the argument, ‘the physicalist view of reality cannot
include particular points of view’, is not an assumption in need of justiﬁcation,
but follows from the ﬁrst and second premise together. We therefore do not
need to discuss it further. e fourth premise of the argument is: ‘An account
of experience can be given only from particular points of view.’ Why would
we think this premise is true?
Nagel thinks that even if a human being would mimic certain typically
bat-like experiences, such as hanging upside down from the attic by one’s
feet, then still, this person would only know what it is like for a human being
to have that particular experience – not what it is like for a bat. e bat and
the human being are so vastly diﬀerent, according to Nagel, that even when
they are put in similar situations so as to have maximally similar experiences,
their experiences do not even resemble one another at all. Needless to say,
our intuitions can diﬀer at this point. What is of importance here is that,
according to Nagel, experience is essentially subjective in this way, viz. in the
sense that experiences are qualitatively dependent on the subjects who have
them.
Nagel further explains the point that experience is essentially subjective by
explaining how experience is essentially not-objective, i.e. experience does not
have objective character, where ‘objective’ should be interpreted as the exact
opposite of ‘subjective’, viz. as follows:
(O) X is objective =df. X is accessible from many diﬀerent points of
view. 
Not only is experience essentially subjective; according to Nagel experience
is essentially not-objective, where ‘objective’ is deﬁned as in (O). at is
to say, experience lacks the kind of nature that can be grasped from several
diﬀerent points of view. As Nagel puts it:
Experience does not have, in addition to its subjective character, an objective nature
that can be apprehended from many diﬀerent points of view.
 N.B.: Deﬁnition mine, not Nagel’s.
 Nagel : -.
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is means that experience can only be fully understood from one point of
view. As I have argued in the ﬁrst chapter, I think we can call this point of
view a ‘ﬁrst person point of view’. In any case, the kind of understanding we
have of experience is thus a subjective understanding. Or, in other words, the
only accurate view that we can have on experience is a subjective view. Nagel
thinks that the distinction between a more subjective and more objective view
(or understanding of something) is a matter of degree. He writes:
A view or form of thought is more objective than another if it relies less on the
speciﬁcs of the individual’s make-up and position in the world, or on the character
of the particular type of creature that he is. e wider the range of subjective types to
which a form of understanding is accessible – the less it depends on speciﬁc subjective
capacities – the more objective it is. A standpoint that is objective by comparison with
the personal view of one individual may be subjective by comparison with a theoretical
standpoint still farther out.
Now, given this account of the relation between subjective and objective views,
this means that a more objective understanding of a particular experience is
one that is less attached to one particular point of view (i.e. less subjective).
However, as we have seen, experience can be fully understood only from one
point of view: to know what it is like to have a particular experience, you
have to have had the experience yourself and so be able to take up the same
point of view. erefore, any objective understanding is by deﬁnition a lesser
understanding of the experience. In Nagel’s words:
If the subjective character of experience is fully comprehensible only from one point
of view, then any shift to greater objectivity – that is, less attachment to a speciﬁc
viewpoint – does not take us nearer to the real nature of the phenomenon: it takes us
further away from it.
is line of argument can be summarized by the following rhetorical question:
Does it make sense, in other words, to ask what my experiences are really like, as
opposed to how they appear to me?
is concludes our explanation and justiﬁcation of the premises of Nagel’s
argument. Now, is this a good argument against methodological naturalism?
e argument seems to be valid, but are all its premises true? I think the ﬁrst
 Nagel : .
 Nagel : -.
 Ibid.: .
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two premises are pretty solid. We have seen that methodological naturalism
is indeed committed to ‘achieving an objectivist view on reality’ and it does
seem to follow from this that particular points of view are left behind – at
least, I cannot see a way in which this would not be so. But is the third
premise true? Is it the case that experiences can only be fully grasped and
understood from a particular point of view? We have seen in Chapter  that
indeed experiences can only be fully grasped from a ﬁrst person point of view,
which is expressed by deﬁnition (S). is argument is a serious threat for
methodological naturalists.
ere might be another argument in Nagel, which would be an argument
that is directed at physicalism rather than at ‘objectivity’.e argument occurs
in the following passage:
For if the facts of experience – facts about what it is like for the experiencing organism –
are accessible from only one point of view, then it is a mystery how the true character of
experience could be revealed in the physical operation of that organism. e latter is a
domain of objective facts par excellence – the kind that can be observed and understood
from many points of view.
e argument here is diﬀerent from the argument we have just considered,
though the idea behind it is very similar. In the previous argument the point
was that subjective experience cannot have its place, be accounted for or un-
derstood on any objectivist view of reality, since such a view requires leaving
any particular point of view behind, the kind of point of view that is con-
nected to subjective experience. e present argument is not directed at any
objectivist view, but at physicalism in particular. Take two cases (i) and (ii):
In case (i), Jill knows about her experience of smelling a sweet ﬂower because
she is having the experience. In case (ii), a brain scientist knows about Jill
having the same experience by studying her brain scan. Now, in this passage,
Nagel says that he thinks that there is a diﬀerence between these two cases.
Moreover, he says that he thinks that it is a mystery how in case (ii) the ‘true
character’ of the experience could be revealed at all. His reason for thinking
this is that the physical operation of the organism is ‘a domain of objective
facts’, while experience is subjective in the sense of being essentially connected
to a particular point of view.
Even though this is a good argument against methodological naturalism,
in the following I will continue discussing the argument we previously en-
countered. Why? Because the second argument is an instance of the ﬁrst and
will automatically follow if the ﬁrst works. at is: the ﬁrst argument is an
 Ibid.: .
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argument against any objectivist view, so if that argument works, the second
argument, against a particular objectivist view (viz. physicalism) will work as
well.
Back to the ﬁrst argument. Georgalis has discussed this argument and since
his take on it is very interesting, I am copying his discussion below:
Nagel maintains that an objective physical theory must abandon a single point of view.
In a sense I agree with this, but I do not think that this eliminates the possibility of
giving an objective account of the subjective point of view. However, if we rely on a
narrow construal of “objective”, one that constrains it to what is obtainable by strictly
third-person methodologies, there cannot be an objective account of the subjective.
Since both phenomenal and intentional features are in part constituted by a ﬁrst-
person perspective, there are facts that are accessible only from a subjective point of
view, and there is no way that a theory exclusively employing third-person concepts
can adequately accommodate them.erefore, an adequate account of minds must be
supplemented with a ﬁrst-person methodology.
Georgalis thus agrees with Nagel that there cannot be an objective account
of the subjective, if ‘objective’ is narrowly deﬁned as ‘constrained to what
is obtainable by strictly third-person methodologies’. is is very similar to
the way Nagel interprets objectivity and to the way we have interpreted it.
Georgalis thinks that a ﬁrst-person methodology is necessary to supplement
third-person methodologies.
Nagel and Georgalis are not the only ones to recognize that experience is
‘essentially connected to a single point of view’. As we have seen in the ﬁrst
chapter, there are a couple other philosophers who think that the subjectivity
of experience should be understood in exactly this way. I am thinking of Searle
and Farkas. Both these philosophers use terms slightly diﬀerent from the ones
employed in (S). ey both put the same point in terms of ‘perspective’; to
recall:
eworld itself has no point of view, but my access to the world throughmy conscious
states is always perspectival.
And:
An explanation of this circumstance is oﬀered by the observation that mental facts are
perspectival facts.
 Georgalis : .
 Searle : .
 Farkas : .
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Since I think that it expresses fairly the same idea to say that mental facts are
perspectival facts and that mental states are essentially connected to a single
point of view, Searle and Farkas’ arguments can be seen as parallels to Nagel’s
argument – just as Georgalis’ argument is.
is is a very strong argument against methodological naturalism as we
have found it: how can this objectivist theory leave room for subjective expe-
rience, if subjective experience is perspectival, or ‘connected to a single point
of view’ or, as Georgalis puts it, when ‘both phenomenal and intentional
features are in part constituted by a ﬁrst-person perspective’ and ‘there are
facts that are accessible only from a subjective point of view’? is means that
methodological naturalism is false or, in any case, limited such that it excludes
the area of the mental.
Now, is Nagel’s argument the same argument as the argument from per-
spective? In comparing these arguments there are a few diﬀerences worth not-
ing. First, obviously very diﬀerent language is used in Nagel’s argument and
in the argument from perspective. is makes the arguments sound very dif-
ferent, though that might be a superﬁcial rather than a substantial diﬀerence.
Second, the argument from perspective (as well as the knowledge argument)
is formulated on the level of an individual, whereas Nagel’s argument is set at
the level of ‘theories’. For simplicity, let’s use the knowledge argument as an
example here (which, as we have seen, runs very similar to the argument from
perspective). e knowledge argument is phrased in terms of Mary possessing
all physical knowledge and then having a personal experience which, suppos-
edly, adds to this knowledge. Nagel’s argument is not staged at the level of
the individual but at the level of ‘theories’: physicalism is supposed to provide
us with a complete theory of the physical knowledge. But, according to the
argument, only from a particular, subjective point of view, can experience
really be understood and so, if these subjective points of view would be taken
into account, supposedly knowledge would be added to the physicalist theory.
Despite these diﬀerences, I think we can say that the knowledge argument and
Nagel’s argument are very similar. Both arguments contend that physicalism
(or methodological naturalism, or ‘objective’ views) does not provide a com-
plete account or complete knowledge of the (physical) world because there is
something one learns from, or only knows by, having experiences (from a ﬁrst
person point of view). As said above, there are obvious diﬀerences in language
and the level at which the argument is set diﬀers. However, I think the gist of
the arguments is very similar.
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Next, I will discuss the (in)compatibility of methodological naturalism with
the following deﬁnition of subjectivity:
(S) E is subjective =df. E is private.
As we have seen, this deﬁnition of the subjectivity of experience can be for-
mulated more formally as follows:
(S0) E is subjective =df. For all subjects S, if S has E, then only S has
E.
ismeans that experiences are subjective in the sense that only one individual
can have a particular token experience. As we established before, a(ny) token
experience can only be had by one individual, which is to say that token
experiences are private. As I made explicit, this deﬁnition of the subjectiv-
ity of experience is about tokens, whereas deﬁnition (S) is about types of
experiences.
According to (S), token experiences are private, which means that only
one individual can have any token experience. Now, what does it mean to
have an experience? One might think that a distinction needs to be made
between having an experience in (a) an epistemic sense and having an expe-
rience in (b) an ontological sense. If one interprets having an experience in
(a) an epistemological sense then what it means to have an experience is to be
aware of the experience or to be acquainted with it. If one interprets having
an experience in (b) an ontological sense, then the term ‘having’ indicates the
relation that obtains between the property instance and the object that has
it, i.e. between the person and the token experience. In this section, I will
interpret (S) and ‘having an experience’ in an ontological sense. I will do so
because in the formulation of (S) no epistemic terms are used. Moreover, I
interpret (S), which is a very similar deﬁnition to (S), as (S)’s epistemo-
logical counterpart (a). e epistemological ‘having of an experience’, (S),
will therefore be discussed in the next section.
 Even though ‘having an experience’ can be explained in an epistemic and in an ontological
sense, it is not clear if the concept of ‘having an experience’ actually breaks apart like that.
In real life, it seems like it doesn’t. After all, one cannot have an experience in an ontological
sense (i.e. stand in an ontological relation to a token experience) without being aware of
having the experience. What it is to have an experience just is being aware of having that
experience. However, the fact that one cannot consider these aspects separately in daily life
      
e fact that only one person can have a particular token experience is a
metaphysical fact, not a nomological one. It’s not just a fact of nature that
token experiences are not available to more than one person. A token experi-
ence, given what it is, could not possibly be had bymore than one person.is
case is just an instance of a general phenomenon: generally, property instances
cannot be shared; token experiences are an instance of this general principle.
Now that we know what (S) means, the question is: is experience subjec-
tive in this sense? As we brieﬂy discussed in Chapter , it would be if there are
examples of experiences being subjective in this way. Are there such examples?
ere are plenty of examples of the fact that experience is subjective in the
sense of (S); in fact, every experience is an example of (S). After all, for any
particular token experience (with its phenomenal character), there is only one
person who can have it. Conrad puts it as follows:
A particularly salient feature of conscious mental states is that people do not share one
and the same such state; they are exclusive or ‘private’ to one individual.
Examples of such private experience tokens include the fact that only I can
have my experience of seeing a red ﬂower and only I can feel my headache. As
Tye writes:
My pains, for example, are necessarily private to me. You could not feel any of my
pains.
Velmans describes the privacy of experience like this:
I do not have direct access to your experiences and you do not have direct access to
mine. For example I cannot experience your pain, your thoughts, your colour qualia,
the way your body feels to you, the way the sky looks to you, the way I look to you, and
so on. I can only have my own experiences (however well I empathise). e privacy
and subjectivity of each individual’s experience is well accepted in philosophy of mind.
It seems to be a fundamental given of how we are situated in the world.
is passage supports deﬁnition (S) as a deﬁnition of the subjectivity of
experience and it also oﬀers several examples of how (token) experiences and
their phenomenal character are only had by one person. Naturally, these types
does not mean that a theoretical distinction should not be drawn. I will therefore leave it
open whether there is a substantial diﬀerence here.
 Conrad .
 Tye : .
 Velmans : -.
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of experiences can be had by more than one individual, i.e. not only I have ex-
periences of seeing a red ﬂower and I am not the only one to have experienced
headaches; others have similar experiences, which are similarly private.
e next question we need to answer is whether the fact that token experi-
ences are subjective in this sense, i.e. private, is compatible with methodolog-
ical naturalism. As we have found, methodological naturalism is the thesis
that the only things which exist are those things which are intersubjectively
available (i.e. accessible to more than one person). It seems, then, that we have
an outright incompatibility here.
e considerations about the privacy of token experiences lead us to the
following argument against methodological naturalism based on deﬁnition
(S), which I will call the ‘argument from privacy’.
e Argument from Privacy I
. ere are token experiences. [Chapter ]
. A token experience can be had only by one person. [Chapter ]
. A token experience is accessible only to the person who is having
that experience. [Chapter ]
. ere is something that is only accessible to one person. [, , ]
. If naturalism is true, then everything that exists is intersubjectively
available, i.e., accessible to more than one person. [Chapter ]
. erefore, methodological naturalism is false. [, ]
is argument is formulated in terms of access. However, it might be objected
that access talk suggests that experiences are objects that we somehow have
access to and that it would be better to talk about us ‘having experiences’
than about ‘accessing experiences’. e argument from privacy can also be
formulated without reference to access:
e Argument from Privacy II
. ere are token experiences. [Chapter ]
. A token experience can be had only by one person. [Chapter ]
. Experience tokens which are had only by one person are not inter-
subjectively available. [Chapter ]
. ere is something that is not intersubjectively available. [, , ]
. If methodological naturalism is true, then everything that exists is
intersubjectively available. [Chapter ]
. erefore, methodological naturalism is false. [, ]
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How could the methodological naturalist avoid this conclusion? ere are
several options open to him, as he could deny each premise of the argument.
Since the arguments are obviously very similar, the premises that I will be re-
ferring to are the premises from either argument. Let’s consider these diﬀerent
options.
e ﬁrst option open to the naturalist is to deny the ﬁrst premise, namely
that there are token experiences. I argued for the existence of token experiences
in Chapter  and I will rest my case here. e second option is to deny the
second premise, which is the principle of privacy. As I have indicated before,
I cannot see how anyone could hold or defend that more than one person
could have a particular token experience.
e third way for the naturalist to avoid the conclusion that their theory
is false is by denying the third premise that experience tokens are not inter-
subjectively available, but only accessible to one person. One popular way of
denying this is by arguing that the identity theory is true. If the identity theory
would be true, then experiences are possibly intersubjectively available. Since
this is an important objection against my overall argument, I will discuss the
identity theory extensively in section ...
e fourth option open to the naturalist to avoid this problem is to deny
the fourth premise, which is our account of methodological naturalism. Since
I have argued for this interpretation of naturalism extensively in the previous
two chapters, I will here, again, rest my case.e naturalist could nevertheless
argue that this is not the right interpretation ofmethodological naturalism and
try to defend either metaphysical naturalism or a diﬀerent version of method-
ological naturalism. Since I do not think that either of these enterprises could
be successful, I will not discuss this any further.
Denying any of the premises thus only gets the naturalist so far, but there
is another kind of objection to this argument, which is the objection from
unobservables. One way the naturalist can reply to this argument is by saying
that there are a number of things that we cannot observe, which he never-
theless thinks exist and thinks he is justiﬁed to believe in. Examples of such
unobservables, or things that we cannot observe, but of which the naturalist
thinks they exist, include: other galaxies, electrons, a cat in a box, etc.
Now, this might seem to be a good objection at ﬁrst, but there is an
important way in which these cases are not analogous to our case of experience
and its phenomenal character. Here is where the analogy breaks down: even
though it is logically impossible for more than one person to have access to
token experiences (and their phenomenal character), or in other words, even
though it is logically impossible for token experiences to be intersubjectively
available, it is not logically impossible for other galaxies, electrons and cats in
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boxes to be intersubjectively available, or for more than one person to observe
those. Granted, there are other, more fundamental problems with observ-
ing these speciﬁc entities, but once or if one person could observe another
galaxy, others could as well. And if one person could observe an electron,
then in principle another person could do so as well. e point is that there
is nothing in principle that makes that these entities are not intersubjectively
available. It is not the case that one subject has some sort of privileged access
to these entities, as is the case with experience and phenomenal character. In-
tersubjectively available in this context thus means ‘possibly intersubjectively
available’.
It seems, then, that this sense in which experience is subjective is incom-
patible with methodological naturalism and this incompatibility can be used
to formulate an argument against methodological naturalism, as we have just
seen.
. ():   
According to deﬁnition (S), experiences are subjective in the sense that they
can only be known from a ﬁrst person point of view:
(S) E is subjective =df. E can only be known from a ﬁrst person
point of view.
We have already discussed what points of view are, but what is a ﬁrst person
point of view? A ﬁrst person point of view is the point of view of the person
having an (type or token) experience. is person can talk truly in the ﬁrst
person (i.e. using ﬁrst person language) about his or her experience. Accord-
ing to deﬁnition (S), only the person having a particular (type or token)
experience can know the experience. In other words: experiences can only be
known by one person, which is the person having the experience.
What does it mean to ‘know an experience’?ere are at least two options.
e ﬁrst option is that ‘knowing an experience’ means the same as ‘knowing
what it is like to have an experience’. Knowing an experience would then
be the same thing as knowing the phenomenal character of that experience.
If this is the case, then we have already discussed this interpretation of the
subjectivity of experience in sections . and . where we discussed (S)
and (S). However, the second option is that ‘knowing an experience’, in the
sense of (S), does not have anything to do with phenomenal character and
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is diﬀerent than ‘knowing what it is like’. Since we have already discussed
the ﬁrst option, in this section I will consider the second option, viz. that
‘knowing an experience’ is diﬀerent than ‘knowing what it is like to have an
experience’.
Even if (S) is interpreted in this second way, (S) is still closely related
to subjective-making properties (S) and (S). According to (S), experience
is essentially connected to a single point of view. e fact that experience is
essentially connected to a single point of view is a necessary but not a suﬃcient
condition for the fact that experience can only be known from a ﬁrst person
point of view. After all, if experience was not essentially connected to a single
point of view, then it could not be the case that experience can only be known
from a ﬁrst person point of view. Subjective-making property (S) is also a
necessary condition for (S): experience can only be known from a ﬁrst person
point of view because experience is private. e point to be made about (S)
is similar to the point made by Nagel’s argument. Nagel’s point was that there
cannot be an objective understanding of subjective experience.e point that
we are making here, that experience can only be known from a ﬁrst person
point of view, is similar, yet diﬀerent.
Now, before we can assess whether (S) is compatible with methodological
naturalism, we need to know what kind of knowledge in involved in (S).
What kind of knowledge do we have of our experiences? As we already dis-
cussed in Chapter , Byrne makes the correct and interesting point that we do
not literally observe our experiences. But if we do not observe our experiences,
then how do we know about them? at is, how do we know that we are
having experiences and how do we know which experiences we are having? I
will brieﬂy discuss two accounts of how we (come to) know our experiences
below: Perry’s and Feigl’s.
According to Perry, experiences are epistemically accessible to us just be-
cause we have them:
Having an experience, that is, merely being in a state that has a subjective character,
makes the experience epistemically accessible to us.
He puts the same point again as follows:
We have experiences, and it is like something to have them. To have them is not to
know anything about them or think about them or be conscious of them or be aware
 Perry : .
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of them. It is simply to have them. But having them puts us in a position to attend to
them, be aware of them, think about them, know things about them, form concepts
of them, and so forth. Our experiences are epistemically accessible to us.
If experiences are epistemically accessible to us, this means that we can have
knowledge of them. What kind of knowledge do we have of our experiences?
e most plausible idea is that the knowledge that we have of our experiences
is ‘knowledge by acquaintance’, a term which goes back to Russell. It is not
propositional knowledge, or know-how, but the kind of knowledge we have
of, for example, other people or (non-propositional) objects. If one has knowl-
edge of acquaintance of other people, this does not mean that one knows
facts about them, but that one knows them. We not only have knowledge of
acquaintance of other people, but also of material objects and their properties
and of mental states, such as experiences.
Despite the fact that it is very commonly thought that the kind of knowl-
edge we have of our experiences is knowledge by acquaintance, there are
other options. For example, Feigl has an alternative view. Feigl thinks that
the relation we stand in to our experiences is a relation of ‘acquaintance’, not
‘knowledge by acquaintance’. Here is how Perry describes Feigl’s view:
Feigl calls the relation our own experiences bear to us, in virtue of which we can know
about them, “acquaintance”. Acquaintance itself is not knowledge. He distinguishes it
sharply from knowledge by acquaintance; that is what you get by paying attention to
and thinking about the experiences with which you are acquainted.
It seems as though Feigl distinguishes an extra step before one obtains ‘knowl-
edge of acquaintance’, which he simply calls ‘acquaintance’. When you go on
to reﬂect on the experiences you are acquainted with, you obtain knowledge
of acquaintance of your experiences.
e accounts of Perry and Feigl are a little bit diﬀerent, but also very
similar. I think we can say that they use diﬀerent terms and language to
describe the same, or a very similar, phenomenon.
After this discussion of the kind of knowledge that is involved in (S), we
can now answer the question whether (S) is compatible with methodological
naturalism. It seems that the subjective-making property (S) is incompatible
with methodological naturalism. We have found that experience is subjec-
tive in the sense speciﬁed by (S), which means that experience tokens can
 Ibid.
 Ibid.
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only be known from a ﬁrst person point of view. But things which can only
be known from a ﬁrst person point of view cannot be known from more
than one point of view. We have already established that what it means for
something to be intersubjectively available is for it to be capable of being
known from more than one point of view. is means that experience tokens
are not intersubjectively available but, as we established in Chapter , they
do exist. According to methodological naturalism, everything that exists is
intersubjectively available. Methodological naturalism is thus false. Here is
the argument in a more formal form:
Argument from Knowledge of Experience
. ere are experience tokens which are known only from a ﬁrst
person point of view. [Chapters  and ]
. If there are things that can only be known from a ﬁrst person point
of view, then those things cannot be known from more than one
point of view.
. If something cannot be known from more than one point of view,
then it is not intersubjectively available.
. Experience tokens are not intersubjectively available. [, , ]
. If methodological naturalism is true, then everything that exists is
intersubjectively available. [Chapter ]
. erefore, methodological naturalism is false. [, ]
It should be noted that this argument is very similar to Nagel’s argument,
which we discussed in section ... Again, the diﬀerence is that Nagel’s
argument is about knowledge of phenomenal character, and this argument
is about knowledge of experience. But the general points of these arguments
are nevertheless very similar.
e argument is clearly valid. However, there is an objection against this
argument that we should consider, which runs as follows. It seems, from the
argument, that it is the knowledge that is not intersubjectively available, not the
experience.ere is an easy reply to this objection, which is this. To talk about
‘knowledge’ is to talk about things that are known or, in other words, about
what is known.We can, for example, share knowledge, meaning that there are
propositions that we both know. So, even though it might seem as though,
by talking about knowledge of experiences, we are talking about something
other than the experiences themselves, if the knowledge of propositions about
experience is not intersubjectively available, then these propositions are not
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intersubjectively available. is is a problem because, if these propositions
cannot be veriﬁed by the ideal scientist, then they cannot be part of a scientiﬁc
theory. And if there cannot be a scientiﬁc theory about something, then this
‘thing’ does not exist.
. ():  : 
is section addresses our ﬁnal deﬁnition of the subjectivity of experience:
(S) E is subjective=df. ere is some subject S which has E.
As we have seen, experience is always had by a subject, i.e. experiences are
always someone’s experiences. If this deﬁnition is true, as we have found it to
be, this leads us to infer that in fact there are such things as subjects. Subjects
include not just human beings, but also bats, Martians and possibly others
who can have experiences. I am here mainly interested in the human subjects
of experience, i.e. in persons. If we think that human beings have experiences,
then human beings are ‘subjects’ and some of these subjects are persons. Is the
fact that there are persons incompatible with methodological naturalism as
we have deﬁned it?
e answer to this question obviously depends on what we take a person
to be. If persons are intersubjectively available, then their existence might not
be incompatible with methodological naturalism. However, if persons turn
out not to be intersubjectively available, then their existence could very well
prove to be incompatible with methodological naturalism. So, the crucial
question is, are persons intersubjectively available? is is a matter of great
dispute, which depends ﬁrst and foremost on one’s view on persons. However,
before we can talk about the ontology of persons, we ﬁrst need some basic
terminological clariﬁcation of what I mean when I say ‘person’. I will here
assume that a person is that which each of us refers to by using the personal
pronoun ‘I’. Now, is the referent of the personal pronoun ‘I’ intersubjectively
available?
ere are two main positions one can take with respect to the metaphysics
of persons. First, one can take the position that a human person is a material
 A third position is nihilism, the view that there are no such things as persons. e reason
why we are not considering this is obvious: the truth of this position is incompatible with
there being things that are subjective in the sense of (S), while we have argued in Chapter 
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object such as a body, or a part of a body, such as a brain. Second, one can
take the position that a human person is an immaterial substance or a soul. If
persons are material objects, then it should be obvious that persons are indeed
intersubjectively available. Medium-sized material objects like human bodies
are the paradigm examples of objects that are intersubjectively available. Also
the brain and neurological activity is intersubjectively available, namely by the
use of brain scans, brain imagery, etc.
If persons are souls, or immaterial substances, then it is harder to say
whether or not they are intersubjectively available. One might think that they
obviously aren’t, on the basis that nothing immaterial can be intersubjectively
available, until one considers the fact that there are a number of immate-
rial entities which are plausibly intersubjectively available, such as properties,
universals, numbers points in space, events, etc. If these are intersubjectively
available, then why would immaterial souls not be? One might point out
that immaterial souls, though like these other entities in so far as they are
immaterial, are importantly unlike them in many other ways; human persons
are not abstract like numbers and universals (if there are such things), and they
are certainly vastly diﬀerent from points in space or events.us, it seems that
we cannot obviously conclude from the fact that there are some immaterial
objects that are intersubjectively available, that human beings, if they are
immaterial, are also intersubjectively available. It should be noted, however,
that we also cannot conclude that human beings, if they are immaterial, are
not intersubjectively available. It seems to me that, given that there are some
immaterial objects that are plausibly intersubjectively available, we cannot say
either way whether or not human beings, if they are immaterial souls, are
intersubjectively available.
What does this mean for our question whether or not the subjective-
making property (S) is compatible with methodological naturalism? e
conclusion we should draw regarding (S) is then a provisional conclusion. It
that there are such things. Of course there are many other views about persons as well,
which can for example be found in Van Inwagen and Zimmerman (), but I cannot
go into all of these here.
 One might think that using the word ‘material’ in this section somehow begs the question,
if ‘material’ like naturalism is deﬁned in terms of being intersubjectively available. However,
it does not have to be the case that this is how we deﬁne ‘material’. Even a naturalist in
our sense could deﬁne ‘material’ in some other sense such as ‘being extended in space’ or
‘having causal powers’.
 For example see Van Inwagen.
 For example see Papineau and Armstrong.
 For example see Swinburne, Robinson and Plantinga.
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depends on one’s stance on the ontology of persons whether the existence of
persons is compatible with methodological naturalism or not. If one thinks
that persons are identical to material objects, then there is no incompatibility
here. If one thinks that persons are identical to immaterial objects, then it is
not so clear whether or not there is an incompatibility. Since I cannot go into
the debate about the ontology of persons more, we can here not conclude
whether (S) is compatible with methodological naturalism or not.
.   
ere are a number of objections against these arguments against methodolog-
ical naturalism, as well as objections against the claim that naturalism and the
subjectivity of experience are incompatible. In this section, I will extensively
discuss two such objections. I will set out by discussing Lycan’s arguments
for the claim that the subjectivity of experience is not incompatible with
methodological naturalism. Secondly, I will discuss the identity theory, which
is in itself an objection against the claim that the subjectivity of experience is
incompatible with methodological naturalism.
.. Objection I: Lycan
In Consciousness and Experience, Lycan extensively discusses subjectivity (he
calls it ‘the subjectivity of the mental’) and its relation to materialism.
In this chapter I will focus speciﬁcally on the claim that the mental is essentially sub-
jective, and for this reason cannot in fact or in principle be described in ‘objective’
terms.
Lycan acknowledges that the relation between subjectivity and materialism is
sometimes thought of as problematic. He describes the observed problem as
follows:
Purely scientiﬁc terms are ‘objective’, thus since human beings notoriously havemental
attributes, materialism is false. In particular, it is often said that no materialistically
acceptable third-person scientiﬁc description of a conscious human subject can cap-
ture the fact of ‘what it is like’ for the subject to be in a mental state of such and
 Lycan’s interpretation of ‘materialism’ might be diﬀerent than our interpretation of
methodological naturalism, but this has no bearing on the relevance of his objections.
 Lycan : .
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such a sort. is fact, an intrinsically subjective or perspectival fact, can be known
only to the subject who is in the state and to beings suﬃciently similar to the sub-
ject to be able to appreciate the subject’s ﬁrst-person reports of what being in the
state is like. Certainly nothing in physics, neurophysiology, psychology, or any other
science as currently conceived can answer the question of what it is like for a bat
to be having the sonar sensation (if any) associated with its vaunted echolocation
technique.
Lycan thus addresses the exact topic that we are here concerned with and
he thinks that there is no problem here for the materialist, which gives us a
reason to discuss Lycan’s reply in detail. Lycan thinks that there is no problem
for the materialist for the reason that there are three ‘fallacies’ in thinking that
subjectivity is a problem for materialism, and, in addition, there is a fourth
issue which he calls ‘the banana peel’. In the following, I will discuss these
four objections one by one and oﬀer replies to them.
One point that needs to be made right away is that the fallacies that Lycan
points out are not fallacies of any one argument that he is replying to in par-
ticular. Lycan mentions the arguments from Nagel, Jackson and Gunderson,
which he regards as diﬀerent versions of the same argument and calls most
of these arguments ‘non-starters’ – a claim which he does not back up in
any way. Despite the fact that he thinks these arguments are non-starters,
he nevertheless feels the need to reply to them, since there is a feeling that
subjectivity is a problem for materialism:
But there remains a feeling that ‘subjectivity’ is an obstacle tomaterialism. And – I wish
to admit – there remains a genuine obligation on the materialist’s part to give some
account of the subjectivity or perspectivalness or point-of-view aspect of the mental.
In discussing each fallacy, I will reconstruct an argument against materialism,
which I think is the argument in which Lycan observes a fallacy. Since he does
not give these arguments, it remains my interpretation what the fallacies are
and in which reasoning these fallacies are committed.
Let’s set out by discussing the ﬁrst fallacy. Take two cases (i) and (ii): in
case (i) a subject, Jill, is having an experience, for example, she smells a ﬂower.
In case (ii) an observer, Jack, is observing the subject, Jill, who is having that
particular mental state. Jack is either observing Jill or Jill’s brain (activity).
Now, there is a diﬀerence between cases (i) and (ii): Jill’s experience is vastly
diﬀerent from the experience that Jack has of observing the subject. at is:
 Ibid.
 Ibid.: .
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Jack does not have the same experience as Jill does in virtue of observing Jill’s
brain (activity). In Lycan’s words:
A human being, looking at an empty but deeply cyan-colored display on a Super
VGA monitor has an intense visual sensation, but a neurophysiologist monitoring
that subject’s brain from a good safe distance has nothing of the sort.
After having established that the subject and the observer have vastly diﬀerent
experiences, Lycan turns to ‘the fallacy’ right away. Without much argumen-
tation or explanation he writes:
I hope the fallacy is plain. No materialist theory of the mind has ever entailed that
watching the grey cheesy brain of someone who is having an intense cyan (or whatever)
sensation is qualitatively or in any other way like having that sensation oneself.
Since this moves a little fast, a little reconstruction is called for. Lycan seems
to think that there is an argument against the materialist, which is based on
the fact that the observations from a subject and from an observer of the
subject are vastly diﬀerent. Within that argument, he thinks that there is a
fallacy. How is the argument against materialism, based on this observation,
supposed to run? Again, Lycan does not say so explicitly, but I think we can
reconstruct the argument as follows:
Argument against Materialism I
. If materialism is true, then experiences of a subject and of an ob-
server of the subject should be the same.
. e experiences of the subject and the observer of the subject are
not the same.
. erefore, materialism is false.
Lycan believes premise  is true, but he does not believe the ﬁrst premise, nor
does he believe the conclusion. e reason why Lycan rejects the ﬁrst premise
is, I think, because he thinks that it is a fallacy. Now, it is not very clear what
the fallacy is, but this is what I think it is.
Take a case where Jill looks at a red ﬂower and Jack looks at Jill’s brain. Jill’s
visual experience is of an, say, intense and beautiful color red. However, Jack’s
experience is not of an intense red, but rather of dull grayish, the color of Jill’s
 Ibid.: .
 Ibid.: .
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brain. And this is how it should be. After all, the objects of the experiences
of Jill and Jack are very diﬀerent: the object of Jill’s experience is a red ﬂower,
hence the red experience, while the object of Jack’s experience is a grayish
brain. For anyone to think otherwise is to commit the fallacy of thinking that
a mental state has the same properties as the object of that mental state, i.e.
the fallacy of thinking that Jill’s experience of a red ﬂower actually would look
red to an observer of Jill’s brain, Jack. e object of Jack’s experience is not
the ﬂower, nor is Jill’s mental state identical to the object of Jill’s mental state.
Now the fallacy is plain: the subject’s brain is not a red ﬂower and so does not
look that way to an observer of the subject’s brain.
If this is Lycan’s objection (which I cannot be sure about since he does not
explain it in detail), I have a short reply to it, viz. that I don’t commit this
fallacy in any of my arguments, and none of my arguments rely on premise .
As far as I can tell, Nagel and Jackson’s arguments also do not rely on premise
. Lycan’s ﬁrst objection is therefore not a problem for any of my arguments;
neither is it for theirs.
Let’s turn to discussing the second fallacy. Here Lycan considers a diﬀerent
meaning for the term ‘subjectivity’, viz.:
In calling mental items subjective, one might mean that they are known or presented
to their owners in a way that they cannot be known to second and other parties.
is interpretation of subjectivity is more relevant to our argument, since
this is one of the senses in which we found experience to be subjective. Lycan
thinks that the above statement is true; however, he claims that the materialist
would never deny this:
We do not, in nature, have scanners that directly access the brains of others. But
this fact too poses no threat to materialism, since no version of materialism entails
or suggests that individual organisms do have scanners that directly scan the internal
operations of other organisms.
Let’s reconstruct the argument against the materialist, based on the above
claim, which is supposed to contain the second fallacy. Lycan does not spell
out that he is objecting against this particular argument explicitly, but from
what he does say I can only infer that this is in fact the argument in which he
recognizes a fallacy.
 Ibid.
 Ibid.: .
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Argument against Materialism II
. If materialism is true, then an experience should be known or pre-
sented in the same way to their owners as it is to second and other
parties.
. An experience is not known or presented in the same way to their
owners as it is to second and other parties.
. erefore, materialism is false.
According to Lycan, the second premise is true, but the ﬁrst and third premises
are false. e fallacy should then consist in the ﬁrst premise. ere are two
things that need to be said with respect to the ﬁrst premise. First, this premise
is only true on some interpretations of materialism. For example, if one in-
terprets materialism as ‘causal materialism’ (see Chapter ), then there is no
reason to think that this entails that experiences should be known or presented
in the same way to their owners as it is to second and other parties. However, if
one interprets materialism as methodological naturalism as I have done, then
it does have that entailment and premise  is true. It thus depends on one’s
interpretation of materialism whether or not premise  is true.
Second, on my interpretation of materialism, premise  is true, so how
should I respond to Lycan’s objection that this is a fallacy? I think what should
be said is this. I have given an argument for why I think that premise  is
true and I have given an argument for why I think that this is a problem
for naturalism – an argument much more complex than the argument above.
For Lycan to deny that premise  is true and to deny that it is a problem
for materialism is just to beg the question. Of course, Lycan could be right
and I could be wrong, but Lycan does not give any arguments to support his
position, nor does he give any arguments against the kind of argument that I
have presented. All Lycan does is saying that he disagrees, which is his good
right, but, again, as such merely begs the question.
Let’s turn to the third fallacy that Lycan observes. Lycan starts out by men-
tioning the knowledge argument, and then goes on to say that the knowledge
argument suggests that there are ‘subjective facts’. According to Lycan, the
existence of subjective facts is then used in an argument against materialism:
e knowledge argument tempts one to think that there is a special kind of fact,
an intrinsically subjective or perspectival fact of ‘what it is like’, that eludes physical
science and ‘objective’ science of any other sort. After all, one can know all the sci-
entiﬁc facts about Aplysia californica, about bats, about human beings, about the Big
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Bang, about anything you like, without knowing what it is like to have any particular
sensation whatever. So there is a fact left over that is inaccessible to the third-person
perspective.
e argument against materialism that we can reconstruct based on the idea
that there are subjective facts runs as follows.
Argument against Materialism III
. If materialism is true, then there are no facts that are inaccessible
to the third person perspective.
. ere are facts that are inaccessible to the third-person perspective.
. Materialism is false.
is time it seems that Lycan does not think that the ﬁrst premise is the fallacy,
but he seems to think that the second premise is ‘a fallacy’, or let’s say, he seems
to think that the second premise is false. us, Lycan thinks that all facts are
accessible to the third-person perspective.
Lycan explains that it might seem to be the case that there are subjec-
tive facts, but that in reality these are identical to objective facts, even if we
sometimes know the one fact (say the ‘objective fact’) without knowing the
correlative other fact (say the ‘subjective fact’). at is to say, there really only
is one fact there, which can be known in diﬀerent ways or under diﬀerent
descriptions. In Lycan’s words:
e fact of its being like such and such for the bat to have its sonar sensation can be one
and the same as the fact of the bat’s being in a particular neurophysiological condition,
even if the chiropterologist can know the latter without knowing the former.
According to Lycan, the fact that we can know A without knowing B, even
though A=B, has to do with knowledge being ‘ﬁnicky’ and ‘hyperintensional’,
and does not imply that A is not identical to B.
How should we respond to the supposed ‘fallacy’ philosophers make in
thinking that there are subjective facts? First of all, I’m not sure if Lycan’s
denial of subjective facts is a good argument against the knowledge argument.
I will try to sketch why not. According to Lycan there are no subjective facts.
e subjective facts that we might think we know are not subjective facts,
 Ibid.
 Ibid.: -.
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but they are in fact identical to objective facts. If there are only objective
facts, then it is possible for me to know all the objective facts about ma-
terial objects, the workings of the eye and brains and colors, just like the
famous Mary does. Yet when Mary sees a red ﬂower for the ﬁrst time, she
learns a new fact, viz. ‘this is what it is like to see a red ﬂower’. If there
is a fact to the matter of what it is like to see a red ﬂower, then this is it.
However, if there are no subjective facts; there are only objective facts that
Mary already knows. So how do you explain that she learned anything new
if this is neither an objective nor a subjective fact? Obviously one can deny
that she learns anything new at all, but Lycan does not seem to be saying
that. I guess he would say that she comes to know the same (objective) fact,
but in a diﬀerent way. However, it seems that not only her learning process
is diﬀerent, but also the information that she possesses upon having seen
the red ﬂower is diﬀerent. One could argue she merely has gained knowl-
edge of acquaintance and no propositional knowledge, or that she merely
gained certain skills, or a phenomenal concept, or any of the options that
we discussed in section ... In any case, whether the denial of subjective
facts simply solves the problem that the knowledge argument raises is not
clear.
Second, I doubt that Jackson’s argument relies on the existence of sub-
jective facts. Granted, the knowledge argument turns on the fact that there
is something new Mary learns when she sees a red ﬂower for the ﬁrst time.
However, it does not necessarily need to be a ‘subjective fact’ that she learns
of (or about).
Let’s turn to the fourth issue, which Lycan does not call a ‘fallacy’, but an
‘issue’ and since the title of the section is Banana Peel, I will refer to this issue
as the ‘banana peel’. What is the banana peel?
e banana peel is an issue that Lycan has with Nagel’s writing in particu-
lar. In his writing about experiences, Nagel sometimes uses ‘act-object jargon’;
this is Lycan’s way of saying that Nagel sometimes talks as if experiences are
objects. Here are Lycan’s own words about Nagel:
In speaking of experiences as things that present appearances to us and toward which
we take viewpoints, he makes them into objects of consciousness, as if we encountered
them from time to time.
Lycan has three issues with this kind of talk that he thinks Nagel uses. e
ﬁrst is that Nagel would beg the question with this kind of talk:
 Ibid.: .
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Nagel’s act-object formulation begs the question against the materialist, or would beg
the question if incorporated into the premises of an antimaterialist argument. For no
materialist I know of has ever granted the existence of purely mental objects scanned
by a third eye of the mind.
If Nagel would talk about experiences as if they were ‘purely mental objects’
and if he would use that talk in an argument against the materialist, this
argument would beg the question, since the materialist does not believe in
purely mental objects.
e second issue with this kind of talk follows from the ﬁrst. If one would
want to argue against the materialist by saying that there are ‘purely mental
objects’, then no further argument against materialism is needed. at is: if
one wants to maintain that there are such objects, then one does not need to
introduce subjectivity, since the mere existence of these objects is already an
argument against the materialist.
e third issue with this kind of act-object talk is that ‘it misrepresents
the locus of subjectivity’. is issue is also related to the ﬁrst (and second).
According to Lycan the way Nagel talks about experiences is misleading:
Nagel talks of being appeared to by, and taking viewpoints toward, our experiences.
But if ‘experiences’ are not after all objects, phenomenal individuals, they are adver-
bially qualiﬁed or taxonomized events.
Now, the crucial diﬀerence between Lycan and Nagel is that on Nagel’s un-
derstanding a third person cannot represent someone else’s ﬁrst person point
of view. However, on Lycan’s view, someone’s viewpoint-taking can be accu-
rately represented by a third person:
Of course, we represent the external world in any number of ways, and any such
representation is a representation from a point of view; this point-of-view aspect
remains to be accounted for. But it hardly follows that an event of representing of
viewpoint-taking on someone’s part cannot itself be represented by someone else in a
third-person, scientiﬁc way.
is issue, just like the second, goes back to the ﬁrst, i.e. Nagel’s talk of
experiences as if they were objects.
In reply to the banana peel objection, I don’t want to speak for Nagel, but
I do want to address this objection as an objection against my own project.
 Ibid.
 Ibid.: .
 Ibid.
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Since I do not rely on the premise that experiences are purely mental objects,
this objection is not an objection against any of my arguments.
Concluding, I think we can say about Lycan’s objections that some objec-
tions are not explained very clearly, some seem to beg the question, and some
object to premises that I do not rely on in my arguments.
.. Objection II: Identity eory of Mind
One obvious objection against the idea that experiences are not intersubjec-
tively available is to hold that experiences are identical to brain states, which
is one of the premises of the theory called the ‘identity theory of mind’.
Generally, the identity theory of mind can be formulated as follows:
e identity theory of mind holds that states and processes of the mind are identical
to states and processes of the brain. Strictly speaking, it need not hold that the mind
is identical to the brain.
ere are at least two versions of the identity theory of mind: the type-type
identity theory and token-token identity theory. According to the type-type
identity theory of mind, a type of mental state is identical to type of brain
state. According to the token-token identity theory of mind, a token mental
state is identical to a token brain state.
Now, if token experiences and token brain states are identical, then token
experiences are intersubjectively available just as token brain states are. is
means that whether or not experiences are intersubjectively available depends
on whether you think there is a diﬀerence between the cases where (i) a subject
Jill has an experience with phenomenal character and knows about this by
introspection and (ii) a scientist Jack observes a brain scan of the subject, Jill,
and knows about the experience and its phenomenal character by studying
and measuring brain activity. Why does it matter whether or not you think
there is a diﬀerence between case (i) and case (ii)? I will get to this question
after cases (i) and (ii) are clariﬁed and qualiﬁed ﬁrst.
Case (i) is a case situated in daily life, wherein a person (the subject), Jill,
has an experience with phenomenal character. For example, Jill smells a ﬂower.
‘Smelling the ﬂower’ is the experience and what it is like for Jill to smell the
ﬂower, for example, ‘the ﬂower smells sweet’, is the phenomenal character (or
qualia) of the experience. Jill knows by introspection that the ﬂower smells
 Smart .
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sweet. She is aware of the experience she has and just by reﬂecting on it she
can tell that the ﬂower smells sweet. Case (ii) is of a diﬀerent nature.
Case (ii) is a case situated in a lab, in which a neuroscientist, Jack, observes
the brain scan of a subject who is having a particular experience. Let’s take the
case of Jill smelling a ﬂower again, so that we can compare them easily. In
case (ii) Jack studies the brain scan of Jill, who smells the ﬂower. For the sake
of the argument, let’s assume that neuroscientists have been able to establish
which region of the brain shows activity when a subject has an experience
with a particular (say, sweet) smell. In this case, Jack will be able to tell from
studying Jill’s brain scan that Jill smells a ﬂower, which smells sweet to her.
Obviously, there are many diﬀerences between cases (i) and (ii), but what
is of crucial importance here is the question whether there is an important
diﬀerence in the knowledge of the experience between Jill in case (i) and Jack
in case (ii). In other words, is there a diﬀerence in knowledge of the experience
between a subject who has the experience and an observer whomerely observes
the experience of a subject by means of studying a brain state?
What do I mean by ‘diﬀerence in knowledge’? ere are a few ways in
which knowledge in these cases can diﬀer. First, the subject and the observer
could have the same or a diﬀerent kind of knowledge (i.e. propositional
knowledge, knowledge by acquaintance, know-how) of the experience. Sec-
ond, they could have the same or a diﬀerent extent of knowledge about the
experience, i.e. the one could have information about the experience that the
other does not have, e.g. in virtue of their diﬀerent ways of observing the
experience, by introspection and observation of a scan respectively.
e question whether there is a diﬀerence in knowledge between a subject
having an experience and an observer observing a brain state which is not
his own and by means other than introspection, is the crucial question in
the qualia debate. We have already discussed the qualia debate, but I will here
address this crucial question again brieﬂy. Is there a diﬀerence in knowledge of
experience between a subject having the experience and an observer observing
the subject having these experiences? And, more speciﬁcally, is there anything
that the subject can know that the observer per deﬁnition cannot know? Is
there something we learn from having a particular experience as opposed to
knowing the physical facts about the experience?
 Needless to say, this hypothetical case would require some neuroscientiﬁc progress for it
to ever be actual. However, it seems reasonable to assume that these kinds of things are in
principle possible. Maybe this is easier to see for a case in which a subject is in pain and a
scientist can see activity in a certain region in the brain on a brain scan.
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If one thinks that there is no diﬀerence in knowledge between cases (i)
and (ii), then one is most likely an identity-theorist. After all, if you think
that an observer studying a brain scan can know the same information about
the experience as the subject in question who is having the experience, then
it must be the case that experiences (or: mental states) are identical to brain
states. If this would not be the case, then the observer and the subject would
not be observing the same ‘thing’, in which case they could not know the
same information. If you are an identity theorist, then experience is thereby
intersubjectively available. After all, not only the person who is having the
experience (the subject), but also observers of this subject’s brain scan have
access to the experience. e subject as well as the observer has access to,
and adequate knowledge of, the experience in question. Given that ‘inter-
subjectively available’ means that more than one person should be able to
access something, in this case, experience is intersubjectively available. But
for experience to be intersubjectively available in this way, the identity theory
needs to be true. But is the identity theory true?
Both the type-type and token-token identity theory are very problematic.
According to the token-token identity theory a particular mental state (of
a particular person) is identical to a particular brain state (at a particular
time). e problem with the token-token identity theory is that it is hard
to specify and give evidence in its favor, since each particular mental state of
each particular person at any particular time might correspond to a unique
brain state. is means that the theory cannot be tested or veriﬁed, since we
might never even have the same brain state twice. Of course this does not
mean that the token-token identity theory is false, but there is also no reason
to think that it is true. What about the type-type identity theory?
According to the type-type identity theory, types of mental states are iden-
tical to types of brain states. So my particular token experience of pain is not
identical to a particular token brain state, but the type experience of pain is
identical to a type of brain state. e problem with the type-type identity
theory is that it rules out that a particular mental state could be realized
by diﬀerent brain states, which is rather implausible. at would mean, for
example, that only humans could experience a particular mental state (such
as pain), and a Martian with a silicon brain could not have that same mental
state. ere are many other objections against the type-type identity theory as
well, but I will conﬁne myself to discussing one famous one, namely Kripke’s.
In order to explain Kripke’s objection to the type-type identity theory, we
only need to imagine a particular type of brain state and the particular type
of mental state to which it is supposed to be identical. If this brain state and
this mental state are in fact identical, they are so necessarily. e necessity
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of identity is commonly accepted in analytic philosophy, as Perry puts it: ‘If
A and B are in fact one thing, there is no possible world in which they are
two things.’ Now Kripke points out that, in the case of brain states and
mental states, their identity seems to be contingent. According to Kripke, the
physicalist admits that the relation between brain states andmental states seems
to be contingent but holds that this is merely an apparent contingency, just
as the identity of many other phenomena seems to be contingent, such as the
identity of molecular motion and heat. However, Kripke argues that there is a
disanalogy between the apparent contingencies of the identities of molecular
motion and heat on the one hand and brain states and mental states on the
other hand. How are these cases disanalogous?
Whereas the contingency of the identity of molecular motion and heat can
be explained, no such explanation is possible in the case of the contingency
of the identity of brain states and mental states. How can the contingency in
case of molecular motion and heat be explained? Kripke proﬀers the following
explanation:
In the case of the apparent possibility that molecular motion might have existed in
the absence of heat, what seemed really possible is that molecular motion should have
existed without being felt as heat, that is, it might have existed without producing the
sensation S, the sensation of heat.
In the case of molecular motion and heat, there is thus an ‘intermediary
between the external phenomenon and the observer’, namely the sensation
of heat. Molecular motion merely produces heat. But if this is the case, then
the analogy with the apparent contingent identity of brain states and mental
states breaks down, since brain states do not produce mental states and there
is no intermediary available. Kripke uses the example of pain to show how the
analogy breaks down:
In the appropriate sentient beings is it analogously possible that a stimulation of the
C-ﬁbers should have existed without being felt as pain? If this is possible, then the
stimulation of C-ﬁbers can itself exist without pain, since for it to exist without being
felt as pain is for it to exist without there being any pain. Such a situation would
be in ﬂat out contradiction with the supposed necessary identity of pain and the
corresponding physical state, and the analogue holds for any physical state which
might be identiﬁed with a corresponding mental state.
 Perry : .
 Kripke : .
 Ibid.
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So, the contingency of the relation between the molecular motion and heat
might be able to be explained, but in the case of pain no such explanation
is possible. Why not? Because in the case of molecular motion and heat we
pick out ‘molecular motion’ by one of its accidental properties ‘heat’, but we
do not pick out pain by one of its accidental properties: we pick it out by the
property of pain itself. Here is a longer passage where Kripke makes this exact
point:
In the case of the identity of heat with molecular motion the important consideration
was that although ‘heat’ is a rigid designator, the reference of that designator was
determined by an accidental property of the referent, namely the property of produc-
ing in us the sensation S. It is thus possible that a phenomenon should have been
rigidly designated in the same way as a phenomenon of heat, with its reference also
picked out by means of the sensation S, without that phenomenon being heat and
therefore without molecular motion. Pain, on the other hand, is not picked out by
one of its accidental properties; rather it is picked out by the property of pain itself,
by its immediate phenomenological quality. us pain, unlike heat, is not only rigidly
designated by ‘pain’ but the reference of the designator is determined by an essential
property of the referent. us it is not possible to say that although pain is necessarily
identical with a certain physical state, a certain phenomenon can be picked out in the
same way we pick out pain without being correlated with that physical state. If any
phenomenon is picked out in exactly the same way that we pick out pain, then that
phenomenon is pain.
is means that there is a disanalogy between the relation between molecular
motion and heat on the one hand and the relation between brain states and
mental states on the other:
e apparent contingency of the connection between the mental state and the corre-
sponding brain state thus cannot be explained by some sort of qualitative analogue as
in the case of heat.
And that, in turn, means that there is no explanation for the apparent con-
tingency of the identity of brain states with mental states, except of course
that the identity is de facto contingent. But, as we said at the beginning of
our discussion, there is no contingent identity. erefore, brain states are not
identical to mental states.
In sum, we can say that both versions of the identity theory are thus very
problematic. e naturalist could still choose to adhere to a version of the
identity theory, but this way out would come at a very high price.
 Ibid.: -.
 Ibid.: .
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In this chapter, we have established that there is an incompatibility between
subjective experience and methodological naturalism. is poses a dilemma:
should one reject the existence of subjective experience altogether in order
to comfortably remain or become a methodological naturalist, or should one
believe in the existence of subjective experience and adopt an alternative meta-
physics such as dualism? Maybe there are options that are less extreme. In this
section I will discuss three such ‘less extreme alternative approaches’ proﬀered
by philosophers who have explicitly addressed the incompatibility between
the subjectivity of experience and methodological naturalism. I will discuss
these alternative approaches and see if they address the arguments we have
given and, if so, if these alternatives are genuine options for the naturalist.
e ﬁrst alternative approach urges us to consider an alternative inter-
pretation of the term ‘objectivity’, since the standard interpretation might
partly constitute the incompatibility that we have observed. is alternative
interpretation of ‘objectivity’ is proﬀered by Chrisley. e second alternative
approach is similar: Velmans also proﬀers to redeﬁne the term ‘objectivity’ as
a form of ‘intersubjectivity’. Velmans’ idea is similar to Chrisley, yet not the
same. e third alternative approach that I will discuss is the theory of ‘sub-
jective physicalism’, oﬀered by Howell, which presents a form of physicalism
that grants that an objective understanding of reality cannot be complete.
.. Chrisley: Objectivity as Intersubjectivity
In “A View From Anywhere: Prospects for an Objective Understanding of
Consciousness” Chrisley addresses the exact question that Nagel and Geor-
galis are concerned with, which we discussed in section ., viz.:
Can there be an objective understanding of subjectivity itself? In particular, can there
be an objective understanding of conscious experience? Or does the essentially per-
spectival, subjective nature of experience prevent its full inclusion in a truly objective,
non-perspectival world view?
As we have seen, Nagel’s answer to the ﬁrst two questions is ‘no’. Chrisley
thinks that Nagel’s answer to these questions is not an unqualiﬁed ‘no’, but
rather an: ‘It depends. It depends on what kind of objective understanding is
in question.’ Georgalis’ answer is very similar to Nagel’s: it is ‘no’ iﬀ the term
 Chrisley .
 Ibid.: .
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‘objectivity’ is interpreted in a particular way (the way we have interpreted it),
which Georgalis calls ‘on a narrow construal of ‘objective’, one that constrains
it to what is obtainable by strictly third-person methodologies.’ Now, this
interpretation of ‘objective’ and ‘objectivity’ is exactly the place where Chrisley
jumps into the discussion. How?
Chrisley thinks that the problem that Nagel and Georgalis see with pro-
viding an objective understanding of subjectivity is due to their interpretation
of ‘objectivity’. Here is what Chrisley proﬀers to do:
I would like to defend the possibility of an objective understanding of consciousness,
in all its subjective glory. e problems that Nagel encounters stem, I believe, from
his “view from nowhere” conception of objectivity. I will argue that this conception of
objectivity is problematic, and will therefore employ a diﬀerent notion of objectivity
(…).
To be more speciﬁc, Chrisley thinks that the problem with a ‘view from
nowhere’ conception of objectivity is that it ‘takes objectivity to be a particular
kind of view’. Chrisley contends that all views are from somewhere, which
constrains the relevant notion of objectivity. e question whether there can
be an objective understanding of subjectivity should be reformulated as: ‘Can
there be an understanding of consciousness, which is as objective as physics is
about the physical world?’ If there is some limit to the objectivity of physics
then a similar limit to the objectivity of consciousness should not be held
as an argument against that objectivity. Now, what kind of interpretation of
objectivity does Chrisley proﬀer as a substitute for Nagel’s interpretation?
I am proposing that objectivity is not a view from nowhere. On the other hand, objec-
tivity does involve views of the world. So perhaps objectivity is not itself a particular
view, but a virtuous way of negotiating perspectival subjective views.
After Smith, Chrisley calls this interpretation of objectivity ‘objectivity as per-
spective coordination’ or ‘a view from anywhere’. Negotiating perspectival
 Ibid.: .
 Ibid.
 Ibid.
 Ibid.: .
 Chrisley : . Even though Chrisley’s account of objectivity is inspired by Smith’s I
am here not going into Smith’s account further. Smith’s account of objectivity is based
on his ‘constructivist, participatory’ metaphysics, which is very diﬀerent from the kind
of metaphysics we assume in this project. For the sake of completeness here is Chrisley’s
description of Smith’s account of objectivity: ‘Smith’s idea is that the fundamental nature
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subjective views and coordinating them should be understood as equivalent
actions here. Since on Chrisley’s account objectivity is the coordination of
diﬀerent perspectives from diﬀerent points of view, this kind of objectivity
does not only allow for subjectivity, it requires subjectivity. After all, the
‘objective view’ is a coordination or negotiation of all the subjective views
together. Since Chrisley’s concept of ‘objectivity’ requires subjective views and
is a coordination of these subjective views, we can safely say that his concept
of objectivity is better understood as ‘intersubjectivity’.
Now, we need to ask two questions. First, is Chrisley’s alternative account
of ‘objectivity’ relevant for our arguments? And second, could the method-
ological naturalist accept it?
Chrisley’s alternative account of ‘objectivity’ seems to be relevant for
Nagel’s argument against physicalism. To recall, according to Nagel, physi-
calism is an objectivist theory that necessarily leaves any points of views out
of account. If physicalism would be an intersubjective theory instead of an
objectivist one (in Chrisley’s terms), then, as such, it would not be incompat-
ible with methodological naturalism. However, to reinterpret objectivity as
intersubjectivity does not make a diﬀerence for the other arguments against
methodological naturalism that we have formulated, or in any case, it is not
clear that it does. e naturalist will still hold that those things exist that
the ideal scientist tells us that exist and this means that propositions need
to be veriﬁable. is, in turn, means that the propositions cannot be about
things that are not intersubjectively available. To redeﬁne the term objectivity
is thus not going to make a diﬀerence regarding the incompatibility of the
subjectivity of experience and methodological naturalism.
.. Velmans: Objectivity as Intersubjectivity
Chrisley is not the only one who proﬀers to redeﬁne objectivity as ‘intersubjec-
tivity’. Velmans proposes to redeﬁne ‘objectivity’ in a similar fashion. He does
so as part of his ‘reﬂexive monism’ within which ‘the external phenomenal
world is viewed as part-of consciousness, rather than apart from it’. e
motivation for this reﬂexive model of perception and the relation between
consciousness and the physical world stems from exactly the problem we
have been studying: the incompatibility between subjective experience and
methodological naturalism. is is how Velmans describes his motivation:
of objectivity is the creation, stabilization, and maintenance of objects in the face of the
underlying non-objectual nature of reality.’ Chrisley : -.
 Velmans : .
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Classical ways of viewing the relation of consciousness to the brain and physical world
make it diﬃcult to see how consciousness can be a subject of scientiﬁc study. In contrast
to physical events, it seems to be private, subjective, and viewable only from a subject’s
ﬁrst person perspective. But much of psychology does investigate human experience,
which suggests that the classical ways of viewing these relations must be wrong.
is is why Velmans comes up with a new model, the reﬂexive model, which
is part of a sort of neutral monism that he defends. I will here not discuss
Velmans’ whole view but I will focus on the interpretation of the concept of
objectivity that he develops as part of it.
Before we can get to this revised concept of objectivity, however, we need
to know about one important part of his theory of reﬂexive monism. Ac-
cording to this theory, material objects are not ‘publicly accessible’ at all, as
is always assumed. e whole physical world is ‘part’ of consciousness and,
as such, as private as our experiences and our own mental states. Why does
Velmans think that material objects are not publicly accessible? His reason is
that we cannot access these material things directly but we can only access
our experiences of them. Our experiences of mountains are just as private
as our experiences of, for example, our headaches: they are both experiences
and equally private.ere are thus no publicly accessible objects, according to
Velmans, which is why he thinks that the concept ‘public’ should be replaced
by ‘private experiences shared’:
Further, to the extent that things are subject to similar perceptual processing in dif-
ferent human beings it is reasonable to assume a degree of commonality in the way
such things are experienced.While each experience remains private, it may be a private
experience that others share. Consequently, experienced things (phenomenal objects
and events) may be ‘public’ in the sense of private experience shared.
Velmans uses this idea for his interpretation of objectivity. He proﬀers to
substitute ‘objectivity’ with ‘intersubjectivity’ in a way similar to Chrisley.
What is this concept of intersubjectivity?
Once an essentially ‘private’ experience becomes ‘public’ in the sense that others
have similar (private) experiences, there is also a transition from subjectivity to inter-
subjectivity. Each private experience is necessarily subjective in that it is always the
 Ibid.
 Velmans calls it ‘reﬂexive monism’, not neutral monism, but I think we can say that his
monism is a form of neutral monism.
 Velmans .
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experience of a given observer; once that experience is shared with another observer it
becomes inter-subjective. To the extent that an experience can be generally shared (by a
community of observers) it can form part of the data-base of a communally grounded
science.
An important diﬀerence between this concept of intersubjectivity and the
ordinary concept of objectivity is that, whereas objectivity requires the absence
of subjective viewpoints, intersubjectivity does not – on the contrary.
Note that the intersubjectivity in this sense does not entail an absence of subjectivity,
i.e. it does not entail the existence of some observer-free ‘objectivity’ even for obser-
vations and measurements in natural science.
According to the reﬂexive model, material objects and science involving these
objects are thus not ‘public’, ‘objective’ and ‘repeatable’ in the sense in which
they are normally understood. ey are only public in the sense of ‘private
experience shared’, they are intersubjective rather than objective, and they are
repeatable in the sense that ‘they are suﬃciently similar to be taken for ‘tokens’
of the same ‘type”.
e result of this alternative view of the physical world and of science
makes that a ‘science of consciousness’ is perfectly in line with ordinary sci-
ence.is view of objectivity, i.e. intersubjectivity, includes subjectivity rather
than opposes it.
On Velmans’ account, would the subjectivity of experience still be incom-
patible with methodological naturalism or not?Well, it seems that they would
not be incompatible because the idea of what science is and of what naturalism
is would be altered to such an extent that there is no incompatibility anymore
with subjective experience. is could be seen as an improvement of the
current situation where one is forced to either deny that there are subjective
experiences, or to claim that methodological naturalism is false. However,
it comes at a price, which is accepting the reﬂexive monist model and the
view on science and naturalism that it entails. e issue here is that it is very
unlikely that the naturalist is willing to accept a science which is not public
and repeatable in the sense that we have talked about, or in other words: it
would be hard to ﬁnd a naturalist who would still accept this as science. And
not just this view of science would be problematic to accept for the naturalist
 Ibid.
 Ibid.
 Ibid.
   
but also this view on the material world. As we have seen, Velmans thinks that
material objects are also not public but identical to the experiences we have
of perceiving them. e reﬂexive monist model is a form of neutral monism
and even though it would, as such, be a solution to the incompatibility we
have observed, it is unlikely that it is an acceptable solution for the natural-
ist.
.. Howell: Subjective Physicalism
A third alternative approach to the incompatibility of subjective experience
and methodological naturalism is the theory of ‘subjective physicalism’. In
his paper “Subjective Physicalism” Howell presents a version of physicalism
that includes the thesis that everything that exists is physical, but also aﬃrms
that objective theories cannot capture all there is to capture. Howell describes
subjective physicalism as:
A version of physicalism according to which all things, properties, and facts are physi-
cal, but no objective theory – including physics – can completely describe the world. In
particular, some physical states are subjective, in that those states must be undergone
in order to be fully grasped.
Now, although this sounds promising, the question is what this sort of view
would look like. Howell lays down two versions of the theory of subjective
physicalism:
Subjective physicalism can be developed in two ways, involving either of the following
claims:
. Inclusive subjective physicalism: ere are two ways of grasping some physical
properties: objectively, via physical descriptions, and subjectively, via conscious
experiences.ere are no properties, however, that physical descriptions leave out.
. Exclusive subjective physicalism: Some physical properties can be grasped only
subjectively. e properties that underwrite conscious experience (e.g. qualia) are
physical, but they are not identical with any property mentioned in a completed
physics.
Since Howell focuses on the second interpretation of subjective physicalism in
his paper, so will I. How can we understand exclusive subjective physicalism
 Howell : .
 Ibid. Paraphrased.
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better? e core idea of it is that physicalism is true. What does Howell mean
by ‘physicalism’ here? He deﬁnes physicalism as follows:
e world is completely metaphysically grounded in the physical, in that everything
supervenes on things, properties, and states that are not fundamentally intentional or
phenomenal.
But this is not all there is to the theory because, even though physicalism
is true, according to it, this does not require or entail that an objective de-
scription of reality has to be complete. is is the case because, even though
everything there is is physical, some states require that they are undergone in
order for anyone to know what it is like to have them.
ere are aspects of the world one cannot fully understand without occupying par-
ticular subjective states. is understanding, therefore, cannot be conveyed without
putting someone else in that subjective state. (…) It is the necessarily experiential
nature of qualitative states that makes them intractable for an objective description of
the world.
With respect to experiences and phenomenal character, the subjective phys-
icalist would therefore hold that one cannot know the experiences (or know
what it is like to have them) without having them:
What is doing the work for the subjective physicalist is actually the more basic claim
that there is something that it is like to instantiate certain physical states, and that it
is only by instantiating those states that one can fully grasp then.
is means that, once again, this alternative theory is relevant for Nagel’s
argument against physicalism.Nagel would not have problems with subjective
physicalism since he mainly wants to make the point just aﬃrmed in the
passage above and does not want to argue against physicalism in particular.
Nagel wants to argue mainly that an objective understanding or, objective
account of reality, cannot completely describe reality. is is exactly the point
that is granted by the theory of subjective physicalism.
But again, this alternative theory is not relevant for any of the other argu-
ments that we have formulated against methodological naturalism. Why can
subjective physicalism not help the naturalist against the arguments we have
raised against it? Well, the methodological naturalist thinks that all and only
 Howell : .
 Ibid.: .
 Ibid.: .
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what science tells us is true and for any statement to be scientiﬁc it needs to
be veriﬁable by other scientists. is means that these propositions can only
quantify over things that are intersubjectively available. e issue is that the
theory of subjective physicalism allows for experiences that are not intersub-
jectively available. is means that either subjective physicalism is incoherent
or it means that methodological naturalism should be drastically redeﬁned. If
the former is the case, the methodological naturalist cannot accept subjective
physicalism, for who can accept an incoherent theory? If the latter is the
case, the methodological naturalist could not accept subjective physicalism
because it would be too far removed from the methodological naturalist’s own
position. If it is necessary that the methodological naturalist gives up the idea
that there cannot be things that are not intersubjectively available, then he
ceases to be a methodological naturalist.
. 
In this chapter, we established that the subjectivity of experience, in some
senses, is incompatible with methodological naturalism as we have deﬁned it.
We have found that (S) is in itself not incompatible withmethodological nat-
uralism, but does turn out to be so in virtue of (S). For a while we bracketed
(S) to see if (S) would also be a problem for methodological naturalism if
(S) was taken out of consideration, but this wasmerely a thought experiment:
phenomenal character is essentially connected to a single point of view.
We then turned to a full discussion of (S) in section . and we concluded
that (S) is incompatible with methodological naturalism. Using this incom-
patibility, we formulated an argument against methodological naturalism,
which we called ‘the argument from perspective’. We compared the argument
from perspective to both the knowledge argument and Nagel’s argument and
found that these arguments are not identical, yet very similar to one another.
Next, in section ., we discussed deﬁnition (S) and concluded that
(S) is incompatible with methodological naturalism as well. Based on this
incompatibility we formulated another argument against methodological nat-
uralism: the privacy argument. is argument relies on the premise that to-
ken experience and token phenomenal character can only be had or accessed
by one person, which turns out to be problematic on our interpretation of
methodological naturalism. Naturally, there are objections against this kind of
argument, such as, for example, the identity theory, which we later discussed
extensively, in section ..
In section . we concluded that deﬁnition (S) and methodological nat-
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uralism are also incompatible. Deﬁnition (S) states that we can only have
knowledge of our experiences from a ﬁrst person point of view, which led us
to formulate another argument against methodological naturalism, which is
similar to, yet diﬀerent from, the privacy argument that we considered in the
previous section.
Section . concerned the last deﬁnition of subjectivity that we distin-
guished which is that experiences are subjective in the sense that they are
always had by a subject (S). Here, we considered whether the existence of
persons is compatible with methodological naturalism. We concluded that, if
one thinks persons are material objects, then they are intersubjectively avail-
able and compatible with naturalism. However, if one thinks that persons
are not material objects, but e.g. immaterial souls, then it is not clear whether
they are compatible with methodological naturalism. It thus depends on one’s
ontology of persons whether their existence, and so (S), is compatible with
methodological naturalism.
After concluding that at least three deﬁnitions of the subjectivity of ex-
perience are incompatible with methodological naturalism, in section . we
discussed two objections against this conclusion. e ﬁrst objection is from
the hand of Lycan and consists of a number of smaller objections, which we all
discussed and to which we oﬀered replies. e second objection we discussed
is the identity theory, which, if true, would deny one of the premises that
functions in all of our arguments.We discussed a number of objections against
the identity theory and concluded that it is not a very promising theory.
Finally, in section ., we discussed three alternative approaches to the
incompatibility of subjective experience and methodological naturalism. Ob-
vious alternative approaches would be to deny that there are subjective experi-
ences or to abandonmethodological naturalism, but in this section I discussed
three less extreme approaches. Two of them are attempts to redeﬁne the con-
cept objectivity as intersubjectivity, and the third is a theory called ‘subjective
physicalism’. Even though these do seem to be alternative approaches to the
problem at hand, it is unlikely that the methodological naturalist could adopt
them.We cannot but conclude, then, that methodological naturalism and the
subjectivity of experience are incompatible.
***
Now that we have come to the end of our discussion, let’s take stock.emain
question this dissertation aimed at answering was whether the subjectivity
of experience is compatible with naturalism. After careful analysis of all the
concepts involved, we have had to conclude that in fact the subjectivity of
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experience and (methodological) naturalism are not compatible. Where can
the naturalist go from here?
ere are at least two things the naturalist could do. First, the naturalist
could come upwith a new version ofmetaphysical naturalism that we have not
discussed and that does not fall prey to the objections that we have presented
against the forms of metaphysical naturalism that we did discuss. It might be
the case that such a form of naturalism can be thought of and, if so, it remains
an open question whether that form of naturalism would be compatible with
the subjectivity of experience. I am skeptical about this option, however, since
metaphysicians have been working on accounts of materialism, physicalism
and naturalism for a long time, which makes it seem unlikely that a totally
new account is forthcoming.
Second, the naturalist could come up with an alternative to methodolog-
ical naturalism, which remains close to the sympathies of the naturalist, but
which is not incompatible with the subjectivity of experience. In this chapter,
we considered three alternative approaches that in the end did not work, but
that does not mean that there is not yet another one that does work. is
seems a genuine option, though one concern is whether this alternative would
still be deserving of the name ‘naturalism’. However, both these options, and
maybe others, can be further researched. For now, naturalism is a fascinating
topic and for naturalists and non-naturalists alike it is very interesting to see
how the debate about it is going to develop, whichever direction it takes.

is dissertation concerns the question whether naturalism and the subjec-
tivity of experience are compatible. It is often assumed, as well as argued for,
that subjectivity is a problem for naturalism; it is nevertheless not clear what
the phenomenon of subjectivity is, or what the thesis of naturalism exactly
amounts to. I devote a large part of my dissertation to analyzing these notions
before concluding that the subjectivity of experience and the version of natu-
ralism that I have found to be tenable, methodological naturalism, are in fact
incompatible.
In the ﬁrst chapter, I analyze the notion ‘subjectivity’. I discuss a number
of deﬁnitions of the subjectivity of experience that are given in the literature,
and some further deﬁnitions suggested by the discussion of those. After giving
a list of ﬁve deﬁnitions of the concept ‘subjectivity’, I go on to argue that
experience is subjective in all these senses. I also argue that self-consciousness
and intentionality are subjective in the same ways.
Subjectivity is a problem for naturalism only if there are such things as
experiences. In the second chapter, I address the question if there are such
things. After considering arguments against it, I present a strong argument
for the conclusion that there are such things as experiences. is argument
is an adaptation of Van Inwagen’s argument for the existence of properties
which turns on Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment. I continue with
a discussion of eliminativism and behaviorism, which can be seen as replies to
this argument. I show that behaviorism and eliminativism facemany problems
and ought to be rejected. It follows that we are committed to the existence of
experience.
In the third chapter, I go on to clarify the concept of naturalism. I argue
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that ‘materialism’ and ‘physicalism’ are versions of naturalism, which can be
divided into two diﬀerent kinds: ‘metaphysical’ and ‘methodological’. ere
are a number of versions of metaphysical naturalism: ‘classical materialism’,
‘spatiotemporal materialism’, ‘causal materialism’ and ‘anti-supernaturalism’.
Since none of these versions of naturalism are tenable we have to reject meta-
physical naturalism. e question of this dissertation then becomes if the
subjectivity of experience is compatible with methodological naturalism.
In the fourth chapter, I go on to consider what methodological naturalism
is. After considering a number of possible deﬁnitions, I conclude that it is
best understood as the view that science tells us which things exist. Although
a number of problems can be raised against this form of naturalism, none of
them are fatal. Given the fact that the things that science tells us that exist are
public or intersubjectively available, it follows that methodological naturalism
is committed to an ontology of public and intersubjectively available entities.
Finally, armed with the analyses of these terms, the ﬁfth chapter addresses
themain question of this dissertation. I conclude that three of the ﬁve senses in
which experience is subjective are incompatible with methodological natural-
ism as we have deﬁned it. I then discuss objections the naturalist might have to
these arguments and conclude that they fail. I also consider three alternative
approaches, which could possibly avoid the problem; however, I show that
the methodological naturalist could not adopt these for a number of diﬀerent
reasons. I conclude that naturalism and the subjectivity of experience, at least
in some senses, are incompatible.
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Naturalisme en subjectiviteit
Een ﬁlosoﬁsche analyse
Er wordt vaak aangenomen, of explicitiet geargumenteerd, dat subjectiviteit
een probleem is voor naturalisme. Het is echter niet zo duidelijk wat het
fenomeen ‘subjectiviteit’ eigenlijk is en wat de theorie ‘naturalisme’ precies
behelst. Mijn proefschrift tracht een bijdrage te leveren aan dit debat, dat zich
afspeelt op het grensgebied van metafysica en ‘philosophy of mind’, door de
betreﬀende termen uitvoerig te analyseren alvorens de vraag te stellen of dit
fenomeen en deze theorie inderdaad onverenigbaar zijn.
In het eerste hoofdstuk bespreek ik het fenomeen ‘subjectiviteit’. Er wordt
vaak over het mentale leven, of ‘the mind’, gezegd dat het ‘subjectief ’ is. In
plaats van alle aspecten van het mentale leven te bespreken, richt ik mij in dit
hoofdstuk op één aspect, namelijk ‘ervaring’. De vraag die centraal staat in het
eerste hoofdstuk is: wat is de subjectiviteit van ervaring? Of, in andere woor-
den, wat betekent het om te zeggen dat ervaring subjectief is? Ik begin mijn
poging om deze term te verhelderen door te kijken naar Nagels beschrijving
van de subjectiviteit van ervaring in zijn artikel “What is it like to be a Bat?”
Dit artikel is een klassieker in het veld en wordt vrijwel altijd als uitgangspunt
genomen bij de bespreking van subjectiviteit. Uit Nagels artikel zijn twee deﬁ-
nities van de subjectiviteit van ervaring af te leiden: (S) Subjectivieit van erva-
ring =df. Ervaringen hebben fenomenaal karakter. En: (S) Subjectiviteit van
ervaring =df. Ervaringen zijn noodzakelijkerwijs verbonden met een bepaald
perspectief. Uit de daaropvolgende discussie over hoe we volgens Nagel de
term ‘bepaald perspectief ’ moeten uitleggen, kunnen nog twee deﬁnities van
subjectiviteit worden afgeleid: (S) Subjectiviteit van ervaring =df. Ervaringen
zijn privé. En: (S) Subjectiviteit van ervaring =df. Ervaringen kunnen alleen
gekend worden vanuit een eerste-persoonsperspectief.
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Na deze vier deﬁnities van de subjectiviteit van ervaring te hebben onder-
scheiden, besteed ik aandacht aan de overige literatuur over dit onderwerp om
te zien of er nog andere deﬁnities moeten worden toegevoegd aan deze inven-
tarisatie. Er blijkt nog één andere deﬁnitie van de subjectiviteit van ervaring
te zijn gegeven, namelijk: (S) Subjectiviteit van ervaring =df. Ervaringen zijn
altijd ervaringen van een subject. In de overige literatuur worden deﬁnities
gegeven die identiek zijn aan, of kunnen worden gereduceerd tot, een van
deze vijf deﬁnities. Het blijkt dus dat de subjectiviteit van ervaring op vijf
verschillende manieren geïnterpreteerd kan worden.
In het laatste deel van het eerste hoofdstuk onderzoek ik vervolgens of erva-
ring ook daadwerkelijk subjectief is in deze vijf betekenissen en ik concludeer
dat dat inderdaad het geval is. Ik bespreek vervolgens kort de vraag of andere
aspecten van het mentale leven, zoals zelfbewustzijn, intentionaliteit en se-
cundaire eigenschappen van objecten, subjectief zijn in dezelfde betekenissen
en ik kom tot de conclusie dat in ieder geval sommige mentale fenomenen
subjectief zijn in één of meerdere betekenissen van het woord.
In het tweede hoofdstuk komt de vraag aan bod of er wel zoiets is als
ervaring. Immers, als er geen ervaringen zijn dan kan de ‘subjectiviteit van
ervaring’ geen probleem zijn voor naturalisme. Ik begin dit hoofdstuk met de
bespreking van een aantal argumenten tegen het bestaan van ervaring, waarna
ik een argument presenteer voor het bestaan van ervaring dat gebaseerd is
op de metaontologie van Quine. Volgens Quine zijn we gecommitteerd tot
het bestaan van dingen waarover onze zinnen quantiﬁceren, als we tenminste
geloven dat deze zinnen waar zijn. In navolging van Van Inwagen, die deze
methode heeft gebruikt om aan te tonen dat er zulke dingen zijn als uni-
versalia, laat ik zien dat deze methodologie kan worden gebruikt om aan te
tonen dat er zulke dingen zijn als ervaringen. Ik sluit het hoofdstuk af met een
bespreking van twee theorieën die kunnen worden opgevat als objecties tegen
dit argument voor het bestaan van ervaringen: behaviorisme en eliminitivis-
me. Aangezien deze theorieën niet houdbaar blijken te zijn, zoals ik laat zien
in dit hoofdstuk, blijft het argument voor ervaring staan.
Het derde hoofdstuk markeert het begin van de analyse van de term
‘naturalisme’. De eerste sectie biedt een overzicht van het gebruik van deze
term aan de hand van een inventarisatie van in de literatuur gegeven deﬁnities
van materialisme, fysicalisme en naturalisme. Het blijkt dat er een belangrijk
onderscheid kan worden gemaakt tussen twee soorten deﬁnities: metafysische
deﬁnities aan de ene kant en methodologische deﬁnities aan de andere kant.
De termen ‘materialisme’, ‘fysicalisme’ en ‘naturalisme’ verwijzen niet per
deﬁnitie naar verschillende theorieën, maar er zijn varianten van materialis-
me, fysicalisme en naturalisme die metafysisch van aard zijn en varianten die
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methodologisch van aard zijn. Deﬁnities van materialisme die metafysisch
van aard zijn verschillen niet aanzienlijk van deﬁnities van fysicalisme die
metafysisch van aard zijn, maar ze verschillen wel substantieel van methodolo-
gische deﬁnities. Om deze reden laat ik de termen ‘materialisme’, ‘fysicalisme’
en ‘naturalisme’ vallen en spreek ik in het vervolg slechts over ‘methodolo-
gisch naturalisme’ en ‘metafysisch naturalisme’, waarbij deze termen ook de
methodologische respectievelijk metafysische varianten van materialisme en
fysicalisme insluiten.
In het vervolg van hoofdstuk  bespreek ik vier versies van metafy-
sisch naturalisme: (i) klassiek materialisme, (ii) spatio-temporeel materialis-
me, (iii) causaal materialisme, en (iv) anti-supernaturalisme. Alhoewel deze
theorieën elk op een bepaald moment populair zijn geweest, blijken ze, elk
om verschillende redenen, onhoudbaar te zijn. Dit betekent dat metafysisch
naturalisme in het algemeen niet houdbaar is en dat de vraag of het compatibel
is met de subjectiviteit van ervaring niet gesteld hoeft te worden.
In hoofdstuk  wend ik mij vervolgens tot een bespreking van methodo-
logisch naturalisme. Volgens methodologisch materialisme kunnen de din-
gen die bestaan niet worden gekarakteriseerd door een bepaalde metafysische
aard (zoals het geval is bij metafysisch naturalisme), maar moet een bepaalde
methodologie worden gebruikt om te bepalen uit welke elementen de ultie-
me realiteit is opgebouwd. De methode die hiervoor moet worden gebruikt
volgens methodologisch naturalisme is de wetenschap. Dat betekent dat de
wetenschap ons uiteindelijk zal vertellen welke dingen bestaan. Nadat ik heb
vastgesteld wat ‘methodologisch naturalisme’ betekent, moet de vraag gesteld
worden of het een houdbare theorie is. Zoals eeder aangetoond is metafysisch
naturalisme onhoudbaar, dus om naturalisme in het algemeen serieus te kun-
nen nemen zal het het methodologisch naturalisme beter moeten vergaan dan
het metafysisch naturalisme. Ik laat zien dat methodologisch naturalisme ook
een aantal problemen kent, waarvan Hempels dilemma het meest bedreigend
is, maar dat geen van deze problemen fataal is. Ik sluit het hoofdstuk af met
een bespreking van wetenschap, de wetenschappelijke methode en een van de
karakteristieke aspecten van wetenschap in het bijzonder, namelijk ‘objectivi-
teit’. Ik leg de objectiviteit van wetenschap uit als het idee dat wetenschappe-
lijke stellingen veriﬁeerbaar moeten zijn.
In het vijfde hoofdstuk wend ik mij uiteindelijk tot de vraag of de subjec-
tiviteit van ervaring, zoals gedeﬁnieerd in het eerste hoofdstuk, en methodolo-
gisch naturalisme, zoals beschreven in het vierde hoofdstuk, compatibel zijn.
Om dit te kunnen bepalen, bespreek ik elke deﬁnitie van de subjectiviteit van
ervaring afzonderlijk om vast te stellen of het in die interpretatie compatibel
is met naturalisme. Voor de eerste deﬁnitie van subjectiviteit (S) geldt dat
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het afhangt van (S) of (S) al dan niet compatibel is met naturalisme –
op zichzelf is het niet duidelijk of het feit dat ervaring fenomenaal karakter
heeft, (S), een probleem is voor naturalisme. Uit de bespreking van (S),
(S) en (S) blijkt dat subjectiviteit in deze interpretaties incompatibel is
met naturalisme. Als ervaring noodzakelijkerwijs verbonden is met een be-
paald perspectief, (S), privé is, (S), of alleen gekend kan worden vanuit een
eerste-persoonsperspectief, (S), dan betekent dat dat zinnen over ervaring
geen wetenschappelijke stellingen kunnen zijn. Wetenschappelijke stellingen
moeten immers veriﬁeerbaar zijn en kunnen dus geen betrekking hebben op
fenomenen die subjectief zijn in de betekenissen van (S), (S) en (S). Aan-
gezien de wetenschap ons alleen de waarheid en de volledige waarheid geeft,
althans volgens de methodologisch naturalist, kunnen er niet zulke dingen
zijn als ervaringen. Aangezien we in de eerste twee hoofdstukken hebben
vastgesteld dat ervaringen wel degelijk bestaan, moeten we concluderen dat
methodologisch naturalisme onwaar is.
Tot slot stel ik dat het afhangt van welke ontologie van personen men
aanhangt of subjectiviteit in de interpretatie van (S) compatibel is met natu-
ralisme.
Concluderend kan gesteld worden dat in ieder geval drie van de vijf deﬁ-
nities van de subjectiviteit van ervaring niet compatibel zijn met naturalisme.
Na het geven van mijn argumenten bespreek ik twee bekende objecties tegen
mijn conclusie van incompatibiliteit, Lycans objectie en de identiteitstheo-
rie, die ik beide voorzie van antwoord. Tot slot bespreek ik drie alternatieve
theorieën die niet al te ver van methodologisch naturalisme afstaan, maar die
wel compatibel zijn met subjectiviteit. Deze theorieën zouden een oplossing
kunnen bieden voor het probleem in kwestie, maar het is onwaarschijnlijk dat
de methodologisch naturalist deze alternatieven zou kunnen aanvaarden.
